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Project



U.S.  
MILITARY  
SUPPORT FOR  
SAUDI ARABIA  
AND THE WAR  
IN YEMEN



CENTER FOR  
INTERNATIONAL POLICY

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The Arms and Security Project does independent research, media outreach, and public education on issues of nuclear policy, Pentagon spending, and the impacts of the global arms trade, with an eye towards promoting reforms in U.S. policy.

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# U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT FOR SAUDI ARABIA AND THE WAR IN YEMEN

## Summary

The Saudi regime's murder of Jamal Khashoggi and its continued killing of civilians in Yemen has drawn unprecedented scrutiny to the U.S.-Saudi military relationship. This report looks at that relationship in closer detail, with an eye towards how it creates leverage that the U.S. can use to change Saudi conduct and end the Yemen war.

The assassination of U.S. resident and Washington Post contributor Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi national, at the hands of the Saudi regime has provoked a rethinking of U.S.-Saudi relations in general, and military relations in particular.<sup>1</sup> President Trump's declaration that he would not stop U.S. arms sales to the kingdom even if it is responsible for Khashoggi's death frighteningly suggests that contractor profits and a small number of jobs take precedence over the need to hold a murderous regime accountable.<sup>2</sup>

The President's assertion that it is possible to balance benefits to the U.S. economy against the heinous behavior of an ally doesn't hold up to scrutiny. No economic benefit, no matter how large, can justify continuing to arm a regime that has not only killed a journalist in the most brutal way imaginable but has killed thousands of civilians in indiscriminate bombing attacks in Yemen, many of them with U.S.-supplied bombs and aircraft.<sup>3</sup>

But if economic arguments are to be brought into play, they should at least be accurate. This has not been the case. The president has claimed a sweeping range of jobs flowing from his alleged \$110 billion arms deal with Riyadh, from 40,000 to "over a million," in one case boosting his estimate by 400,000 jobs within just a few days' time. To be fair, it seems like the million jobs figure was meant to include some commercial deals as well as the purported arms sales, but the president's ad hoc utterances on the subject make it hard to know for sure.<sup>4</sup>

The biggest flaw in President Trump's ever-growing estimate of the U.S. jobs at stake in arms sales to Saudi Arabia is that the size of the alleged \$110 billion U.S.-Saudi arms deal – in some cases referred to as if it is a single transaction -- is wildly exaggerated. The White House has issued a list of deals adding up to \$110 billion, but most of them were either notified to Congress during the Obama administration, or are projections far into the future of potential sales that are unlikely to ever occur.<sup>5</sup> In hard numbers, the State Department estimates that the Saudi regime has signed \$14.5 billion in letters of offer and acceptance (LOA's) for new weaponry and support equipment since President Trump took office.<sup>6</sup> That's a little over 10% of the much touted \$110 billion figure. And these letters of offer and acceptance represent only one step in a longer process, not signed contracts.<sup>7</sup>

Another way of looking at the issue is that Congress has received \$20 billion in notifications of potential new arms sales to Saudi Arabia since President Trump took office. There have

also been roughly \$2 billion in deals licensed by the State Department, for a total of \$22 billion.<sup>8</sup> Most of these have not reached the stage of a letter of offer and acceptance being signed, and the largest one, a \$13.5 billion deal for a Lockheed Martin Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system, is still under discussion.<sup>9</sup> A September 30, 2018 deadline for Saudi Arabia to take advantage of a 20% discount on the deal is long past.

All of the major Saudi arms sales in the pipeline are based on arrangements made during the Obama years, when that administration notified Congress of a record \$117 billion in arms offers to Saudi Arabia over its eight years in office.<sup>10</sup> Over those same eight years, there were \$65 billion worth of formal agreements signed with Saudi Arabia and roughly \$18 billion in deliveries made.<sup>11</sup> The discrepancy between offers, agreements and deliveries is a result of the fact that a significant number of offers don't eventuate in agreements or sales. In addition, deliveries generated by completed deals are often spread out over many years. And finally, the value of some deals is reduced between the time of the initial offer and the final agreement.

