How Libya Failed to Rebuild the State while Prolonging Divisions

Author: Khaled Mahmoud
Edited by: Erik Prins

Amid rising political and military divisions, the ousting of the governor of the Central Bank of Libya (CBL) Saddek Elkaber in August 2024 led to a temporary halt in oil production, a lifeline of the economy. Despite the appointment of a new governor a month later, uncertainties remain over disagreements on how to handle Libya’s oil revenues through the CBL.

This chaos and sustained insecurity are part of the political disorder and the absence of a unified state. Late 2023, a natural disaster struck the country, the aftermath of which reflected this disunity.

Meanwhile, the situation on the ground suggests that fighting could erupt at any moment in Tripoli between rival armed militias and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA), who seeks control of the city and make an end to the chaos.

In 2022, Libya remained trapped in the same confusion and turmoil it had experienced since the fall of late Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime during the 2011 NATO-backed popular uprising.

Abdul Hamid al-Dbeibeh, head of the Government of National Unity (GNU), strengthened his hold over Tripoli and the western region, despite efforts by the House of Representatives (HoR), based in Tobruk, to remove him from power.

Meanwhile, the HoR placed its hopes on Fathi Bashagha, known as “the tyre-man” among Libyans, and appointed him as prime minister of the rival Government of National Stability (GNS) in February 2022. Bashagha was a former member of the Misrata Military Council, which rose to prominence during the conflict against Gaddafi.

Bashagha presented himself as a veteran politician, having previously served as minister of Interior in the Government of National Accord (GNA) led by Fayez al-Sarraj. He resisted Sarraj’s attempts to remove him and aimed to convince the public of his seriousness in dismantling the militias controlling Tripoli. Bashaga’s promises were never realised.

Bashagha, whose family is of Turkish origin and, like Dbeibah, hails from Misrata, shifted from fighting Haftar’s forces in their failed 2019 attempt to liberate Tripoli to allying with him.

Bashagha believed that Haftar’s backing would enable him to seize power, not as a minister but as the head of government.

After being appointed by the HoR, which had stripped Dbeibah’s government of its powers due to delays in holding the 2021 presidential and parliamentary elections, Bashagha planned his entry into Tripoli.

He aimed to prove to the international community that whoever controls the capital is the most powerful. Bashagha infiltrated the city, relying on the loyalty of the Nawasi Brigade. He claimed to have entered the Brigade-guarded gates of Tripoli, in civilian cars without any incidents and without guards.

Prime minister Bashaga, now a rival to Dbeibah based in Tripoli, attempted to win over the militias that Dbeibah depended on to maintain his government. He reached an agreement that he thought could pave the way for his entry into Tripoli.

The Nawasi Brigade (the Eighth Force) announced the entry of Bashagha’s government into Tripoli, but violent clashes soon followed with forces loyal to Dbeibah’s GNU.

Despite Nawasi Brigade’s defection to the rival prime minister, Dbeibah retained the loyalty of other armed factions, allowing him to thwart the infiltration of Tripoli.

After around seventeen hours in the city, Bashagha was forced to leave, sneaking out with his aides and a small force of militants, claiming that he wanted to “prevent bloodshed.”

Dbeibah quickly reaffirmed his authority by visiting the sites of clashes, describing Bashaga’s infiltration as an “outlaw armed group sneaking in under cover of darkness to spread fear and chaos.” He praised the security forces for “handling the situation with professionalism.”

After the military confrontation ended, Bashagha lost favour with Haftar and the HoR, who realised he was not the right man for the job. They realised that depending on him to control Tripoli was just as unrealistic as Haftar’s failed 2019 war.

The Tobruk-based parliament abandoned Bashagha following his failure and called for his investigation, effectively ending his political career as quickly as it had started.

Bashagha “the tyre-man,” who once proudly spoke of his expertise in the car tyre trade, became another victim of Haftar’s relentless ambition to control Tripoli.

Haftar, who remains in good shape despite his age, understands that staying in his base in al-Rajma near Benghazi is not enough to fulfil his dream of making history by becoming Libya’s president.

In his political and military moves, Haftar misjudged both Dbeibah, head of the GNU, and Mohamed al-Menfi, head of the Presidential Council. Both were brought to power in October 2020 by a UN-backed agreement following the ceasefire in Tripoli.

The end of the war in 2020 had marked the start of a new phase, where the UN mission briefly regained control, overseeing the political and military situation through a troika composed of Dbeibah’s government and al-Menfi’s Presidential Council.

This new leadership seemed to be made up of men who had suddenly been thrust into power like footballers charging forward to score.

