While the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, marked the end of Ba’thist rule in Syria, it remains uncertain whether this truly signifies a ‘New Syria’ or merely another shift in authoritarian control.
Nikolaos van Dam [1]
Since December 8, 2024, people have been speaking of a ‘New Syria’ because the Ba’th regime of President Bashar al-Asad has disappeared and been replaced by a new regime led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (which roughly translates to ‘the Commission for the Liberation of Greater Syria’).
The question now is whether this truly marks the beginning of a ‘New Syria’ or if it is merely a change of regime—albeit one with a completely different character from the previous one. If we consider Syria’s history up to this point, the usual pattern has been one totalitarian regime replacing another. However, if we are speaking of a ‘New Syria’ in this context, it suggests the establishment of an entirely new regime that would represent an abrupt break with the past.
Immediately after the fall of the Asad regime, there was immense euphoria and joy across wide segments of Syrian society. Many were relieved that the dictatorship of the Asads and the Ba’th Party, which had lasted more than 55 years, had finally come to an end.
For many, it symbolized the conclusion of Ba’thist tyranny and the bloody civil war that had raged for nearly fourteen years, resulting in over half a million deaths, more than twelve million refugees, and large parts of Syria left in ruins. It also seemed to signal the end of severe human rights violations by the Syrian regime, including torture in prisons, the immense poverty caused by the war, apparent sectarian discrimination, and the domination of the country by prominent figures from the Alawite minority, who suppressed the Sunni majority population.
It all seemed very promising, yet the situation remains extremely precarious. Whether meaningful improvement will truly occur remains to be seen.
After more than 13 years of bloody civil war, Syria finds itself in an exceptionally challenging position, one that will be very difficult to overcome. First, the country is nearly bankrupt. Furthermore, it could take decades to rebuild. Even if all the building materials were readily available and sufficient funding were secured, it would still be highly challenging to construct the vast number of homes required—if only because there are not enough construction workers.
And this addresses only the material aspect of the problem. Beyond that, the population is deeply traumatized, with psychological and societal effects that are likely to persist for generations.
Due to these circumstances, the new regime faces enormous challenges that must be addressed. This, incidentally, would apply to any new Syrian regime, regardless of its orientation or ideology.
However, just as the Ba’th regime was unique as an Arab nationalist secular regime dominated by Ba’thists, mostly from Syrian Arab minorities, the new regime also has a distinctive character. The new Syrian interim president, Ahmad al-Sharaa, has a particularly notable background. He was originally a member of Bin Laden’s extremist Islamist organization, al-Qaeda, and later led the similarly radical Islamist group Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. Through several transformations, this organization eventually evolved into the radical Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
HTS succeeded in gaining control over large parts of Syria’s northwestern Idlib province, where it established an ultra-conservative Islamist administration with an efficient governing apparatus. It is precisely this radical organization that played the leading role in toppling the Asad regime.
Many countries supported various military opposition groups during the Syrian civil war, but HTS was not among them.
At most, HTS received tacit acceptance or indirect support, primarily from Turkey.
One of the key reasons why the numerous Syrian military opposition groups stood little chance of toppling the Asad regime was their lack of unified support and cooperation. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and the United States each backed different factions, which, in turn, in several cases rivalled and fought against one another.
HTS’s ability to bring down the Asad regime was due to a combination of factors. After so many years, the Asad regime had become severely demoralized, and conscripted soldiers in the regime’s army were so impoverished that many deserted in December 2024. In contrast, HTS was well-organized and well-prepared. The ease with which the regime fell must have been a surprise to HTS itself, just as it was to the regime.
Another factor was that Asad’s main allies—Russia, Iran, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah—were no longer willing or able to intervene on his behalf. They were not prepared to fight for a Syrian army that no longer had the will to fight itself.
Asad’s flight from Syria to Moscow was also a complete surprise, even to his closest associates, who suddenly found themselves without a president.
