The future of the Palestinian Authority (PA) is increasingly uncertain as it faces mounting challenges from both internal and external forces.
Ali Noureddine
This article was translated from Arabic to English
Since the onset of the war in the Gaza Strip, the Palestinian Authority (PA), led by Mahmoud Abbas, has faced mounting challenges that raise serious concerns about its future and its capacity to function effectively. Israel‘s increasingly harsh actions have undermined the Palestinian state project, extinguishing hopes for a revived negotiation process and diminishing the PA’s political significance in the near term.
Meanwhile, key regional and international stakeholders involved in Palestinian affairs are beginning to question the effectiveness of the PA and its ability to carry out its official responsibilities.
Domestically, the situation is similarly bleak. The PA has been unable to exert meaningful influence, either politically or diplomatically, to curb the violence in Gaza.
Moreover, it has failed to secure broad consensus among Palestinian factions to establish common objectives for Gaza’s future post-conflict. The Palestinian Authority is now widely regarded as a marginal player, constrained to a limited role largely defined by the space Israel allows it in the civil administration of the West Bank.
New Israeli Challenges During the War
In July 2024, amid the ongoing Israeli war on Gaza, the Israeli Knesset made an unprecedented move by passing a resolution rejecting the establishment of a Palestinian state. This resolution garnered support from 68 members, including opposition figures from the “National Camp” party, alongside right-wing members aligned with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government.
In contrast, only nine members from the Arab and left-wing blocs opposed the measure. This vote reflects a broader strategic direction in Israel, transcending temporary political divides.
The significance of this event cannot be fully understood without considering its political context and timing. The decision was made just days ahead of Israeli Netanyahu’s visit to Washington, signalling a clear attempt to strengthen his negotiating position against U.S. pressure to advance the two-state solution. By passing this resolution, the Knesset aimed to set a hard limit on Netanyahu’s concessions, preventing him from yielding to any U.S. demands or making compromises with the Palestinian Authority.
This step continues a series of actions by Israel designed to quash any possibility of the PA evolving into a sovereign state. In June 2024, the Israeli Security Cabinet revoked key executive powers previously granted to the PA in significant portions of the West Bank, including areas east of Bethlehem and southeast of Jerusalem. Additionally, Israeli law was extended to areas that were nominally under Palestinian administrative control.
During the same period, the Israeli Supreme Planning Council approved plans for the construction of 5,300 settlement housing units in the West Bank, in strategically chosen areas that facilitate further fragmentation of Palestinian communities. Simultaneously, Israel seized 12.7 square kilometres of land in the Jordan Valley, designating it as “state land,” marking the largest confiscation of private Palestinian property since the establishment of the PA.
These actions were coupled with an intensification of the Israeli siege imposed on West Bank cities and villages in place since the beginning of the war in October 2023. The siege has halted economic activities by barring Palestinian workers from leaving their towns. Military raids across the West Bank have resulted in the deaths of more than 700 Palestinians by mid-September 2024.
In essence, Israel has used the war to reshape the security and political landscape in the West Bank, systematically dismantling the two-state solution and fostering conditions that may force demographic shifts, pushing Palestinians to migrate. These developments have eroded the foundation upon which the PA was created, originally envisioned as the seed of a future Palestinian state.
As a result, many Palestinians have lost faith in the Oslo Accords, which laid the groundwork for the Palestinian Authority’s establishment.
The Pressing Regional and International Reality
In addition to facing Israeli pressures, the Palestinian Authority is navigating a highly complex regional and international landscape. The United States, once a staunch supporter of the two-state solution, has come to view Abbas’s leadership as weak and unreliable since the outbreak of the war.
In March 2024, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken publicly expressed that the Biden administration was no longer convinced by the internal reform efforts of the PA.
The U.S. government is now pushing for a fundamental overhaul of the PA’s governance model. Blinken indicated that Washington wants to see executive powers transferred to a “more representative” government, rather than concentrated solely in the hands of Abbas. This would involve appointing a popular and independent prime minister, moving away from the current structure where the prime minister operates as part of Abbas’s inner circle.
In practical terms, the U.S. position is rooted in a pragmatic view of governance. The concentration of power within Abbas’s leadership, combined with the inefficiency of other civil administrations, has severely undermined the PA’s effectiveness, leading to a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the Palestinian public. The dominance of the Fatah movement over the PA has only deepened the crisis.
As a result, the U.S. has now shifted to demanding significant restructuring within the Palestinian Authority before considering any new political engagement.
Abbas’s concerns, however, extend beyond these immediate demands. He is also deeply anxious about the potential return of former U.S. President Donald Trump to office, which could lead to the abandonment of the two-state solution based on the 1967 borders.
Trump’s 2020 peace plan, which was supported by Netanyahu, called for continued Israeli control over large parts of the West Bank and the legalization of existing settlements, effectively nullifying the PA’s hopes for statehood and undermining its very reason for being.
At the same time, the PA and Fatah are increasingly wary of certain Arab nations exploring alternative Palestinian governance options. The United Arab Emirates, for instance, has shifted its support away from the PA in recent years, backing Fatah dissident Mohammed Dahlan. The UAE is positioning Dahlan to play a role in managing the Gaza Strip post-war, using Emirati aid as leverage.
Meanwhile, the Tehran-backed axis has strengthened its alliance with Hamas during the current war, following a period of reconciliation between the two. After years of strained relations stemming from the Syrian civil war, Hamas has overcome the disruptions that had affected this relationship since the beginning of the Syrian revolution in 2011, which puts further pressure on the PA.
Hamas is seen by many as a viable alternative to the PA’s political model in both Gaza and the West Bank, further complicating the Authority’s future.
Loss of Domestic Role
Due to the factors outlined above, the Palestinian Authority has been unable to play a meaningful role in influencing the course of the war. This outcome continues a trend that has persisted since the collapse of the peace process and the Oslo Accords, which effectively reduced the PA to a civil administration and a mechanism for security coordination, rather than advancing it as a project for Palestinian statehood.
As a result, many Palestinians now view the PA as operating within the confines set by the Israeli occupation, even if unintentionally, rather than acting as part of the Palestinian national liberation movement.
Polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Survey Studies reveal a deep-seated disillusionment: 84 per cent of Palestinians favor Abbas’s resignation, and 65 per cent believe the PA has become a burden on the Palestinian people.
Moreover, 73 per cent of respondents reject U.S. or Arab-backed initiatives to reform the PA with the aim of resuming negotiations with Israel. This widespread opposition underscores the deep pessimism within the Palestinian public about the future of these proposed reforms.
In reality, even if the PA expressed a willingness to reform, as some plans suggest, it lacks the capacity to reclaim its once-envisioned role. The inefficiency of its civil administration and the ineffectiveness of its ministries stem not only from internal issues like corruption and weak governance but also from external factors, such as the constraints imposed by the Israeli occupation and the limited sovereign powers granted to the Palestinians.
Given these conditions, it is unrealistic to expect the PA to establish a viable state, even if it were genuinely committed to reform.
For these reasons, a growing consensus within Palestinian political and popular circles, including factions aligned with Fatah, is focused on revitalizing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO is seen as a more comprehensive and unified framework for representing Palestinian political factions and social groups.
Many believe that by broadening the organization’s scope and including all Palestinian factions, the PLO could resume its role as a liberation movement capable of pursuing or imposing political gains in the future. This approach is increasingly viewed as a more effective alternative to relying on the PA, whose role is limited by Israeli-imposed security arrangements and constraints.