Imamoglu’s win represents a serious blow to the AKP’s electoral dominance in Turkey. However, observers should not mistake it for a fatal one. The party still commands powerful support across the country, even if it has lost the two largest cities. And although the first cracks seem to have appeared in Erdogan’s political base, it will not be until the next general election in 2023 – the centenary of the Turkish Republic – that the most pivotal consequence of this election will become evident: a CHP victory at the national level.

If the rerun is clouded in the same controversy as the first vote, it will likely be the final nail in the coffin of Turkish democracy. Conversely, if Imamoglu wins again, and the vote is uncontested, it will herald a new balance of power and perhaps a new era of Turkish politics.

Will breaking Ocalan’s isolation do the trick? Not in the sense that HDP supporters will suddenly vote for the AKP’s candidate. But they could feel less compelled to vote at all, which would negatively impact the CHP.

Such rhetoric indicates that will use his control of Turkey’s courts, media outlets, election monitoring bodies and other institutions to target opposition members, campaign staff and even Imamoglu himself as “criminal.”

Any discussion of Turkish human rights must mention the difficulties faced in cementing the rights of women and ethnic and sexual minorities. Femicide, violence against women and honour killings remain a stain on Turkish society and one that has traditionally been met with a lukewarm government response.

The big question in the Kurdish-majority municipalities in the south-east of Turkey was whether the candidates for the leftist Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), which won the most votes in the local elections on 13 March 2019, would be acknowledged as the winners.

Both Imamoglu and Erdogan were born and raised in humble, conservative families. Aside from these shared roots and a love of football, the two have relatively little in common.