Neither al-Menfi nor Dbeibah were widely known before being selected in Geneva by a 75 member strong UN-appointed committee during the political dialogue.

Despite concerns of bribery and financial corruption surrounding the Geneva process, Haftar and his ally Aguila Saleh, the speaker of the HoR, in the presence of al-Menfi and Dbeibah reluctantly accepted the fait accompli imposed by the Geneva dialogue.

As a result, Haftar, a veteran military leader, found himself saluting the civilian Mohammed al-Menfi, who had never served in the military, but now served as the new supreme commander of the Libyan army.

Egypt advised Haftar and Saleh not to oppose the new authority.

Haftar met al-Menfi once, but it was not a positive experience, and they never met again. Dbeibah also distanced himself from Haftar and refused to meet him, even though he took the oath before the HoR as head of the new government in March 2021, until that brief cooperation soon ended.

By the end of 2022, Dbeibah still controlled Tripoli as the head of the internationally recognised government (GNU), while Bashagha’s weak parallel government, the GNS, only operated in areas controlled by Haftar’s forces in the east and south.

Throughout 2022, many oil fields and ports were shut down due to local conflicts and pressure by armed groups, severely affecting oil exports, the backbone of Libya’s economy.

By 2023, the Libyan crisis had entered a phase of stagnation and failure.

In May, Bashaga was replaced by Osama Hammad, a bureaucrat with no political ambitions, Hamad followed Haftar and Saleh’s directives, as reflected in his public statements.

Dbeibah and Hammad symbolised the dual power structure that has plagued Libya’s institutions, with two rival authorities constantly disputing legitimacy, to no avail.

Storm Daniel, which struck the eastern cities and caused the worst disaster in Libya’s history, was not enough to push the political players to negotiate and resolve their differences.

On September 9, the people of Derna woke up to a disaster. The torrent coming from the Derna Valley swept away neighbourhoods along its banks and caused great destruction in the city centre.

Eyewitnesses spoke of an indescribable event, saying they heard an explosion late at night, followed by a second one about fifteen minutes later. Minutes after that, floodwaters rushed through the centre of the city, destroying everything in their path.

Martin Griffiths, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, stated that “climate and capacity have collided to cause this terrible, terrible tragedy.” Meanwhile, the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization, Professor Petteri Taalas, shed light on the situation in Libya by saying: “The tragedy in Libya highlights the devastating and cascading consequences of extreme weather on fragile states.”

The struggle for power between the rival GNU and GNS, along with the lack of central authority, shaped the entire disaster. Ordinary Libyans paid the price for the failure of their political leaders.

The storm caused catastrophic flooding, with 4,333 people confirmed dead and about 8,540 missing, including 930 migrant workers. Many of these workers lived in the hardest-hit areas of Derna, suggesting that the real death toll is likely higher than reported.

Unlike the divided political leaderships competing for power, Libyans responded in unity and answered the call for relief in the affected areas. In this way, the floods seemed to dissolve the divisions between them.

However, this disaster was not an isolated incident. After nearly a decade of chaos and conflict, the political fragmentation in the country had already severely weakened the infrastructure and worn down state institutions.

The existence of about 140 government institutions, split between the east and west, aggravated the situation. While Libya had never faced a disaster of such magnitude before, the political divisions further complicated both the response and relief efforts, hampering a unified and effective recovery.

Wolfram Lacher, a Libya specialist at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), noted that the government in the east, the GNS, was weak and lacked the mechanisms to respond to the disaster. Meanwhile, the UN-supported government in Tripoli had no authority in the east due to political divisions.

The disaster failed to unite the rival powers, even when it came to reconstruction efforts. The GNS called for an international conference to oversee the rebuilding of Derna and other areas devastated by Storm Daniel. Meanwhile, the GNU, confident that local resources were enough, officially sought assistance from the World Bank to manage the reconstruction funds for the affected regions.

The situation became worse when the High Council of State (a consultative body based in Tripoli) refused to approve a budget for storm recovery, citing national security concerns.

The head of the UN mission at the time, Abdoulaye Bathily, saw his appeals for an end to the chaos go unanswered. He expressed concern about conflicting initiatives from various Libyan factions for the reconstruction of Derna and other affected areas.

However, no one heeded his repeated warnings that these unilateral efforts would backfire, further deepening the divisions within the country, obstructing reconstruction, and going against public opinion.

Amid the complexities surrounding reconstruction and compensation, the authorities have ignored both local and international calls for an independent investigation into the failures in managing the disaster, with no effective international mechanism in place to pursue such inquiries.

