If Turkey is forced to drastically up its military commitment to Libya to combat Egypt’s support (beyond the recently agreed bill to deploy troops to Libya), then Ankara may come to regret its rush to secure its maritime rights.

The signing of the deal between the two official governments of Turkey and Libya has had some immediate (albeit relatively muted) consequences. Coastguard forces loyal to Haftart stopped and searched a Caribbean-flagged vessel that was carrying an illicit cargo of small arms and briefly detained some Turkish crew. Both countries have announced investigations into the shipment, but with independent infor-mation in short supply the fog of war has settled on Libya, offering impunity to both local and foreign ac-tors. With another power like Turkey in the mix, Libya looks no closer to peace in the post-Qaddafi era.

Russia’s deepening involvement in Libya’s ongoing civil war, supporting Field Marshal Khalifa Belqasim Haftar and his Libyan National Army (LNA) that is waging an offensive against the United Nations-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj, have been exposed in recent reports.

With a distinct culture from the country’s Arab majority, the culture and identity of the Amazighs has undergone a history of repression, particularly under the rule of Gaddafi, who saw them as a separatist threat to his crafting of the narrative of Arab unification in the region.

French President Emanuel Macron has played a double game by declaring support for the GNA while aiding Haftar behind closed doors. Although Paris has never formally admitted to backing the general, it has provided political cover, weapons, training, intelligence and special forces assistance.

Even Italy, which has clashed with France’s position in Libya, hasn’t opposed Haftar’s manoeuvres. Rome instead appears to be pivoting towards Haftar to safeguard its oil and gas interests and prevent migration to Italy.

It’s mainly in the south that Italy and France are competing. Both countries have tried to separately broker an end to tribal fighting while coopting militias to secure their interests. Yet the lack of coordination between France and Italy has exacerbated local tensions.

Many failed to realize that Haftar amassed a large base of support among former members of the Libyan army who had fought against Gadafi in 2011 and who felt threatened as the Islamists began to “purify” the state of elements of the “old regime.” Haftar portrayed himself as Libya’s saviour (“Libya’s Sisi”) from Islamist organizations spreading chaos.

As Italy pressures Tripoli to address the latter’s interests, France is coveting Haftar. The ambitions of both European countries have effectively undermined UN Special Envoy to Libya Ghassan Salame’s action plan for the country. The plan was designed to amend the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) as well as hold a national conference to bring together all of Libya’s key stakeholders. The next steps were supposed to include a constitutional draft and referendum, paving the way for parliamentary and presidential elections.

“The fact that the conditions agreed upon by Haftar to handover oil ports to the legitimate NOC were not met, such as economic reforms, Libya’s central banks’ unification and salaries for the LNA, foretells that the Libya oil crescent will remain an area that will be the theatre of more conflict.”