## Key Findings

- The Saudi military is heavily dependent on U.S. weapons and support, and could not operate effectively without them. Two-thirds of the 365 combat capable aircraft in the Saudi arsenal are of U.S.-origin, including 171 F-15 combat aircraft, a mainstay of the Saudi air war in Yemen. The Saudi land forces and national guard possess over 3,000 U.S.-supplied armored vehicles, and the Saudis have tens of thousands of U.S.-supplied bombs and missiles.
- The Trump administration has not concluded a "\$110 billion arms deal" with Saudi Arabia. President Trump's much touted mega-deal with Saudi Arabia is a mixture of orders approved during the Obama administration, a few new offers, and tens of billions in speculative deals. Actual deals implemented since President Trump took office total just \$14.5 billion.
- Saudi arms sales support at most tens of thousands of jobs in the United States, not hundreds of thousands or "a million," as President Trump has claimed. Actual, paid-for deliveries of U.S.-produced arms for Saudi Arabia have averaged about \$2.5 billion per year over the past decade, enough to support at most 20,000 to 40,000 jobs, some of which are located overseas (see below). In addition, a significant number of the jobs sustained or created by Saudi arms deals would not be at risk if specific deals were cancelled. Many of the workers now involved in producing arms for Saudi Arabia would be shifted to other projects by firms that have record backlogs for existing contracts with the Pentagon. And an analysis by Reuters has revealed that most U.S. defense contractors expect "relatively minor additions to their U.S. workforce and [a] more significant buildup in Saudi Arabia" as a result of arms deals now in the works.<sup>12</sup>
- Many of the jobs created by U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia will be located in Saudi Arabia. The jobs impact of Saudi arms sales in the United States will be further reduced by



the fact that the new Saudi economic plan aims to have 50% of the value of that nation's arms sales produced in the kingdom itself. U.S. firms like Raytheon, Lockheed Martin, and Boeing have pledged allegiance to this goal. Raytheon CEO Thomas Kennedy summed up this approach: "By working together, we can help build world-class defense and cyber capabilities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia."

- The U.S.-Saudi arms trade has a marginal impact on the U.S. economy. Even the high-end estimate of 40,000 U.S. jobs related to Saudi arms deals represents less than three one-hundredths of one percent of the U.S. labor force of over 160 million people.
- Boeing, Raytheon, Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics are by far the biggest beneficiaries of the U.S.-Saudi arms trade: From combat aircraft and attack helicopters (Boeing), to precision-guided bombs (Raytheon and Lockheed Martin), to missile defense systems (Raytheon and Lockheed Martin), to combat ships (Lockheed Martin) to tanks (General Dynamics), to transport planes and helicopters (Lockheed Martin), the largest U.S. defense contractors are the biggest customers and most important suppliers of the Saudi military.
- Cutting off U.S. arms and support is the best way to press for an end to the Yemen war. A bipartisan set of members of Congress from both houses are pressing for an end to arms sales and military support for the Saudi/UAE intervention in Yemen, and the time is ripe to move forward on these efforts, even as the administration has pledged to seek a ceasefire there and to end U.S. refueling of Saudi aircraft.
- The sections that follow provide the key details necessary to understand the scale and nature of the U.S. military relationship with Saudi Arabia, from the arms and weapons systems involved to the use of such equipment in the Saudi-led war in Yemen. It also examines the question of who benefits most from this relationship, and concludes with a section on the growing Congressional opposition to the status quo.

