Occupation After Gaza Will Get Worse, but this is not Inevitable

By Erwin van Veen

One of the yet unanswered questions that hangs over the destruction of Gaza and its people is why the world watched a livestreamed genocide for about a year and a half without intervening. It was, after all, only around the summer of 2025 that international pushback and interventions cautiously started to counter Israeli and US designs. President Trump’s ‘peace plan’ is neither about peace nor it is much of a plan. It will not bring peace because it puts Israeli interests front and center. It is not much of a plan because it is vague and lacks clarity on the political end-state.

Leaving historical inquiry into the world’s inaction to later scholars for now, the more relevant questions are how the carnage in Gaza can be stopped and, especially, how it can be avoided that the entire occupation goes the way of Gaza with Palestinians in the West Bank ending up concentrated in cordoned-off urban centers that are ripe for destruction after the next ‘terrorist incident’.

To answer this question, I take stock of the main emergent international initiatives that aim to halt the genocide and revive the case for a Palestinian state; sketch four bleak scenarios for the future of occupation; and suggest how international action can be scaled up to prevent the scenarios from materializing.

Emergent initiatives to halt a genocide

The French/Saudi initiative at the United Nations is perhaps the primary strategic and long-term initiative of the moment to push back against Israeli annexationist designs. It intends to put a two-state approach firmly back on the international agenda. If it gathers sufficient support, it will bring the internationally accepted political boundaries of Israel’s state building project forcefully back into view. However, the initiative is taking shape slowly, almost after the possibility of two states co-existing has been eliminated given the Israeli destruction of Gaza and rapid annexation of the West Bank. Worse, it does so far not yet seem to come with the required pressure to bend Israel to its designs, even though the New York Declaration of 4 August 2025 opens the door to the possibility of sanctions. 

Linked to the previous point, there is also the recent British, Canadian, Australian and French recognition of the State of Palestine during the 80th session of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), together with a few smaller countries. Following a similar move by Spain, Ireland and Norway in May 2024, recognition signals that a number of Western countries are finally becoming more serious about the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people and belatedly recognize that non-recognition has handed Israel a stranglehold over the Palestinians since the Oslo Agreements. The problem here is that the Israeli government and parliament have made it crystal clear that a Palestinian state will only become a reality over their dead bodies. Hence, if the countries that just recognized the state of Palestine, or have done so in the past, wish to avoid exposure as ‘emperor without clothes’ they need to bring significant, material and costly pressure to bear on Israel in the near-term.

In addition, there are Spain, Ireland, Turkey and The Hague Group (THG) that have already attached some material consequences to Israel’s war crimes, such as an arms embargo and a prohibition on financial dealings by their public sector with the Israeli administration. There is moreover the European Commission’s proposal to belatedly suspend preferential tariffs on part of Israel’s exports of goods to the EU under the Association Agreement. 

Moreover, there is a long list of civil society initiatives to put pressure on governments unwilling to sanction Israel (e.g. large protests in the Netherlands, a major strike in Italy), expand the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions campaign (such as getting financial institutions to disinvest), isolate Israel internationally (e.g. the Eurovision song festival, the Vuelta in Spain, halting academic institutional cooperation) or provide direct aid to Palestinians in Gaza (the Sumud flotilla and convoy). 

Finally, there is President Trump’s peace plan that intends to turn Gaza into an international protectorate that doubles as a kind of Free Trade Zone without a clear prospect of a political end-state. On the upside, it may finally bring a welcome end to the gruesome violence that Israeli forces have wrought on the Palestinians of Gaza after Hamas its rampage on 7 October 2023. On the downside, it is a victor’s Diktat that has been heavily influenced by Israel and does not lay the ground work for durable co-existence as it offers Israel all manner of exits back to war. 

To some, these initiatives are remarkable turning points given the impunity with which Israel has long maintained occupation in the face of countless UN resolutions and court judgments. To others, these steps are too little and too late given conditions in killing ground Gaza. 