Amnesty International highlighted that the two rival authorities mishandled the response, failing to investigate the responsibilities of those in power to protect the people’s rights to life, health, and other human rights, as part of criminal investigations into the disaster.

Bathily realised his efforts to engage the main parties in a new political dialogue had failed, and he resigned abruptly, leaving the UN mission in disarray once again.

Since 2011, the Libyan conflict has had an astronomical cost, affecting every part of the economy. Growth has not only slowed but has become highly volatile.

Mouin Kikhia, chairman of the Libyan Democratic Institute, believes this is the moment to stop foreign interference, suggesting that now is the time for outsiders to step back from imposing their directives.

Hopes for Egyptian-Turkish mediation, following nearly a decade of diplomatic crisis, had once offered a glimmer of optimism for resolving disputes in Libya. However, this hope has since faded.

The core issue preventing elections in Libya is that those who currently hold wealth and power through their theoretically temporary positions have no incentive to negotiate their exits or subject their positions to the risks of an electoral process.

The disparity between the West and the East of the country exacerbates internal instability and raises the risk of regional conflict in the Mediterranean.

Libya’s political deadlock deepened when Central Bank Governor Saddek Elkaber clashed with the GNU over government spending. This conflict escalated when Mohamed al-Menfi, head of the Presidential Council, who had seldom involved himself directly in Libya’s internal crisis, unexpectedly dismissed Elkaber in August 2024.

Both the Tobruk-based parliament and Haftar’s forces in the east opposed the move. The dispute led to a halt in oil production, affecting global oil prices and threatening to escalate into the worst crisis in years.

International diplomatic efforts have centred on preserving the independence and integrity of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) and the Central Bank. However, this has become increasingly uncertain after the dismissal of the NOC chairman in 2022 and the crisis over control of the Central Bank.

After mediation by the UN mission, both governments in the west and in the east reached an agreement to appoint Naji Muhammad Issa Belqassim as new governor to the bank. Despite the fact that oil production was restarted ever since, many challenges remain over the handling of oil reserves in the divided country.

Despite Libya’s substantial oil reserves, the economy remains in dire straits. Internal conflicts have led to frequent closures of oil fields and ports, reducing production and government revenue, which has further weakened the economy.

Khalifa Haftar, over time, allowed his sons to rise within politics and media, tightening their grip on eastern Libya. This raised questions about whether he was preparing them to rule, perhaps ahead of his departure from military life.

It appeared Haftar was positioning his six sons in strategic political and military roles until the family clearly controlled much of the social and economic fields in the east.

His sons now hold key military and civil positions: al-Siddiq, the eldest, is his confidant, first assistant, and personal envoy; Major General Saddam commands the ground forces; Brigadier General Khaled leads the security units, and Belqasim oversees the Development and Reconstruction Fund.

Al-Siddiq did not hide his political ambitions, declaring his readiness to run in the presidential elections, even though he knows elections cannot happen without improvement of security and a new government.

Al-Siddiq, now 43, has no military duties but has built his public image on social media, as speculation grows about his father’s intention to run for president.

Saddam and Belqasim hold US citizenship, having been born in Virginia, where Haftar sought asylum during Gaddafi’s rule.

Stephanie Williams, a former UN mission official, believes Haftar’s sons are competing for succession. She noted that the general consensus is that Saddam, Haftar’s military heir, recently promoted to two-star general, is expected to take control of the army.

While Haftar’s departure could cause unrest in eastern Libya, Williams suggests that passing the leadership to the next generation may go relatively smoothly.

Mohamed al-Barghathi, a former Libyan minister of Defence, believes that most major countries follow the principle of seniority and hierarchy in military service. He warns that disputes could arise from dissatisfied military personnel if Haftar’s sons are granted ranks without following the above principle.

A UN expert report highlighted that Saddam’s control over the main military units, financial resources, institutions, and political bodies has reached unprecedented levels.

Though Saddam, 32, is seen as his father’s likely successor, some doubt that this transition is certain.

The recent floods that devastated Derna provided Saddam with an opportunity to step into the spotlight by leading relief and disaster management efforts.

Italian media reported this as a display of power by Saddam and his brother Khaled. Meanwhile, numerous meetings between US embassy officials and Haftar’s sons have raised questions about the purpose of these interactions, the importance of rapprochement with Washington, and its connection to countering Russian influence.

Despite these meetings, it is believed that the US officials’ visits are part of Washington’s strategy to safeguard its interests, particularly amid Russian expansion, and are unrelated to finding solutions to Libya’s political crisis.