

a) This plan assumes that:

- Palestinian security services in the West Bank have lost 80 percent of their capabilities and 70 percent of their intelligence sources within the Islamic armed groups. The Palestinian security services have not replenished intelligence sources either arrested or killed during the Intifada.
- Palestinian security services in Gaza have lost 50 percent of their capabilities and 70 percent of their intelligence sources, in particular their coverage of Hamas' military wing which is very poor.
- The general Palestinian population has lost confidence in the security services and will oppose any security units that try and arrest suspects. A widescale arrest campaign is therefore not achievable. Israel's own two year arrest campaign in the West Bank has succeeded in reducing the age and technology available to Palestinian terrorists but not their numbers nor motivation.
- The present Palestinian security service management structure has proven itself unable to produce strategies to confront the constantly evolving terror phenomenon. Further top-down attempts to change/unify the present traditional management of the security services will not guarantee improved performance on the ground.
- Motivation at all levels of the security services (rather than lack of training, computers or other logistical support) is the main obstacle to renewed Palestinian security work. Training and access to proper equipment/offices is important but will not produce security results alone.
- The Israelis will provide no help in the early stages apart from occasional warnings of "hitting home". Prior to the Intifada, the Israelis provided up to fifty percent of the threat intelligence the Palestinians received. The Palestinians have no eavesdropping capability of any worth and insufficient human sources to match this shortfall even in the medium term.

- Be implemented at the same time as;

a) a further ceasefire amongst the Palestinian factions

b) a redeployment of the Palestinian police (unarmed in the West Bank) in an active law and order campaign throughout the OTs.

c) a three month campaign by Rafah Tantiin and security services closely linked to Rafah Tantiin to dismantle the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades in the West Bank and the Popular Resistance Committees in Gaza first by persuasion ending in enforcement

- Show results within two to three months according to agreed benchmarks verified by a 3-5 man international verification team.

- Be a technical security plan insulated as much as possible from political developments and negotiations

- Build stand-alone task forces from the best of the middle-ranks of the security services rather than rely on the traditional Palestinian security service structure or any particular Palestinian security service for results

- Focus these task forces on subjects not particular military groups nor political organizations as in the past. The main subjects are; suicide bombers from the West Bank, tunnels in Rafah, weapons smuggling and production, Qassam rockets in Gaza, terror finance, and incitement.

- Ensure that these task forces work only on their objectives and leave policing objectives like law and order, dismantling of Al Aqsa Brigades and Popular Resistance Committees, and political/security negotiations (ie deploying security forces in areas from which the Israelis withdraw) to the traditional security chiefs and the political leadership.

- The task forces need to start and work together. In isolation their work will lack coherence. They have primacy in dealing with the subjects on which they are tasked with the Palestinian security services subordinate to them on these issues
- The work of the task forces provides a base line for Palestinian security work (the minimum) on which individual security services should and can build through their own security actions or with the police to prevent other forms of attacks or incitement
- The task forces do not comprise a new security service but an emergency structure within the present Palestinian security structure. Their role will diminish as the Palestinians and Israelis move back to political negotiations. At some stage, the personnel in the task forces (with their superior shared experience) can become the core of a new unified Palestinian internal security service
- The task forces should be housed in buildings outside the present Palestinian security service buildings. Many of the task forces can and should be housed in the same buildings in Ramallah and Gaza City for reasons of efficiency and security. The buildings used by the task forces should not be publicized and will need to be guarded
- The task forces must report (in writing) a summary of their actions to an overall commander of the task forces twice a day. The overall commander must forward these reports to the political leadership and the international verification team the same day.
- The task force commander will have a chief of staff and a private office team that is responsible for overall liaison with the Palestinian political leadership, the Palestinian security services and the Israeli security services. The task force commander or his chief of staff will be included in Palestinian delegations to negotiate with Israelis on town withdrawals, handling of fugitives and other security related issues
- Staff in the task forces should receive substantially higher wages than normal security personnel. They will be replaced immediately if they break procedures, leak information about the task forces or do not keep to their agreed hours of work. They will sign undertakings on these points before receiving higher wages
- A three-five man international verification team will be based in Jerusalem drawn from mainly UK staff with security or military backgrounds. It will conduct its work mainly within the task forces and will not make its presence or its movements public. Its job will be to ensure and encourage the task forces to meet their pre-agreed benchmarks. They will have no contact with the Israeli security agencies.
- The benchmarks suggested in this plan have timescales for implementation from the day the plan is executed not from the day it is adopted by the Palestinian leadership. The Palestinians will need time to set up and equip the task forces

