Nikolaos van Dam outlines his vision for post-war Syria

Interview of Elie Hajj with Nikolaos van Dam

1. As an expert on Syrian affairs, Your Excellency, do you believe Syria is now at the beginning of the end of the crisis, or is it facing a new, albeit different, phase of the conflict?

For any Syrian government—whatever its colour, composition, or good intentions, whether Islamist, secular, dictatorial, or democratic—it will be extremely difficult to make Syria rise from the ashes of a war that lasted for over thirteen years. Looking at Syria’s present situation, we cannot yet say that the conflicts between the various Syrian parties involved—military, civilian, ethnic, or sectarian—are over, if only because the central government in Damascus has not yet gained full control over the entire Syrian territory and because fundamental solutions to various issues have yet to be found.

For instance, the controversy with the Kurdish-dominated PYD/YPG, which controls parts of northern Syria, is still unresolved—along with the question of Syria’s future political structure: centralised or decentralised, authoritarian or democratic (or something in between?). Another issue is the position of religious minorities such as the Alawites and Druze. In the aftermath of transitional president Ahmad al-Sharaa’s assumption of power, several bloody sectarian atrocities were carried out, notably against members of these two communities. The new regime has yet to win their trust.

Will the new Syrian state be secular, or will it be dominated by Sunni Islamist forces and currents, tolerating but not fully respecting the equality of other religious groups? What will be Syria’s economic structure? And so on. Yes, Syria is at the beginning of the end of this crisis, but it is also confronted with tremendous new challenges, some of which may take decades to resolve, such as rebuilding the country, overcoming the traumas of millions of Syrians, and rebuilding mutual trust among citizens wherever possible. Even if all the funds and materials were available, there is still a shortage of manpower to carry out reconstruction in the foreseeable future. Rebuilding could take decades, and living in the rubble is not a recipe for stability. For returning refugees, there must also be sufficient means of subsistence in the form of employment and income—things that are, for the time being, hardly available.

2. Do you believe that the concessions shown by the new Syrian regime, in exchange for recognition from the United States and other Western and Arab states, are sufficient to ensure long-term stability?

I am convinced that the United States is primarily interested in its own strategic objectives in the region—alongside those of its main ally, Israel—rather than in the interests of the new Syrian regime or the Syrian people. If U.S. and Israeli interests happen to coincide with Syria’s, that will be acceptable for Washington and Tel Aviv; if not, their own priorities will prevail. The United States and Israel want stability in the region, but only on their terms and under their control. Such a formula cannot produce genuine stability, real peace, or healthy intra-regional relations—neither in the short term nor the long term.

Recognition of the new Syrian regime by the United States, other Western powers, and Arab states does not fundamentally alter this reality. That said, the Syrian authorities have taken certain steps—within the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 2254—that are also in their own national interest. However, any concessions that undermine Syria’s independence or territorial integrity, even if made to satisfy Western or Arab demands, will certainly not guarantee long-term stability.

If Western states were truly interested in giving Syria a fair chance to recover from the devastation of war, they would have immediately lifted all sanctions in their entirety.

3. Does this recognition reflect a shift in Western priorities towards ensuring regional stability?

By uncritically supporting Israel, various Western countries have not truly contributed to regional stability—let alone to justice. In principle, it should indeed be in the Western interest to promote stability in the region. Yet if history is any guide, Western policies have often had a destabilising rather than a stabilising effect. Western military interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and elsewhere—including those launched in the wake of the bloody so-called Arab Spring—are clear examples of this.

Ensuring regional stability is often proclaimed as a Western objective, but in practice it is pursued only insofar as it serves their own perceived political interests.

4. Considering the reports of a potential security agreement between Israel and the new Syrian regime, how might this affect the dynamics of the entire region?

If a new security arrangement between Syria and Israel were to lead to the full end of Israel’s occupation of Syrian territory, it would have a positive impact on the dynamics of the entire region. But if—as is to be expected—Israel continues to refuse to withdraw completely, the consequences of that occupation will remain negative.

