More aggressive to US enemies, arguably more erratic with US allies and with the financial benefit to the US at the centre of his foreign policy, Trump’s involvement in the Middle East has not been a stabilizing factor in one of the most turbulent periods of the region’s recent history. With at least two years left in the White House, it is too early to say what his lasting legacy in the Middle East will be, but the signs do not point to a positive one.

Trump threat and his earlier vow to stand by the Kurds despite the troop withdrawal gives Saudi Arabia and other Arab states such as the United Arab Emirates and Egypt political cover to support the Kurds as a force against Iran’s presence in Syria. It also allows the kingdom and the UAE to attempt to thwart Turkish attempts to increase its regional influence.

But the real question is, what will the Kurds do? Initially following Trump’s pull-out tweet, an SDF alliance with the regime of Bashar al-Assad and Russia seemed most likely. There were early signs of the SDF reaching out to both parties and protesting the US move. Within days, pro-al-Assad forces were reportedly moving into areas previously dominated by the SDF.

The threat posed to Hatay by the PKK and its Syrian affiliates was highlighted again in January 2018, when the Turkish army and Turkish-backed forces attacked Afrin. Whether the threat was exaggerated to justify the Afrin operation is difficult to say, but once again Hatay has found itself, through no fault of its own, on the sidelines of war.

Since the operation in Afrin began, Turkey has been quick to exploit the international concern about the Islamist group, asserting that it is fighting IS as well as the YPG in the area. Turkey’s state news agency reported that ‘the PYD/PKK terror group has released all Daesh [IS] prisoners under the condition that they will fight against the Turkish army and Free Syrian Army (FSA) in Syria’s Afrin region’.

What Russia wants and what the regime wants in the long run may not be the same. Although Russia intervened to save al-Assad from being toppled, the Russians are now eager to see a political settlement to the civil war that will allow them to wind down their military involvement.

With no end to the visa crisis in sight and no sign of either side willing to compromise on any of the surrounding issues, from criminal cases to military support for the Kurds, Turkey-US relations are entering the unknown.

Today, Shiites are divided into numerous sects, the largest being Twelver Shiism. Shiites make up the majority of the population in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain and Azerbaijan; and they constitute significant minorities in Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India, Nigeria and Tanzania.

It is only now becoming apparent just how close the judiciary and prosecutor offices are to the presidential palace. The main opposition party, the CHP, has maintained that court rulings against politicians is simply an attempt to scare dissenting voices into submission.

Indeed, under Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), Turkey’s policy of engagement with Sunni Islamists across the Middle East and North Africa is indicative of its interest in wider Sunni cohesion rather than an alliance with Qatar alone.