Suicide Bombers/Sacrifice Shooting Attack Task Force

- Suicide bombings/sacrifice shooting attacks are increasingly linked to the social/economic results of the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank. Security measures alone will no longer solve this threat with individuals increasingly launching attacks because of personal revenge or social problems in their personal or family lives. These attacks are however the most sensitive and destructive form of violence in the OTs.
- At present the Palestinians have an ad hoc system of informing the Israelis of the identity of people who have gone missing and may be preparing to carry out a suicide attack/sacrifice shooting. There is no coordination between the Palestinian services on this and no standard procedure for informing the Israelis or following up on threat intelligence provided by the Israelis.

Steps:

- Set up a 4-12 man multi-agency task force in Ramallah to identify and track suicide bombers/sacrifice attackers. Their operations room must be manned by two people at all times. It must be equipped before the project starts with telephone, communications and computer equipment and linked to the field and main offices of all the main security services who must receive orders to contact the task force immediately they receive information.
- The team must set up direct lines to Stabnet and the Israeli Defence Force to provide them with threat intelligence as fast as it arrives. They must log every call made and received with the Israelis. Each call should preferably be recorded.
- The team must work to a standard set of procedures which it follows at all times (ie a log of all calls received, a standard form of personality information on possible suicide bombers/sacrifice attackers to fax to the Israelis (full name, age, physical description, political affiliation, clothes last seen wearing, location last seen, knowledge of Israel, mobile phone number, time when Palestinian security forces received the information). This form needs to be distributed to all the security services.
- The task force must work to a standard set of procedures when receiving threat intelligence from the Israelis and fax the information provided immediately to relevant field offices. Every action following up the Israeli information should be recorded and timed and kept in a dedicated file for each case.

verification team on a daily basis

- A multi-service patrol (three cars minimum) should be on standby in each Palestinian city to search for potential suicide bombers once they have been identified. The patrol should also have orders to arrest the handlers of any suicide bombers caught with them.

- The task force must coordinate between the Palestinian security services the investigation of each suicide bombing/sacrifice attack uncovered. Each Palestinian security service should provide a report to the task force within forty-eight hours on its findings. The task force must then provide written recommendations to the political leadership via the overall taskforce commander for action by the Palestinian security services against any identified handlers and financiers of suicide bombers/sacrifice attackers.

Benchmarks

100 percent application of a set of standard alert procedures by the Palestinian security services (three weeks)

Steady increase in ratio of attacks solved with Palestinian help relative to the number of alerts reported by the Israelis (five weeks)

Increase in Palestinian arrests of terrorist handlers/financiers (twelve weeks)

Tunnel Smuggling Task Force

- The continued existence of tunnel smuggling in Rafah guarantees violence in Rafah and Gaza as a whole. Few Palestinians profit from the tunnels whilst thousands have lost their homes as a result of Israeli measures against the tunnels. The small number (10-15) of significant smugglers and tunnel financiers are well known in Rafah and increasingly unpopular. These smugglers work for profit not for political reasons. In some cases their families have been in the business for years. Any campaign against tunnels should focus on them and not the tunnels which can be rebuilt too easily and cannot be shut in an efficient manner.

Set up a 4-12 man multi-service task force in Rafah

The task force must coordinate the arrest the 10-15 main smugglers and financiers at present involved in the tunnel business having gained intelligence on their location and movements. The arrests should be timed to happen together.

The task force must ensure that the Palestinian Authority shut the property, commercial offices and bank accounts of those detained or wanted, pending their trial. This will act as a deterrent to others who feel tempted to fill their places. Few of the smugglers/financiers have bank accounts but they are investors in overt businesses

The task force should coordinate the identification and destruction of any tunnels in Rafah near population areas having explained their intentions to the international verification team (who will witness these actions directly) and the Israeli military locally.

