Sadly, these developments coupled with a worldwide crisis of leadership may well worsen before a new generation of leaders can rise and try in earnest to resolve many of these conflicts humanely, passionately and equitably to ensure their durability.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan warned Europe on 22 December that his country cannot handle a new wave of Syrian refugees, adding that over 80,000 people from Idlib had fled to areas near the Turkish border. According to Turkish authorities, Turkey already hosts around 5 million refugees, of which 3.7 million are Syrians.

If Turkey is forced to drastically up its military commitment to Libya to combat Egypt’s support (beyond the recently agreed bill to deploy troops to Libya), then Ankara may come to regret its rush to secure its maritime rights.

The signing of the deal between the two official governments of Turkey and Libya has had some immediate (albeit relatively muted) consequences. Coastguard forces loyal to Haftart stopped and searched a Caribbean-flagged vessel that was carrying an illicit cargo of small arms and briefly detained some Turkish crew. Both countries have announced investigations into the shipment, but with independent infor-mation in short supply the fog of war has settled on Libya, offering impunity to both local and foreign ac-tors. With another power like Turkey in the mix, Libya looks no closer to peace in the post-Qaddafi era.

Returning Syrian refugees to this battleground would make them the “buffer” between these warring forces, turning more vulnerable people into collateral damage of a greater geopolitical war.

On the flip side of the picture, ironically, the making of Erdoğanist authoritarianism has generated ample opportunities for a radical liberalization of the Turkish political system. Scrapping institutional discipline, liquidating the bureaucratic guardians, disposing of the ‘traditional’ cadre structure and confusing the ideological compass that defined the ‘old’ imperious state apparatus, without effectively replacing them with ‘new’ ones, presents a historic moment for a comprehensive and thorough transformation.

The first, still best, option – repatriation of foreign nationals – is arguably a quickly closing window. Even then, questions would remain about what should happen to Iraqi and Syrian nationals, and what role the West should play in resolving their situation. But European powers must avoid taking the third option they’d been exercising by default – doing nothing, and waiting for circumstances to change.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has attracted global attention. Many questions were raised with regards to its scope, aims and feasibility. Now, five years on and with two major meetings concluded (the second was the size of a UN General Assembly), these questions are beginning to fade.

In a region surrounded by threats – from Turkey’s attacks and Islamic State terrorism and patriarchy at home – the women of Kurdistan are fighting for their life and liberty. And the cost is hard, dangerous labor.

Alevis and Alawites are often confused or equated, but aside from a similar-sounding name – both a reference to Ali – they are very distinct. One key difference is ethnicity. Whereas Alevis are typically Turkish or ethnically Kurdish and they pray in Turkish, Alawites are Arab and, like nearly all other Muslims, pray in Arabic.