With its overwhelming regional military superiority and full dominance, Israel does not require occupied Arab territories for its security. Genuine peace would bring Israel far greater security than endless occupation and military aggressiveness ever could. Nevertheless, Israel launched large-scale attacks on Syria’s military facilities after the deposition of al-Asad, and occupied even more Syrian territory, with the aim of further reshaping the strategic balance in its favour and rendering Syria, in effect, militarily toothless against it.

5. Do you believe this agreement would solve the issue of foreign military presence in Syria, or would it complicate it further?

I do not believe there will be any agreement between Israel and Syria in the foreseeable future, since both Israel and the United States are demanding a degree of political and military subservience to what they perceive as their own interests. Any form of foreign presence in Syria only serves to complicate matters further. A clear example is Israel’s recent interference in the Syrian Druze community in Jabal al-Arab, which illustrates how external actors seek to keep Syria divided along regional, ethnic, and sectarian lines.

6. Do you see the new regime in Syria as truly capable of unifying the country, or will the various factions and regions retain their own influence due to external interventions and sectarian resentments?

Putting the genie back into the bottle after so many years of chaos and violence is no easy task. Achieving domestic peace in Syria will require dismantling the country’s many militias, as well as addressing endemic corruption, extortion, intimidation, and other deeply rooted problems. The Ba’th regime never succeeded in reducing corruption during the past half century—partly because doing so would have risked undermining the loyalty of its own corrupt supporters. The current regime may well face a similar challenge.

The new authorities carry an enormous responsibility: they must convincingly demonstrate that their takeover of power was “worth” the staggering price paid by the Syrian people in the course of the revolution—more than half a million dead, a country in ruins, and over twelve million refugees—bearing in mind that the dead no longer have a voice in this matter.

For the new Syrian regime to be successful, it must win the confidence of Syria’s diverse factions and regions, as well as its ethnic and religious minorities.

Thus far, Syrian history has shown a recurring pattern of one dictatorship or authoritarian system being replaced by another. While Syria has almost exclusively experienced authoritarian rule throughout its long history, this does not mean there is no serious potential to build a more democratic society—there certainly is. To achieve this, however, sufficient military and civilian support is required from groups that genuinely desire, and are capable of sustaining, such a transition. So far, these groups have shown neither the ability nor have the extraordinary circumstances provided them with the opportunity to demonstrate such capacity.

The removal of a dictator or authoritarian ruler does not in itself guarantee a shift toward democracy; it can just as easily lead to the rise of another authoritarian figure.

Taking all this into account, the new Syrian regime should be given every opportunity—both internally and through external support—to overcome the immense challenges it faces and to guide the country, together with all Syrians, toward a better future. At present, there are hardly any other realistic alternatives available.

7. To what extent were you surprised by the manner in which the Bashar al-Assad regime fell?

It had long seemed inevitable that renewed resistance—or even a new revolution—against President Bashar al-Asad’s regime would eventually erupt, even if he had introduced extensive reforms. Yet when it actually happened on 27 November 2024, it still came as a complete surprise to me, as it did to many others.

Another unexpected development was that the overthrow of the Asad regime was not led by the opposition forces that had been supported from abroad for many years, but rather by the Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the successor of the radical Islamist Jabhat al-Nusra, Syria’s branch of al-Qa‘ida. HTS now presents itself as having transformed from a radical jihadist movement into a more pragmatic, moderate organisation—at least if the public statements of its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly known by his nom de guerre Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani), are to be taken at face value.

Whether the rank-and-file members of HTS—and the Turkey-backed factions of the Syrian National Army—share this purported moderation is another question altogether. The longer-term implications of a regime dominated by HTS remain uncertain. Winning the war, after all, does not automatically mean winning the peace.

In any case, every effort should be made to prevent a new war.

1 This interview was published earlier in Almodon.com on 26 September 2025.

©Fanack Water