As things stand today, any Iranian move in the Strait of Hormuz that can be portrayed as a threat to the “free flow of commerce” (that is, the oil trade) represents the most likely trigger for direct U.S. military action. Yes, Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and its support for radical Shiite movements throughout the Middle East will be cited as evidence of its leadership’s malevolence, but its true threat will be to American dominance of the oil lanes, a danger Washington will treat as the offense of all offenses to be overcome at any cost.

The ICC may be the only institution capable of breaking the current impasse by threatening to bring Europe’s leaders to criminal account. This is the work of last resort for which international criminal law is designed. The ICC should embrace the progressive ideals that drove its construction, and engage.

In short though, it is evident that Russia exerts more influence on the whole in our region than Iran, whose role as a broker of reconciliations would have been rejected by most of the people in the south, who are suspicious of what they see as Iranian attempts to spread the Shi’i religion and its political ideology.

US sanctions will not only affect Tur­key’s economy negatively but also provide a scape­goat (United States and NATO) for the Turkish economic crisis. Such a situa­tion may cause an irreparable rise in anti-West­ern sentiment among the Turkish people. Public opposition in Turkey may bring lim­itations to future collaboration – even those based on mutual interest – between Ankara and other NATO allies.

The difficult relationship with Kurds and the HDP is embedded in this context. As long as the CHP does not resolve this dilemma and does not replace its ideological-authoritarian canon of values with a liberal understanding of the state, nation and protection of minorities, a substantial contribution to the democratization of the country and to the solution of the Kurdish conflict cannot be expected. As a result, selective cooperation with the HDP can be expected with regard to the HDP as well. The elites of the party are still faced with the ongoing challenge of overcoming the historically developed ideological fundament of the CHP and putting it on a genuine social democratic agenda, as it partly understands itself.

Morsi’s death provoked an outpouring of mourning in Egypt and in countries where the Brotherhood still has a presence, such as Turkey, Qatar and the UK. While much of Egypt looks ready to move on – particularly with many Egyptians focused on the African Cup of Nations which Egypt is hosting – it appears many of the Brotherhood’s supporters had still hoped that Morsi might have one day returned as president.

The failure of the international community – including the African Union – to solve the Darfur crisis in the first place allowed the Janjaweed militia to rise to the national political stage. It’s enough to create despair.

Ultimately, the state hopes that fan-instigated stadium riots will not occur during the Afcon. While the ongoing clampdowns may make the state feel that this problem has been nipped in the bud, there are uncertainties. Hopefully, for the Confederation and Egypt, the Afcon will be all about football and not about ultras or social problems that inspire the protests.

It says quite something about the state of world affairs today that standing up to these twin threats is something that is now strongly pursued among AK Party grandees in Turkey, while there is still deafening silence among the Republicans in the United States.

The challenges presented by events unfolding in Sudan provide a great opportunity for the AU to refine and consolidate its approach to supporting countries in crisis. This is particularly true when the situation involves constitutional reform.