## ARMS OFFERS TO SAUDI ARABIA UNDER THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION

The U.S.-Saudi relationship has evolved into a centerpiece of U.S. strategic thinking and military planning, and the sale of arms is the bedrock of that relationship. Congress has been notified of over \$20 billion in potential arms sales to Saudi Arabia under the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program since January 2017, when the Trump administration came into office. So far, the Trump figure is well under 20% of the \$117 billion in offers made during the Obama administration. The deals proffered during the Trump administration to date include:

- Self-propelled howitzers (\$1.31 billion);
- TOW anti-tank missiles (\$670 million);
- Spare parts, maintenance, and support for M1A2 Abrams tanks, M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), and M198 Towed Howitzers (\$300 million);

- Maintenance and support for AH-64D/E, UH-60L, Schweizer 333 and Bell 406CS helicopters (\$106.8 million);
- A THAAD missile defense system (now estimated at \$13.5 billion, originally notified to Congress at \$15 billion);
- Major training programs for the Saudi Royal Navy (\$250 million) and the Saudi Royal Air Force (\$750 million);
- Ten 74K Persistent Threat Detection System (PTDS) Aerostats (\$525 million);
- AN/TPQ-53(V) radar systems and related support (\$662 million).<sup>13</sup>
- A \$298.4 offer of support for Raytheon Paveway precision-guided bombs, licensed by the State Department.<sup>14</sup>

For full details of U.S. arms offers to Saudi Arabia since 2009, see the appendix to this report.

## U.S. ARMS ALREADY IN THE SAUDI ARSENAL

In terms of Saudi Arabia's immediate ability to continue its military intervention in Yemen, the most important weapons are those already in the Saudi arsenal or part of signed deals for equipment that is now in the pipeline. These systems rely on U.S.-supplied spare parts and maintenance, which gives Washington considerable leverage over Riyadh with respect to its ability to continue to carry out military operations. The preponderance of U.S. equipment used by Saudi forces also makes it difficult for another supplier like Russia or China to replace the United States as a major supplier to Riyadh. It would take decades for the Kingdom to wean itself from dependence on U.S. equipment, training and support, and new equipment might not be easily interoperable with U.S.-supplied systems. Saudi Arabia could buy a Russian or Chinese system here or there to send a political message, but they could not easily replace the role of sales and support from the United States, along with the United Kingdom, as the major bulwarks of its military capability.

### U.S.-Supplied Aircraft

More than two-thirds of Saudi Arabia's estimated 365 combat capable aircraft came from the United States, including 171 F-15 combat aircraft; 5 E-3A early warning and control aircraft; 9 KC-130 refueling tankers; and 30 C-130H Hercules transport planes. Of the 171 F-15's, 90 are F-15S fighter/ground attack aircraft. These U.S.-supplied planes have played a central role in the Saudi-led bombing campaign in Yemen, along with 69 Tornado aircraft supplied by the United Kingdom and 71 Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft supplied by a consortium consisting of the U.K., Germany, Italy, and Spain.<sup>15</sup> An October 2010 offer of 84 additional F-15S's is still in process, with the first aircraft delivered in December of 2016. That deal also included upgrades of 70 F-15s already in the Saudi arsenal.

The Saudi armed forces also have 47 Apache attack helicopters, with 35 allotted to the Royal Saudi Land Forces and 12 allotted to the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG). In October 2010, the U.S. offered Saudi Arabia another 70 Apaches, some of which are believed to have been delivered, although the quantities transferred so far are unclear. The U.S. has also offered the

Saudis 9 Black Hawk transport helicopters and 20 C-130J transport planes; the delivery status of these systems is also not clear at this time. The Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) refuses to provide information on deliveries of U.S. equipment to foreign purchasers, referring inquiries to the purchasing government. Thus far, the government of Saudi Arabia has declined to respond to requests about the timing of deliveries of these tanks or any other U.S.-supplied equipment.

## Bombs and Missiles

The IISS lists JDAMs (Joint Direct Attack Munitions) and Paveway guided munitions as the main bombs in the Saudi arsenal, but they have also received U.S.-manufactured cluster bombs. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has reported deliveries of 1,900 JDAMs and 3,200 Paveway bombs to Saudi Arabia. The figure may be much higher given a 2015 offer of over 19,000 bombs and another deal for Raytheon precision-guided munitions that cleared Congress in March 2017 over strong opposition. The latter deal was put forward by the Trump administration after it reversed a December 2016 decision by the Obama administration to suspend the sale over concerns about Saudi bombings of civilian targets.<sup>16</sup> The deal was nearly voted down by the Senate, with a bipartisan group of 47 Senators voting against it.