Explanations for the slow, hesitant and, at times, symbolic reaction of the international community are varied. Some will point to an unwillingness to incur the wrath of the US, which under President Trump has developed a newfound habit of linking issue areas. For instance, a country that sanctions Israel might see Washington impose punitive trade tariffs. Others will point to European colonial and WWII legacies, as well as Holocaust guilt (e.g. in Germany and the Netherlands). Yet others will cite variations of ‘promised land and end of times’ ideologies (some Christian Evangelists) or the global war on terror that has painted Muslims and Islam in a dark corner since 9/11. Additional factors are  the strength of Israeli propaganda networks, as well as the rise of the extreme right that views Israel’s quest for social homogeneity and safety as template for its own views on foreigners that are not white. 

Paint it black

The main problem is that all initiatives outlined above significantly lag Israeli policy designs and military actions, which are clear geared towards destroying Gaza and settling/annexing the West Bank in the near future. 

As a result of an historical unwillingness to hold Israel to account for war crimes and occupation in much of the Western and Arab worlds, and the slow as well as incomplete nature of present international initiatives as discussed above, scenarios for the future of occupation after Gaza are negative. This is simply a function of the analysis of the underlying factors. It will take a step change in the level of international intervention in the short-term to use the silver lining that current initiatives represent to turn the tide. I will briefly review four such scenarios before turning to what can be done: 

To start with, a scenario of ‘Revisionist Zionism comes true’ can come to pass (#1). Here, fast expansion of Israeli annexation of the West Bank meets only low levels of Palestinian resistance. Rapid annexation is brought about by greater spatial delineation between Israeli settlers and Palestinians; tighter regulation of Palestinian mobility, residence and work options; as well as both targeted and structural forms of violence to eliminate any militant Palestinian resistance and to pressure Palestinian residents to submit or leave. Israeli settlements expand swiftly, including in north Gaza. South Gaza effectively becomes a prisoner camp under high surveillance and in permanent humanitarian crisis. A successful judicial reform 2.0 in Israel removes even minimal legal constraints on governmental action. In this scenario, Palestinian resistance is low due to the slow recovery of Hamas’ armed capabilities in Gaza because of recurrent Israeli operations and tight border controls; low levels of Iranian support due to its focus on domestic protests, the succession of its supreme leader, and blows suffered by the axis of resistance/Iran itself; and Israeli disarmament of most of the Palestinian Authority’s security forces with US support via its office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC). In Israel itself, ultra-nationalist and extreme-right factions dominate politics. 

Next is the possibility of a ‘Gaza on the Jordan River’ scenario (#2). It features a similarly fast expansion of occupation, but runs into stiff Palestinian resistance instead. This is the result of the Palestinian Authority’s security apparatus successfully evading disarmament, going underground and forming the core of resistance cells throughout the West Bank together with Hamas armed elements. The latter enjoys a recovery in Gaza. Egypt and Jordan informally relax their border controls out of anger with Israeli destruction, enduring occupation and arrogance in its bilateral relations. Their actions reflect the belief that maintaining their own stability is more important to the US than toeing the line on Washington’s pro-Israel policies. In an act of subtle subversion of US and Israeli annexation policy, Gulf states like Qatar and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia provide undercover financial support to Egypt and Jordan to reduce their vulnerability to US financial pressure. Palestinian armed resistance is further buoyed by high levels of Iranian support as its domestic politics and economy stabilize in the wake of Khamenei’s succession.

Alternatively, a ‘colonial-style suffering’ scenario can arise (#3). In this case, Israel expands its occupation only gradually because its extremist political parties do not return to office after Prime Minister Netanyahu’s tenure comes to an end. As the judicial reform 2.0 initiative in Israel remains stalled or off the table, political power shifts back to the Israeli center-right that favors a more gradual approach to annexation. In this, it is assisted by a pliant Palestinian Authority that does not reform as President Abbas’ successor is cut from the same collaborative cloth as he is. The Palestinian Authority continues to act as auxiliary police force to the IDF and increasingly as a humanitarian safety net. Palestinian Authority security forces are neither disarmed nor do they rebel. Hamas fails to recover in the military sense as Israel keeps patrolling the borders of Gaza in strength. Iranian military support also remains low due to domestic protests and a deep economic crisis. Hence, gradual Israeli expansion meets only limited Palestinian resistance

