Erdogan's interests are poised to interact, either positively or negatively, with those of other key players in the Horn of Africa.
Ali Noureddine
This article was translated from Arabic to English
In July 2024, the Turkish Parliament approved a memorandum from President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, authorizing the deployment of elements of Turkiye’s armed forces in Somalia, including within its territorial waters.
This decision followed an announcement from the Turkish Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, which declared the commencement of exploration and drilling operations for oil and gas in Somali marine waters, under a pre-existing economic cooperation agreement between the two nations.
This move marks a significant step in Erdogan’s strategy to expand Turkiye’s economic and military influence in the Horn of Africa. It has implications for the interests and strategies of other regional players such as Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar.
Moreover, Turkiye’s role as a supporting power to the Somali government, both militarily and economically, is likely to impact the future of the ongoing conflicts in Somalia, particularly with Ethiopia and the breakaway region of Somaliland.
The Intersection of Somali-Turkish Interests
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s interests have led him to seek closer ties with Ankara. Somalia boasts a long coastline of approximately 3,898 kilometers, making it the country with the second-longest coastline in Africa. This geographical advantage has expanded Somalia’s maritime exclusive economic zone to an area of 1 million square kilometers.
According to TGS estimates based on two-dimensional seismic surveys, Somalia’s offshore oil reserves could exceed 30 billion barrels. If developed, Somalia could rank sixth in the world for oil reserves. Additionally, this vast marine area has the potential to produce 1,440 tons of fish annually, sufficient for both local consumption and export.
However, Somalia has historically struggled to capitalize on these resources. The civil war of the 1990s led international oil companies to withdraw, and the fall of the military regime in 1991 resulted in the loss of crucial seismic survey data. Political instability has further hindered investment in the sector for many years.
Currently, the country remains a high-risk environment for foreign oil and gas companies. In the north, 800 kilometers of Somalia’s coastline are controlled by the self-declared Republic of Somaliland, which has been unrecognized internationally since 1991. The Puntland State, which declared autonomy in 1998, controls a third of Somalia’s total area, including regions rich in potential oil reserves.
The presence of the Al-Shabaab movement, aligned with Al-Qaeda, poses a significant challenge in the southern regions. Piracy and illegal fishing networks have proliferated in Somali waters, exacerbated by the central government’s weakness and inability to control these activities.
This situation has attracted external powers seeking their own interests in Somalia, often bypassing the central government. Ethiopia, for example, has sought a coastal front to facilitate its international trade. In January 2024, Ethiopia signed an agreement with Somaliland to develop a 20-kilometer coastal strip for use as a port and military base.
Amid this complex scenario, Somalia views Ankara as a crucial ally. Turkiye offers the military protection needed to counter external threats and possesses the expertise to invest in and secure oil and gas fields. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s long-standing interest in the Horn of Africa as an area of Turkish influence has made him a valuable partner for the Somali government.
Turkish Projects in the Horn of Africa Region
Since 2011, Turkish ambitions in the Horn of Africa have become increasingly clear. This trajectory began when Istanbul hosted a United Nations conference dedicated to addressing the drought crisis in Somalia.
During this period, Erdogan visited Somalia, initiating an international campaign to combat the threat of famine. Subsequently, the Turkish government mobilized its civil society organizations and Islamic associations to provide relief support in Mogadishu. Turkish Airlines also became the only airline linking Somalia to the world.
Over the years, Turkish aid to Somalia has surpassed $1 billion. Erdogan further cemented this relationship by establishing Turkiye’s largest embassy worldwide in Mogadishu. In 2017, Turkiye launched its largest military training base outside its borders, located south of Mogadishu, to assist the central Somali government in rebuilding its army. The Turkish military has since provided direct support to the Somali army, including the use of drones in battles against the Al-Shabaab movement.
Turkiye’s interest in Somalia is driven primarily by Erdogan’s focus on energy security, aiming to secure sustainable and affordable gas and oil supplies for Turkish industries. This aligns with Erdogan’s broader vision of making Turkiye a regional energy hub for Europe. Recent agreements for gas and oil exploration, as well as defense agreements for Turkish military deployment in Somali waters, are natural extensions of Turkiye’s long-standing ambitions in the Horn of Africa.
Additionally, Turkiye values Somalia’s strategic geographical location along key international trade routes in the Gulf of Aden. This strategic interest is evident in Turkiye’s acquisition of the right to manage and operate the port of Mogadishu since 2014, for a 20-year period. For Erdogan, a presence in the Horn of Africa ensures the security of Turkish industrial supply chains and guarantees maritime export routes.
Erdogan’s actions today echo the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, whose influence in the region dates back to the 14th century. The Ottomans recognized the Horn of Africa’s significance for maritime trade, supporting the Adal Sultanate in Somalia against Portuguese colonialism in the Red Sea corridors. Thus, Turkiye’s current engagement in Somalia not only has practical economic and security motivations but also carries symbolic and historical significance, reflecting Turkiye’s aspiration to reassert itself as a major international power.
Other Players and Competitors
Erdogan’s interests are poised to interact, either positively or negatively, with those of other key players in the Horn of Africa. For instance, the United Arab Emirates has forged close political ties with the Ethiopian government.
Since 2021, Abu Dhabi has played a role in supplying arms to the Ethiopian regular army in its fight against armed rebel groups. This alliance is also reflected in the partnership agreement between the UAE and the Somaliland government, which Ethiopia supports, to expand and develop the port of Berbera. Additionally, Abu Dhabi has established a military base near the port to train and equip the Somaliland army.
Given these developments, it is evident that Abu Dhabi’s interests conflict with Ankara’s. Turkiye currently supports the Somali government’s sovereignty and does not recognize Somaliland’s independence or its agreements with Ethiopia. Ankara’s potential energy activities, such as exploring for gas and oil in areas controlled by the separatist region, will likely clash with Somaliland and Ethiopian interests.
Conversely, Turkiye’s approach in the Horn of Africa aligns with Egyptian foreign policy. Egypt has been supporting the Somali government for years to counter Ethiopian ambitions in the region, largely due to disputes over the Nile River following Ethiopia’s construction of the Renaissance Dam. In July 2024, the Somali government approved a defense agreement with Egypt to assist in training and equipping the Somali army.
Similarly, Qatari and Turkish foreign policies are expected to converge regarding Somalia. Qatar is a significant supporter of the Somali government, providing aid for education, development, infrastructure rehabilitation, and the reconstruction of public facilities and institutions. Qatari organizations are also active in addressing crises such as droughts, floods and other climate change impacts in Somalia.
As a result, Somalia will likely strengthen its position in addressing issues related to Somaliland and Puntland. Somali sovereignty over maritime waters in these areas has become intertwined with Turkish interests and military presence. Joint defense cooperation with Turkiye will bolster Somalia’s regular forces against Al-Shabaab. However, it remains to be seen how forthcoming trade agreements concerning oil and gas will ensure Somalia’s economic rights.