## Ground Equipment

Saudi Arabia has a substantial number of U.S.-supplied armored vehicles. According to data from the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Royal Saudi Land Forces (RSLF) possess over 3,000 U.S.-origin armored vehicles, including 370 M1-A2/A2S tanks; 390 M-60A3 tanks (the generation prior to the M-1); 385 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles; and 1,190 M-113 armored personnel carriers. These vehicles will be supplemented by deal for 153 M-1A2S tanks that cleared Congress in September 2016. The status of this new tank offer with respect to the timing of deliveries to Saudi Arabia is unclear.

In addition to the above, the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG) has over 1,300 variants of the U.S.-supplied Light-Armored Vehicle (LAV).

The Saudi military also has a significant number of U.S.-supplied artillery pieces, including 110 M-109 howitzers.

## Naval Equipment

A naval blockade of Yemeni ports has been an integral part of the Saudi-led coalition's war in Yemen. The Saudi Royal Navy is much less dependent on U.S.-supplied equipment than the other branches of the Saudi armed forces. But in October 2015 the United States announced a deal to supply Saudi Arabia with four Multi-Mission Surface Combatant (MMSC) ships. According to the State Department, this case was implemented in October 2017 at a value of \$6 billion.<sup>17</sup> The ships are an adaptation of the Freedom variant of the U.S. Navy's Littoral Combat Ship. The Pentagon has stated that "this acquisition will enhance the stability and maritime security in the sea areas around the Arabian Peninsula and support strategic objectives of the United States."

Once it has been accomplished, a process that will take years to complete, the transfer will also enhance Saudi Navy's ability to enforce a future blockade of the sort currently being imposed in Yemen.

Prior U.S. offers of naval equipment to Saudi Arabia have included 30 Mark V patrol boats, and the Phalanx Close-in-Weapons System for installation on Saudi Arabia's fleet of Patrol Chaser Missile Ships (also of U.S. origin).

## Missile Defense Systems

Saudi Arabia currently owns a U.S.-supplied Patriot missile defense system that has been used, on a number of occasions, to shoot down Houthi missiles aimed at targets in Saudi Arabia. In September 2014, the Pentagon announced an additional \$1.7 billion deal to provide Saudi Arabia with 202 Patriot Advance Capability (PAC-3) missiles with related equipment. At the time, the Pentagon stated that "the proposed sale will help replenish Saudi's current Patriot missiles which are becoming obsolete and difficult to sustain due to age and the limited availability of repair parts." The current status of the deal for these interceptors is unclear.

In October 2017, the Trump administration notified Congress of a deal to provide Saudi Arabia with a Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system consisting of 44 launchers, 360 interceptor missiles, and related equipment. The value of the deal is now estimated to be \$13.5 billion, down from the \$15 billion figure originally reported to Congress. As noted above, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have yet to come to initial terms on the deal, much less sign a formal agreement or final contract.

## Training the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG)

The Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), at 73,000 troops, rivals the Saudi Royal Land Forces in size. Its mission includes both internal security and operations on and outside Saudi borders, including a role in the Saudi/UAE-led war in Yemen. Since at least the 1990s SANG has been trained and equipped by the United States, with training conducted by Vinnell Arabia, a formerly independent firm that is now part of the Northrop Grumman Corporation. The most recent offer of support and training for the SANG was in June of 2013, and involved \$4 billion for a "continuation of the United States-supported effort to modernize the Saudi Arabian National Guard (SANG), and associated equipment, parts, training and logistical support."