Finally, there can be a ‘squid game’ scenario (#4). Here, occupation is gradual as in the ‘colonial-style suffering’ (scenario #3, above) but, in contrast, it meets serious resistance. That is because the succession of Abbas, revitalization of the PLO, international condemnation and modest Iranian support enable greater armed Palestinian resistance. The succession of Abbas by someone like Marwan Barghouti opens the door to incorporating Hamas and potentially Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the PLO to revive the organization. Using the Palestinian Authority as a front, the PLO becomes the center of civic and legal resistance against occupation, in addition to running a network of underground armed resistance cells manned by the Palestinian Authority’s security forces. The resistance operates from urban areas that are difficult for Israel to penetrate without massive collateral damage. While it is tempted to replicate its approach for dealing with Hamas in Gaza, more and more Israeli politicians and commanders face ICC arrest warrants in a context in which the ICJ has already rendered Israel’s occupation as unlawful and in which a genocide case hangs over Israel as the sword of Damocles. Even so, the Israeli government uses collective punishment, targeted assassinations and regular military operations to take out resistance cells and leaders. Nevertheless, Palestinian resistance stiffens and even stalwart supporters of Israel in the international community no longer accept the argument that it has a right to defend itself at all costs which, although never applicable under conditions of occupation, rings utterly hollow in the face of Israel’s own annexationist policies.

Why it is not inevitable: Short term and long term strategies

While the scenarios are all bleak, they are amenable to international intervention. In the short-term, only massive economic pressure or international military intervention can save Gaza from total destruction if it is not already too late. This is regardless of President Trump’s ‘peace plan’ and Hamas’ conditional acceptance of the plan because it changes little beyond an immediate cease fire that may be short lived as well. Both economic pressure and military intervention require international rhetoric and paper commitments to be translated swiftly into coordinated action that imposes serious economic, social and diplomatic cost on Israel. This is unlikely to happen with the requisite consensus, speed, forcefulness and courage if the recent past is any guide to the near future.  President Trump’s peace plan actually threw a spanner in these slow wheels of international action as it now allows everyone to sit back and wait. Nevertheless, concerted and material international action needs to remain the objective if the carnage is to be stopped in line with international obligations under the genocide convention. 

Next to an immediate arms embargo, a prohibition on investment and financial transactions, as well as full trade sanctions by a significant coalition of the willing based on the French/Saudi initiatives and The Hague Group, the deployment of UN-mandated military forces to Gaza should be authorized via the UN General Assembly via the Uniting for Peace procedure. Egypt can redeem itself for its absence in Gaza by facilitating deployment via the Rafah border crossing if Qatar and others commit to replace Israeli gas deliveries. 

In the long-term, an effective strategy to end occupation must prioritize ways to re-open discussions on achieving its lasting resolution as peacefully as possible, and less on immediate ‘solutions’. After all, direct imposition of a solution in line with international law, Palestinian self-determination and UN-mandated outcomes is difficult in the short- or medium-term given US support and Israeli military dominance. Such a strategy should be based on:

• Vastly increasing boycott-divestment-and-sanctions pressure on Israel by a mix of willing states, social movements and activists, sport, academic and financial institutions as well as businesses; 
• Long-term peacebuilding efforts via Israeli and Palestinian human rights NGO’s, as well as media, to reframe conflict as occupation and existential fears as possibilities for peaceful coexistence; 
• Rejuvenating the Palestinian leadership to harness the resilience, creativity and resources of the global Palestinian community after the ‘failures’ of the peace-through-violence approach of Hamas and the peace-through-collaboration methods of the Palestinian Authority; 
• Starting new diplomatic initiatives that enable a win-win by tying the end of occupation to normalization of relations across the Middle East and making peace with Iran to increase the size of the cake and generate the required parameters to ensure Israeli as well as Palestinian security and wellbeing.

At the moment, the odds favor a completion of Israeli and American designs that point to the destruction and Israeli resettlement of Gaza, and annexation of much of the West Bank. President Trump’s ‘peace plan’ seeks to give these designs international legitimacy, in addition to making a ceasefire possible. The long-term blowback of such moves might be substantial and it might not be. It is a dangerous gamble to take. Those countries that care about international human rights and law, their own moral standing, stability in the Middle East and the future of conflict must up their efforts now and maintain them for the next years if occupation is to be ended.

Erwin van Veen is a senior research fellow at Clingendael’s Conflict Research Unit where he leads a team that analyses the political economy of conflicts and crises in the Middle East. His own work examines the political use of armed groups in processes of state development and geopolitical conflict.