Jordanian Defense Partnerships are poised to play a crucial role in Jordan’s defense strategy and its alliances with Western and Gulf partners.
Ali Noureddine
This article was translated from Arabic to English
In July 2024, during its summit held in Washington, NATO announced the opening of its first liaison office in the Arab region, located in Amman, the capital of Jordan.
The choice of Amman was attributed to Jordan’s status as a long-term and highly valuable partner for NATO, as noted by NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. The office aims to deepen the partnership between NATO and Jordan through political dialogue and practical cooperation.
Less than a month before this announcement, Jordan hosted the multinational “Eager Lion” military exercise, which included participants from 33 NATO member countries and global partners. The Jordanian army did not disclose the number of soldiers involved but confirmed that it was the largest exercise of its kind since the country began hosting such events 13 years ago.
The declared objective of these maneuvers was to foster a common understanding among the participating forces to address cross-border threats.
Deepening Jordan’s Defense Partnerships with the West
The two events underscore the proactive measures taken by Jordanian authorities to deepen defense partnerships with Western countries, particularly the United States. This trend aligns with Jordan’s longstanding political alliances with Gulf countries.
In April 2024, the Jordanian army collaborated with U.S., British and French forces to intercept dozens of drones launched by Tehran toward Israel, following an attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus. These operations were part of a security and intelligence coordination system overseen by the U.S., aimed at sharing information among “regional partners” and tracking Iranian drones and missiles before they could enter Israeli airspace. These efforts successfully intercepted most projectiles before they reached Israel’s borders.
In January 2024, drones launched by Iraqi armed groups allied with Tehran attacked the logistical support base at “Tower 22” in northern Jordan, resulting in the deaths of three American soldiers and injuries to dozens more. Initially, Jordan attempted to deny the attack occurred on its territory, claiming the base was within Syrian territory to avoid embarrassment and acknowledging the presence of significant, undeclared American military bases within Jordan.
However, satellite images soon revealed that the base was within a large American camp inside Jordan, comprising over 70 buildings. This camp is part of a joint monitoring and control system between the American and Jordanian armies, deployed on both sides of the Syrian-Jordanian border. The system is integrated with U.S.-supported Free Army sites in the Rukban camp on the Syrian side of the border.
These events highlighted the depth of the Jordanian-American defense partnership concerning the Syrian conflict. Consequently, the Jordanian government acknowledged that the presence of American forces is part of a cooperation agreement between the two countries, which includes enhancing training areas and upgrading technical and training border security systems.
The defense partnership between Jordan and the United States has been in preparation since 2021, when a defense cooperation agreement was signed. This agreement allows American military aircraft, vehicles and ships to enter Jordanian territory and waters without restrictions and grants American military personnel absolute legal immunity within Jordan.
As such, the agreement has since put the presence of American forces in Jordan within a legal framework, facilitating the expansion of security cooperation between the two nations, particularly following the outbreak of the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip.
Jordan’s Concerns
The approach taken by the Jordanian regime is linked to a number of concerns and political interests affected by recent regional developments. UNRWA estimates the number of Palestinian refugees registered in Jordan at more than 2 million, the largest number of Palestinian refugees in all UNRWA fields.
In addition to registered refugees, there are conflicting numbers and statistics about the number of Jordanians of Palestinian origin. Some official figures estimate the percentage of Palestinians in Jordan at about 42 per cent, while other unofficial estimates put this percentage at 65 per cent.
In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood has maintained an influential popular presence in Jordan, despite repeated defections leading to the multiplication of political facades and parties founded by the group’s members. Over the past decades, the monarchy in Jordan has tried to weaken organized political parties by adopting electoral systems that encourage tribal representation and fragment influential political blocs.
For these reasons, the Jordanian regime has had ample reasons to fear popular sympathy for the Hamas Movement, which adheres to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, after the outbreak of the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip. There was a concern that this sympathy could turn into political pressure opposing the regime, which maintained diplomatic and economic relations with Israel during the war. This fear was confirmed by popular demonstrations in front of the Israeli Embassy in Amman.
At the same time, the Jordanian regime has noted the recent rapprochement between the Hamas Movement and certain wings of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as groups allied with Iran in the region. This regional rapprochement is particularly sensitive and concerning for Jordan, which shares extensive desert borders with Iraq and Syria, where Tehran-supported armed groups are active.
Furthermore, Jordan’s unique geographical position places it at the heart of regional security balances. It is the only Arab country with direct borders with the West Bank, besieged by Israel. This makes Jordan a potential corridor for supplies to Palestinian resistance cells in the West Bank through the Jordan Valley, a prospect that the Jordanian regime fears could lead to the emergence of security cells on its territory with strong popular support.
These concerns underpin Jordan’s strict control of its northern borders, coordinated with American forces supervising the Free Army in southern Syria. The Jordanian army’s operations since October 2023 to control cross-border armed group activities underscore this strictness. The regime has framed arms smuggling operations to the West Bank as conspiracies targeting the kingdom’s stability by the Muslim Brotherhood and some of Iran’s allies.
Defense partnerships with Western countries thus reflect the Jordanian regime’s efforts to fortify its position amid regional and internal pressures, including the unpopularity of its stance on the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip.
Western and Gulf Interest in Jordan
Western nations and their Arab Gulf partners have compelling reasons to prioritize their defense and security partnership with Jordan.
Jordan’s strategic location, with long borders extending from the Red Sea in the south to the Golan Heights in the north, makes it a critical player in regional stability. Any loss of control over these borders by the Jordanian regime could escalate tensions, turning Jordan into another volatile front.
The Jordanian populace already demonstrates strong support for Palestinian resistance, and destabilization could facilitate arms smuggling into the West Bank, intensifying conflict in this heavily monitored area. This potential for increased volatility underscores the importance of Western countries maintaining a robust defense partnership with Jordan in the Middle East.
For Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Jordan represents the northern gateway to the Arabian Peninsula, marked by a long and challenging desert border. These Gulf nations view any unforeseen political upheaval in Jordan as a potential threat, reminiscent of the Houthi takeover of significant territories in Yemen.
Consequently, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have invested heavily in Jordan through financial aid, investments and military assistance, strengthening their strategic partnerships.
In response to these dynamics, Jordan has increasingly prioritized the security of its regime and the enhancement of its military capabilities in its regional and international partnerships. Simultaneously, Jordan’s Western and Arab allies have heightened their focus on its defense capabilities.
This mutual interest is part of the broader polarization shaping the regional political landscape since October 7, 2023. A significant development to watch is the role of the NATO liaison office in Amman, marking the first initiative of its kind in the region. This office is poised to play a crucial role in Jordan’s defense strategy and its alliances with Western and Gulf partners.