I had previously expected that opposition fighters would face a bloody confrontation in Aleppo and the other major cities to the south, all the way to Damascus. However, the regime’s army suddenly withdrew almost without resistance. Even the regime’s much better-equipped elite units, such as the Fourth Brigade led by Asad’s brother Mahir al-Asad and the Republican Guard, vanished like snow under the sun.
Contrary to my expectations, there was no widespread, bloody reckoning against members of the Alawite minority. There were, however, smaller-scale acts of violent revenge, primarily targeting Alawite supporters of the regime but also affecting Alawites who had no connection to the regime whatsoever.
It is understandable that there were strong feelings of hatred among the Sunni population toward the Alawites, due to the prominent role they held under the regime. However, the regime’s dictatorship was as oppressive for the Alawites as it was for other communities.
The dictatorship, with all its negative consequences, affected everyone across Syria. Only a small group of prominent regime supporters was spared from its brutality—provided their loyalty remained unquestionable. Any doubt about loyalty, no matter how minor, could result in imprisonment, torture, or even execution, including for the most prominent figures within the regime.
Looking at Syria’s new president, Ahmad al-Sharaa, it appears that he has undergone a radical transformation—assuming, of course, that his tolerant, pragmatic, and moderate statements regarding religious minorities and intra-Syrian reconciliation are genuine. If this is true, he has evolved from a radical jihadist into a moderate, pragmatic politician.
Following his takeover in Damascus, Ahmad al-Sharaa has predominantly made moderate and pragmatic statements, calling for the rebuilding of a new Syria in which all Syrians are equal, with tolerance and respect for members of religious minorities. However, it is difficult to believe that all of his Islamist followers share his vision.
Furthermore, the responsibility for the takeover in Damascus and other regions does not rest solely with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. Other military groups, including the Syrian National (Opposition) Army and more radical organizations like Ahrar al-Sham, also played a role. It is certain that these groups will seek to claim their share of power as well.
So far, Ahmad al-Sharaa has primarily appointed his supporters from Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to new positions in both the transitional government and the newly formed army. If this situation persists for a prolonged period, and the euphoria over the fall of Bashar al-Asad’s regime begins to fade, frustration is likely to grow, as the living conditions of Syrians are unlikely to improve in the short term. After all, the country remains largely in ruins, grappling with extreme poverty, teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, and still facing external sanctions.
The possibility of further acts of revenge against supporters of the Asad regime cannot be ruled out either, which could lead to additional unrest. Continuing to live amid hunger, poverty, and destruction is certainly not a recipe for stability.
The new Syrian president has promised elections in four years. However, waiting four years for elections is an extremely long time under the current circumstances. Organizing such elections in a way that genuinely represents the Syrian population will require careful and thorough preparation. For instance, what will the situation of the millions of Syrian refugees abroad be? Where will they be in four years? And which political parties will be allowed to participate?
On the other hand, the main concern about delaying the elections for such a long period is that it could open the door to developments that steer Syria in an undemocratic direction. For instance, HTS, after consolidating its control and eliminating competing parties by forcing them to surrender their weapons, could fully seize power. It might then only hold elections once it is certain of winning them—a scenario often seen in authoritarian regimes.
Still, I believe that the new regime should be given every opportunity to help Syria emerge from its extremely difficult current situation. Perhaps this stance contains an element of wishful thinking. However, in my view, the most obvious alternative is the resumption of a new civil war, which would plunge the country even deeper into chaos.
Now that the dictatorial Asad family regime has been overthrown after more than 54 years, we can say in hindsight that the Syrian Revolution has, for the moment, been successful. The true success, however, will only become clear in the coming years, depending on how Syria progresses.
With the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, the Alawite-dominated rule came to an end, and power returned to figures from the Sunni majority, as was the case before the Ba’th Party seized power in 1963. However, the political and social backgrounds of the new conservative Sunni rulers differ entirely from those that prevailed before the Ba’th era, which began in 1963.
With this fall, the era that began with the founding of the Ba’th Party in 1947 came to a close, much like what happened in Iraq with the fall of President Saddam Hussein in 2003. The glory days of secular Arab nationalism have long since passed, and now political Islam is once again playing a significantly more important role.