# THE USE OF U.S.-SUPPLIED ARMS BY SAUDI-LED COALITION IN YEMEN

A coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates intervened in Yemen in March of 2015 to fight a coalition led by the Houthi rebels, the leaders of a coalition that had overthrown the interim government of Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. Hadi had taken power in 2012 as the



head of an interim government after the fall of long-time Yemeni dictator Ali Abdullah Saleh in the wake of the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011.<sup>18</sup>

The conflict has been marked by violations of the laws of war on both sides, including targeting of civilians, torture, recruitment of child soldiers, and other abuses. There have been over 17,000 civilian casualties in the war, the majority of them via air strikes carried out by the Saudi-led coalition.<sup>19</sup> The Saudi-led coalition has undertaken over 18,000 air strikes since March 2015, a third of which have hit non-military targets.<sup>20</sup> Saudi bombing raids have targeted hospitals, marketplaces, civilian infrastructure, weddings, a funeral, health clinics, and a school bus carrying dozens of children. Independent human rights monitors, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, have found fragments of U.S.-supplied bombs near the sites of strikes on civilians. The bombs identified have included cluster munitions, which are now banned by an international treaty, and guided bombs manufactured by specific U.S. companies – Raytheon and Lockheed Martin.<sup>21</sup>

Untold numbers of additional deaths in Yemen have been caused by a naval blockade and ongoing fighting on the ground that have hindered the distribution of food, clean water, and essential medicine. Over eight million Yemenis are at risk of famine, and bombing of civilian infrastructure, including water treatment plants, has sparked a cholera outbreak that has affected over 1 million people.<sup>22</sup>

In the wake of the murder of Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi behavior, including its conduct in the Yemen war, has undergone intense scrutiny, and prominent members of both parties have suggested that arms transfers to Saudi Arabia should be halted. This debate will be discussed in more detail below.

## CORPORATE BENEFICIARIES OF U.S. ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA

The biggest beneficiaries of the current and prospective arms trade with Saudi Arabia are also four of the top five contractors for the Pentagon – Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and General Dynamics. Details of the size of the deals involving each weapon system are provided in the appendix.

Major Boeing systems under contract or in the works include F-15SA combat aircraft; Apache helicopters; Harpoon anti-ship missiles; Standoff Launch and Defense Missiles – Extended Response (SLAM-ER); Chinook cargo helicopters; and Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs).

Lockheed Martin systems on order or in the pipeline include Hellfire missiles; Multi-Mission Surface Combatants (MMSC); a THAAD missile defense system; C-130J transport aircraft; and PAC-3 missile interceptors.

Raytheon systems in the Saudi arsenal, on offer, or under contract include Paveway laser-guided bombs; Sidewinder air-to-air missiles; a Patriot missile defense system; and Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM).

General Dynamics systems on offer, in the works, or already in the Saudi arsenal include M-1 tanks; M-60 tanks; BLU-117, Mk-82 and Mk-84 general purpose bombs; LAV-24 light-armored vehicles; and anti-tank missiles.

Fuller details of arms sales offers involving the top four contractors listed here are contained in the companion publication, "U.S. Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia: The Corporate Connection."<sup>23</sup> It should be noted that as these are initial offers, and not all will result in final sales. Offers from 2009 through 2018, identified by major system, are included in the appendix to this report.

## ARMS SALES TO SAUDIA ARABIA AND U.S. JOBS AN ASSESSMENT

The estimates of U.S. jobs tied to arms sales to Saudi Arabia have been wildly exaggerated, as noted above. The true number is likely to be closer to the 40,000 jobs figure put forward at President Trump's March 2018 White House meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman than the one million figure he mentioned off the cuff in October 2018 (a figure that apparently was meant to include some commercial deals, the value of which were also exaggerated).<sup>24</sup>

The true number of jobs tied to Saudi sales cannot be precisely determined because the Pentagon does not report systematically on final contracts or which equipment has been delivered. Thus, the status of any given order – whether it has been abandoned, or is at the stage of a non-binding political commitment, or has resulted in a formal agreement or a final contract – is often hard to determine. But the value of deals that have reached the state of a non-binding commitment since President Trump took office is \$14.5 billion.