The task force should coordinate with the media task force (see below) a media and Fatah campaign in Rafah against the tunnels which bring no profit to the locals. Fatah remains the dominant political faction in Rafah

The task force will begin more systematic intelligence sharing with the Egyptians to identify the Egyptian smugglers/arms dealers. This does not happen at present

The task force should identify members of the Palestinian security services who have or are profiting from smuggling in Rafah and recommend disciplinary action. A number of Palestinian security personnel have been involved in small-time weapons trading

Benchmarks

Establish location of main smugglers/financiers (one week)

Arrest of main smugglers/financiers (two weeks)

Freezing of accounts and commercial activities of smugglers (two weeks)

Media campaign (two weeks)

Destruction of tunnels (twelve weeks)

Increase in intelligence sharing with Egypt (three weeks)

- The Palestinians have done more work on terror finance than they have been given credit for both in monitoring funds and freezing Hamas bank accounts. They have a system for monitoring money inflows that works but needs to be built up, centralised (many services have economic security departments) and given a capability to investigate the origins of suspicious funds entering the OTs. Terror finance is a global not local issue.

Steps:

- A multi-service 20-30 man task force must be the only point of contact for the Palestinian Monetary Authority which will provide it daily with all data on money inflows. It will need personnel both in Gaza and Ramallah.
- The task force will identify suspicious inflows and freeze them for 48 hours by order of the Attorney General whilst tasking the security services to investigate the intended recipient of the funds.
- The task force must enforce a system by which all money changers in the OTs report to the Palestinian Monetary Authority all money transactions over USD 5000. It is the job of the task force to follow up on these transactions and task security services to investigate transactions in false names or to known terrorists.
- The task force should coordinate joint security service raids on the offices of dissident money exchangers suspected of links to militant groups, especially in the West Bank.
- The task force must coordinate with ministries to contact all NGOs in the OTs (there are now around 1700) and give them a two month deadline for complying with registration and audit regulations concerning NGOs which are not at present being enforced or face immediate closure.
- The task force must include a unit dedicated to working with international security authorities to investigate the origin of suspicious funds coming into the OTs, especially from Jordan, Israel, Lebanon and Europe.

Benchmarks

- Setting up the task force, building links to the Palestinian Monetary Authority, setting in place procedures for investigating money flows (four weeks)
- Implement system for monitoring money exchangers (four weeks)

- End Palestinian campaign to audit and register NGOs including closure of non-compliant NGOs (twelve weeks)
- Increase in international cooperation with the task force (twelve weeks)

Qassam Rocket Task Force

- The Palestinian Authority in Gaza has made occasional but unsustained attempts to deter Qassam rocket launches which have caused numerous Israeli incursions into Gaza and caused great damage to the Palestinian economy. The Palestinian security services lack good intelligence on the timing of attacks though these are invariably carried out after an Israeli assassination or incursion into Gaza. Most Hamas Qassam rocket production and storage facilities are in well-defended Hamas strongholds where the Palestinian security services fear to enter. Any security measures must therefore focus initially on deterrent and preventive measures such as:

Deterrent Measures

- significantly improve National Security checkpoints in North Gaza so that they are protected better with higher and deeper sandbag defences, have proper spot-lighting to cover the area round the checkpoint, and new barriers for directing the cars into the checkpoint. They must be equipped so that they can be manned on a 24 hour basis (ie hearing, cooking and communications facilities).
- North Gaza checkpoints must check the identity and the interior including the boot of all vehicles (including UN and VIP vehicles) passing through the checkpoints which should be placed on all major and minor road networks leading to areas from where Hamas has fired Qassam rockets. These checkpoints do not need to be placed near Israeli military positions or near the Gaza fence to carry out their functions.

