While diplomatic tensions between Russia and Iran have escalated over different issues, their security and defence cooperation remains intact.
Ali Noureddine
This article was translated from Arabic to English
Since the start of 2024, points of contention between Russia and Iran have been steadily escalating, primarily over border demarcation issues in the Arabian Gulf, disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the ongoing civil war in Sudan.
These disagreements have strained diplomatic relations between the two nations, despite their shared stance against Western influence.
However, the growing tensions have not halted their ongoing security and defence cooperation, which remains mutually beneficial under the principle of shared interests.
Contradictory Interests in the South Caucasus
In September 2024, diplomatic tensions between Russia and Iran reached new heights when Tehran summoned the Russian ambassador to voice concerns over Moscow’s South Caucasus policies, which Iran believes disregard its strategic interests.
This sensitive development followed statements by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who sought to pressure Armenia into a settlement that would grant Azerbaijan control over the “Zangezur Corridor.” Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed a similar position during his August 2024 visit to Azerbaijan.
The Zangezur Corridor is regarded as one of the most significant and enduring border disputes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, particularly following Azerbaijan’s resolution of its control over the Nagorno-Karabakh region through a military operation in September 2023.
Currently, Azerbaijan is demanding control over the Zangezur Corridor, located in the far south of Armenia, to establish communication between its eastern and western territories. Azerbaijani claims to this corridor are framed as a pursuit of “unity” within its territories.
However, Azerbaijan’s interest in the corridor extends beyond mere territorial integrity, reflecting broader geopolitical ambitions. Securing this corridor would enable Azerbaijan to link its ally Turkiye to the Caspian Sea, facilitating connections to other Turkish-speaking nations in Central Asia.
This development presents an opportunity for Azerbaijan and Turkiye to enhance regional and economic connectivity within the “Turkish-speaking world,” in alignment with the visions of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, without traversing Armenian territory. This significant project underscores Erdogan’s strong support for Azerbaijan in its regional conflicts.
In contrast, Iran perceives this expansive project as a direct threat to its strategic interests. The corridor runs along Armenia’s southern border with Iran, and if Azerbaijan’s proposal is realised, Tehran would entirely lose its access to Armenian territory. This scenario poses a further risk, as Iran’s link to the South Caucasus and its connectivity to the global arena would become contingent upon its relations with Turkiye and Azerbaijan, thereby limiting Tehran’s strategic options.
Meanwhile, Moscow has adopted a markedly different stance. Putin appears to be aligning more closely with Azerbaijani interests, especially as Armenia has taken decisive steps to distance itself from Russia and strengthen ties with the West.
Since February 2024, Armenia has frozen its membership in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, subsequently participating in NATO military exercises and announcing joint military drills with the United States. Consequently, Moscow now views Armenia as a new adversary that has pivoted toward Western alliances.
At the same time, it is evident that since 2022, Putin has become increasingly cautious in considering Erdogan’s interests. This approach aims to maintain a conciliatory stance from Turkiye regarding the war in Ukraine. Turkiye is recognised as one of the most powerful and militarily influential nations bordering the Black Sea.
Despite being a NATO member, Turkiye has successfully pursued a balanced policy, navigating relations between Putin and his Western counterparts without excessively increasing its military support for Ukraine.
Consequently, the growing alignment between Russia and Azerbaijan, along with Putin’s backing of Azerbaijan’s claims regarding the Zangezur Corridor, represents a significant aspect of the current understandings between Russia and Turkiye.
These understandings encompass various initiatives, including collaboration in the energy sector and the supply of oil and gas, as well as security and military coordination in regions such as Syria.
Disagreements in Arab Region Issues
The dispute between Russia and Iran over the South Caucasus coincides with the expansion of various conflicts in the Arab region. Moscow continues to support the United Arab Emirates in its claim of sovereignty over three islands disputed with Iran.
This stance prompted Tehran to summon the Russian chargé d’affaires in protest against a joint statement issued by Moscow and a coalition of Arab countries, which called for negotiations regarding the border dispute.
In this context, Putin has opted to confront Iranian interests on a sensitive issue concerning islands that hold significant geopolitical importance for shipping routes in the Gulf region. By doing so, Russia has chosen to prioritise its shared interests with the Arab Gulf states, particularly the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both of which wield considerable influence within the OPEC+ alliance.
Notably, since 2022, Russia has been leading a series of discussions with these two Arab states aimed at regulating oil production levels and stabilising price fluctuations.
In the Sudanese arena, the interests of Russia and Iran have also diverged markedly. Since the onset of the current civil war, Russia has aligned itself with the Rapid Support Forces, engaging in agreements to invest in Sudanese gold fields in exchange for military and logistical support.
This backing is a continuation of the longstanding relationship between the Russian Wagner Group and leaders of Sudanese armed factions that dates back to 2017, focusing on the exploitation of the country’s natural resources.
In contrast, Iran has opted to provide direct military support to the Sudanese regular army in its conflict against the Rapid Support Forces. This strategy has enabled the Sudanese army to acquire advanced drones from Iran, significantly influencing the battles in western Kordofan, Sennar, and Gedaref.
As a result, Gulf and Western nations are increasingly concerned that Iran may establish a direct military presence along the Red Sea coast, bolstered by its newfound alliance with the Sudanese army leadership.
Continuous Exchange of Interests
Despite the ongoing differences and tensions between Iran and Russia, numerous aspects of defence cooperation between the two nations have persisted. In September 2024, the Wall Street Journal reported that Western estimates indicate Iran has transferred ballistic missiles to Russia, despite warnings from European and American officials.
During the same month, Russia showcased advanced dive bombers equipped with an optical guidance system, acquired from Iran, at the Center Technologies Private in Saint Petersburg. This marked the first official confirmation that the Russian military continues to receive such support since the onset of the war in Ukraine.
Thus, it can be said that Russia and Iran maintain a pragmatic policy, sustaining bilateral cooperation in carefully defined areas while isolating it from the broader expansion of their differences.
However, Western officials are increasingly concerned that Tehran’s pragmatism may be driven by its desire to obtain nuclear technology from Moscow in exchange for the military assistance it provides. This context may explain Iran’s commitment to preserving defence cooperation with Russia, despite the diplomatic tensions that characterise their relationship.