The best estimate we can make of U.S. jobs currently linked to Saudi sales involves looking at the value of actual arms deliveries to Saudi Arabia from 2009 through 2017, the first year of the Trump administration. By that measure we get an average total of \$2.5 billion in arms deliveries to Saudi Arabia per year.<sup>25</sup> Deliveries are an imperfect measure, but they have the advantage of representing weapons that have actually been paid for and produced, so in that respect they may be the best proxy we have for the amount of money flowing into the U.S. economy from Saudi arms sales in any given year.

If we take a generous approach and include all jobs created in direct assembly and production of components, along with the jobs induced by the spending of wages by workers employed in assembly or component production, the \$2.5 billion in annual arms deliveries to Saudi Arabia would create 17,500 jobs in any given year.<sup>26</sup> Even if that figure were more than doubled – say, equal to the 40,000 figure cited by President Trump in his White House meeting with Mohammed Bin Salman – it would equal less than three one-hundredths of one percent of the total U.S. labor force of over 160 million people.<sup>27</sup> And many of the jobs sustained by Saudi arms sales

would not be at risk if specific deals were to be cancelled. Defense firms with huge backlogs from contracts with the Pentagon would simply shift many of the workers involved to other projects.<sup>28</sup>

The number of jobs tied to U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia is further reduced by the fact that many of the jobs will be created in Saudi Arabia as part of its new economic plan, which calls for 50% of the value of Saudi arms purchases to be produced in the kingdom by 2030.<sup>29</sup> U.S. firms have pledged allegiance to this goal, setting up subsidiaries in Saudi Arabia, as Raytheon has done, and agreeing to have U.S.-supplied helicopters assembled in Riyadh, as Lockheed Martin has done. Raytheon CEO Thomas Kennedy summed up this approach when he discussed his company's growing partnership with Saudi Arabia: "By working together, we can help build world-class defense and cyber capabilities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia."<sup>30</sup> And an analysis by Reuters has revealed that most U.S. defense contractors expect "relatively minor additions to their U.S. workforce and [a] more significant buildup in Saudi Arabia" as a result of arms deals now in the works.<sup>31</sup>

Where jobs related to Saudi arms sales can have an impact is in places where aircraft, tanks, or bombs destined for the Saudi armed forces are assembled, such as St. Louis, Missouri (F-15 combat aircraft); the Tucson, Arizona area (Paveway laser-guided bombs), and Lima, Ohio (M-1 tanks). In the latter two cases, the Pentagon is also buying the same equipment, so the impact of a Saudi cutoff of arms purchases would be limited.

## CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION TO U.S. SALES AND MILITARY SUPPORT TO SAUDI ARABIA

Even before the Khashoggi murder, Congressional opposition to U.S. support for the Saudi/UAE-led war in Yemen was growing. In June 2017, an unprecedented 47 Senators voted to block a deal for precision-guided munitions for the Royal Saudi Air Force. The deal had been suspended by the Obama administration in December 2016 over concerns about Saudi strikes on civilian targets. And in March 2018, an initiative by Senators Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and Mike Lee (R-UT) to end U.S. refueling and other support for the Saudi/UAE war effort garnered 44 votes in the Senate.<sup>32</sup> The latter effort was a particularly strong show of force as it involved completely ending U.S. support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen, as opposed to stopping a specific arms sale.

In the summer of 2018, reacting to the ongoing Saudi bombings of civilians, Congress passed legislation put forward by Sen. Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Sen. Todd Young (R-IN) calling upon the administration to, among other things, certify that Saudi Arabia was taking due care to avoid targeting civilians as a condition of continued support.<sup>33</sup> But on September 12th of this year, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo certified that the Saudis were making good faith efforts to avoid civilian deaths from coalition air strikes.<sup>34</sup>

After the certification decision was made, accounts in the Wall Street Journal and the Intercept indicated that the decision to assert that the Saudi regime was taking care to avoid civilian casualties was the subject of internal debate within the State Department, and that Pompeo was

swayed by the department's office of legal affairs, which argued that ruling against Saudi Arabia would put billions in U.S. arms sales to the kingdom at risk. The office is headed by Thomas Faulkner, a former lobbyist for Raytheon.<sup>35</sup>

