Amid the fallout from Israel’s war on Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, and as the U.S. pivots under a potential Trump administration, Qatar’s influence is set to grow.
Ali Noureddine
This article was translated from Arabic to English
Amid the fallout from Israel’s war on Lebanon and the Gaza Strip, and the potential impact of President-elect Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. elections, the Middle East is undergoing rapid political transformations.
Central to these developments is speculation about the balance of power that will shape the confrontation between Iran and the United States in the region, as well as the trajectory of the multiple conflicts spearheaded by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
These shifts have brought renewed attention to the role Qatar could play in the coming phase, alongside potential adjustments to its foreign policy. Qatar has long served as a key mediator in the region, facilitating negotiations between Iran and the United States on prisoner exchanges and the release of Tehran’s frozen funds.
Additionally, Doha has been instrumental in brokering hostage exchanges and cease-fire agreements between Israel and Hamas, while maintaining significant influence in Lebanon and Syria.
Trump’s Victory and the Future of U.S.-Qatari Ties
Trump’s nominations for key administration positions provide a clear indication of the direction his Middle East policy is likely to take. Among these, the nomination of Chris Wright as Secretary of Energy signals a departure from environmental protection initiatives, as Wright is a considered a staunch critic of climate change policies, famously asserting that “there is no climate crisis in reality.” Under Trump’s directive, Wright is expected to roll back the environmental restrictions imposed by the Biden administration on the energy sector.
Rather than prioritizing a transition to renewable energy, the Trump administration is expected to emphasize a foreign policy that bolsters major oil and gas producers allied with the United States, ensuring stability in the international energy market. Qatar’s role as a key global supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG) – particularly following Russia’s war on Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions on Moscow – has elevated its status among Western allies. This growing influence also positions Qatar to expand its regional and international roles in the coming years.
In addition, there are compelling factors that might lead Trump to further strengthen Qatar’s position in U.S. foreign policy. Between 2019 and 2023, Qatar ranked as the world’s third-largest arms importer, accounting for 7.6 per cent of global arms purchases, just behind Saudi Arabia’s 8.4 per cent. This statistic is significant for Trump, who has consistently prioritized boosting the U.S. trade surplus through arms exports. Consequently, Qatar’s substantial arms acquisitions could serve as a critical negotiating tool in its relationship with Washington.
Compared to Biden’s nominees, Trump’s selections for key foreign policy and defense roles reflect a notably more hawkish stance on Iran and its nuclear ambitions. This is especially true of the nominations of Mark Rubio for secretary of state and Pete Hegseth for secretary of defense, which suggest that the Trump administration may prioritize a heightened military presence in the Middle East, particularly along the western shores of the Persian Gulf.
In this context, Qatar’s strategic importance to the United States becomes even more apparent. As a major non-NATO ally, Qatar hosts the Al Udeid Air Base, home to the U.S. Central Command, the U.S. Air Force Central Command, the Combined Air and Space Operations Center, the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing, and the 319th Reconnaissance Wing. Al Udeid remains the largest U.S. base in the Middle East and North Africa, serving as a cornerstone of America’s military presence and influence in the region.
Iran’s Reliance on a Qatari Role
In contrast, Iran has adopted a more conciliatory approach toward the West following the election of reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian. Central to Pezeshkian’s foreign policy, supported by his deputy and former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, is the goal of rejoining the nuclear agreement with Western powers and lifting the financial sanctions imposed on Tehran. Meanwhile, rising tensions between Russia and Iran in the South Caucasus and even in Syria are motivating Tehran to break out of its international isolation and engage more openly with the global community.
This positions Iran at a crossroads, facing a tough U.S. administration committed to maximum pressure while advancing a less confrontational policy toward the West. In this context, Doha’s role as a mediator and negotiator becomes increasingly vital. Qatar remains a primary channel for dialogue between Iran and the West, particularly the United States, regarding the future of the Iranian nuclear program.
The relationship between Tehran and Doha is rooted in mutual interests that have shaped their enduring partnership. A cornerstone of this relationship is their shared stake in the North Field in the Persian Gulf – considered the world’s largest gas deposit, with reserves estimated by Qatar at approximately 900 trillion cubic feet. This shared resource underscores the intertwined energy interests of the two countries, even as political differences have surfaced at various points in their history.
Given these dynamics, the Iranian government is expected to increasingly rely on Qatar’s standing as a trusted Western ally to mediate in regional conflicts. Tehran views this relationship as an opportunity to counteract Netanyahu’s preferred approach of dismantling Iran’s nuclear program through military action rather than diplomacy.
Roles in the Gaza and Lebanon War
Qatar has denied the Reuters report suggesting its withdrawal from mediating efforts to end the Israeli war on Gaza. However, it acknowledged a “suspension” of these efforts due to what it described as the “lack of seriousness” from the parties involved in the negotiations.
This indicates that Qatar sees little value in continuing its role to bridge the divide between Hamas and Israel for a prisoner and hostage exchange deal, particularly as the Netanyahu government has thus far rejected the notion of ending the war on Gaza as part of such an agreement.
Nevertheless, it is expected that Tel Aviv will turn to Doha when it resumes negotiations with Hamas, given the absence of viable alternatives to Qatar’s mediation efforts alongside Egypt.
In Lebanon, Qatar has yet to engage in negotiations between Hezbollah and Israel to end the conflict, a role currently spearheaded by the Biden administration. However, Qatar is anticipated to play a significant part in the post-war dialogue with Lebanese political leaders to elect a president for the republic. As a member of the five-nation committee – alongside Egypt, Saudi Arabia, France and the United States – Qatar has been actively involved in addressing the country’s prolonged presidential vacuum.
These external transformations coincide with notable internal changes in Doha. A recent referendum led to amendments in Qatar’s Basic Law (the constitution), altering the process for appointing members of the Shura Council. The reforms grant Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani the authority to appoint all council members, replacing the previous system in which two-thirds were selected through direct elections.
This shift aligns Qatar more closely with other Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which have provided their rulers with greater flexibility in managing domestic and foreign affairs with minimal constraints.