US sanctions will not only affect Tur­key’s economy negatively but also provide a scape­goat (United States and NATO) for the Turkish economic crisis. Such a situa­tion may cause an irreparable rise in anti-West­ern sentiment among the Turkish people. Public opposition in Turkey may bring lim­itations to future collaboration – even those based on mutual interest – between Ankara and other NATO allies.

With museums largely subsidised or free for Turkish citizens, the importance of connecting Turks with the country’s past is obviously valued. Yet as museums increasingly become a political and ideological battle-ground, history is proving to be a powerful weapon indeed.

The difficult relationship with Kurds and the HDP is embedded in this context. As long as the CHP does not resolve this dilemma and does not replace its ideological-authoritarian canon of values with a liberal understanding of the state, nation and protection of minorities, a substantial contribution to the democratization of the country and to the solution of the Kurdish conflict cannot be expected. As a result, selective cooperation with the HDP can be expected with regard to the HDP as well. The elites of the party are still faced with the ongoing challenge of overcoming the historically developed ideological fundament of the CHP and putting it on a genuine social democratic agenda, as it partly understands itself.

Imamoglu’s win represents a serious blow to the AKP’s electoral dominance in Turkey. However, observers should not mistake it for a fatal one. The party still commands powerful support across the country, even if it has lost the two largest cities. And although the first cracks seem to have appeared in Erdogan’s political base, it will not be until the next general election in 2023 – the centenary of the Turkish Republic – that the most pivotal consequence of this election will become evident: a CHP victory at the national level.

It says quite something about the state of world affairs today that standing up to these twin threats is something that is now strongly pursued among AK Party grandees in Turkey, while there is still deafening silence among the Republicans in the United States.

If the rerun is clouded in the same controversy as the first vote, it will likely be the final nail in the coffin of Turkish democracy. Conversely, if Imamoglu wins again, and the vote is uncontested, it will herald a new balance of power and perhaps a new era of Turkish politics.

Will breaking Ocalan’s isolation do the trick? Not in the sense that HDP supporters will suddenly vote for the AKP’s candidate. But they could feel less compelled to vote at all, which would negatively impact the CHP.

There have also been reports that Turkey has provided additional weaponry for rebel forces, including TOW missiles that the United States (US) has to approve for release from storage. That the US would allow the insurgents to be bolstered in this way reflects its own opposition to a military campaign. However, this counter-escalation may lead to greater Iranian support for its Syrian ally.

Any discussion of Turkish human rights must mention the difficulties faced in cementing the rights of women and ethnic and sexual minorities. Femicide, violence against women and honour killings remain a stain on Turkish society and one that has traditionally been met with a lukewarm government response.

The big question in the Kurdish-majority municipalities in the south-east of Turkey was whether the candidates for the leftist Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), which won the most votes in the local elections on 13 March 2019, would be acknowledged as the winners.