Preventive Measures

- a 12-15 man multi-service task force based in Jabaliyya must map the most likely areas in north Gaza from which Qassam rockets could be fired. They must divide responsibility for the areas between them, make connections with the local population, security services and police in each area and put in place an early warning system by which these people contact the task force if they see any unnatural activity or objects. Teams from the task force must visit each area daily and provide a written report.
- A 4-12 man multi-service task force in Gaza City focuses on tasking the security services to collect information on Qassam rocket production, storage and intended attacks. It receives daily reports from the task force in Jabaliyya. It provides a daily intelligence report to the overall task force commander.
- The Gaza City task force can coordinate and call out an armed (joint service) intervention force (five cars, thirty armed men) which must be ready at all times to go to an area where residents or security forces have reported unnatural activity. The team must have one expert capable of dismantling/moving a Qassam rocket.
- The two task forces must ensure the arrest of anyone in north Gaza caught in possession of Qassam rockets or mortars.

Benchmarks

- Reinforcement of North Gaza checkpoints (two to four weeks)
- Establishment of early warning system in North Gaza (four weeks)
- Increasing and sustained pattern of action against Qassam rocket, transport, production and storage facilities (twelve weeks)

Weapons collection is a confidence boosting measure not a security action. It relies on winning the hearts and minds of the Palestinian population to be successful. This does not exist at present but increasing lawlessness and killings under gang law in towns like Nablus and Jenin is starting to concern the Palestinian public. Any weapon collection programmes should start small but remain disciplined and well publicized. Hamas in Gaza has made clear that any attempt to disarm their cadre forcibly will lead to a full scale clash with the Palestinian Authority. Hamas can call on around five thousand armed supporters in Gaza.

Steps

- the Palestinian Authority and Police has to issue first clear public and private warnings that anyone carrying a weapon on the street will have his weapon removed. Given the increasing cost of weapons, this will cause a significant drop in the number of weapons seen in public if the Police and security services are seen to be enforcing this measure
- set up a 4-12 man task force in Gaza to:
 - a) coordinate a media campaign with Fatah and the media task force against the use of locally made pipe bombs (known as Kwa) which are for sale on the street to children in Khan Younis and Rafah. Many children have been hurt mishandling these pipe bombs (made of pipe filled with sulphur and sugar) which make a large sound but cause damage only to those in close proximity to them. Israeli Defence Forces have opened fire indiscriminately on hearing these pipe bombs exploding causing the death and injury of children.
 - b) coordinate the announcement of an amnesty to encourage voluntary handover of weapons and explosives
 - c) invite the international verification team to register the collection of weapons and supervise their destruction
 - d) destroy all weapons seized rather than giving them to the security services (as they may have been used in terror activities before and can be linked to them forensically by the Israelis causing problems for the new owner)
 - e) task the security services to locate and report arms caches and coordinate with either the Police Engineering Unit or the Israelis for their safe disposal

- Banning of public carrying of weapons (one week)
- Media campaign against Kwa grenades (two weeks)
- Amnesty on weapons (four weeks)
- Sustained pattern of increased discovery of arms caches in the OTs (twelve weeks)

Incitement Task Force

Steps:

- a 4-12 man task force based in Ramallah to:
 - a) monitor and register incitement at mosques
 - b) monitor and register incitement on radio stations
 - c) monitor and register incitement in the print media
 - d) provide a daily report to the overall task force commander for onward transmission to the Ministry of Awqaf and Ministry of Information

Benchmarks

- closure of radio stations involved in incitement (three weeks)
- replacement of Imams in mosques involved in incitement (eight weeks)

A small media team needs to focus purely on the project in promoting its successes and providing immediate and detailed responses to any criticisms, especially from the Israeli security establishment. They need to be equipped and housed before the project begins preferably in the same building as the task forces based in Ramallah. The main staff need to attend daily briefings between the overall task force commanders and task force team leaders. They have to write and talk fluent Hebrew and English.

International Relations Task Force

A small international relations team needs to coordinate liaison with foreign security services other than the Israelis. It should produce a weekly written report on the security results produced by the task forces. It needs to coordinate all foreign logistical support to the task forces working with the procurement team.

Procurement

The security services and police have not benefited from the international support available to them under the Road Map because it has not prioritized or been precise or timely enough in explaining its logistical needs.

The above plan needs:

- a procurement team in place to equip the task forces before they start their work
- the team ensures that the task forces gain priority over funds from the Palestinian Authority and international partners
- the team is in charge of all purchases and delivery of all items to the offices of the task forces
- the team must be directly linked to the Ministry of Finance and register all money received and purchases made with the Ministry of Finance