There is also a deal for precision-guided bombs for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates that has been put on hold by Sen. Robert Menendez (D-NJ), the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, over concerns about civilian casualties cause by U.S.-backed and U.S.-armed Saudi air strikes in Yemen.<sup>36</sup> A senatorial hold is customarily respected by the Executive Branch, but it is not legally binding, so in theory the Trump administration could ignore it and go forward with the sale. But given growing Congressional opposition to arming Saudi Arabia after the regime's killing of Jamal Khashoggi, including strong statements against by Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Sen. Bob Corker (R-TN) and Sen. Marco Rubio (D-FL), it is unlikely that a bomb sale to Saudi Arabia and the UAE could make it through the Senate at this time.<sup>37</sup>

Legislative proposals currently in play include a bill sponsored by Rep. Jim McGovern (D-MA) to cut off all arms sales to Saudi Arabia in the wake of the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and because of the continuing Saudi/UAE killings of civilians in Yemen; and an initiative by Senators Bernie Sanders (I-VT), Mike Lee (R-UT) and Chris Murphy (D-CT) to end U.S. support for the Saudi/UAE war effort under the War Powers Resolution; and similar legislation put forward by Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT).<sup>38</sup> A similar measure put forward by Representatives Ro Khanna (D-CA), Mark Pocan (D-WI), Adam Smith (D-WA), Walter Jones (R-NC) and Thomas Massie (R-KY) was denied a vote due to opposition by the Republican leadership and the vast majority of Republican House members. But with the Democrats controlling the House next year, that result could be reversed.

In response to Congressional pressure and the public outcry over the murder of Jamal Khashoggi – which raised the visibility of other Saudi actions, like their indiscriminate killing of civilians in Yemen – the Trump administration has called for a cease fire in Yemen as a prelude to talks to end the war there.<sup>39</sup> The administration has also announced that it will end refueling of Saudi aircraft involved in the Yemen war. But these are limited measures. It remains to be seen whether it will follow through and use all of the leverage it has with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to actually help bring an end to the war. Continued Congressional pressure to end U.S. support for the Saudi/UAE intervention and to block the sale of arms that might be used in the conflict will be an important element of any genuine move towards peace.<sup>40</sup>



## Appendix I

# U.S. ARMS OFFERS TO SAUDI ARABIA 2009 - 2018

The following list consists of potential arms deals notified to Congress during the Obama and Trump administrations. Not all offers notified to Congress result in final sales, and the quantities and value involved in an offer can change as it moves towards completion. Deals that are concluded can take years to complete, from offer, to agreement, to contract, to delivery. The list below represents the universe of arms offers in play over the time period covered. Additional research is required to determine which deals went through, in what quantities, at what value, and when goods or services were delivered.

The list of all notifications for major arms deals between the United States and Saudi Arabia between 2009 and 2018 follows. A link to the formal letter of notification to Congress, which provides additional details on each deal, can be accessed at the web site of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency or by contacting the author. For the larger deals, the short-hand description cannot adequately describe the range and quantity of equipment and services involved, but those details are contained in the official letters of notification to Congress, which can be accessed by clicking on the date of the notification in the table below.

In all, the United States has made \$138.9 billion in arms offers to Saudi Arabia in the past 10 years, \$20.1 billion during the first two years of the Trump administration and \$118.8 billion during the eight years of the Obama administration. Nearly half of the offers -- \$60 billion -- were made during 2010, when large packages for F-15SA combat aircraft, Apache, Black Hawk and other helicopters, tens of thousands of bombs, and other related equipment were offered. Some of these deals are still working their way through the system. For example, the first of 84 F-15SA's offered in October 2010 wasn't delivered until December 2016; as of July 2018, 30 of the aircraft had been delivered.<sup>41</sup>

ITEM	AMOUNT	DATE NOTIFIED
<b>2018</b>		
M-109 Paladin howitzers	\$1.31 billion	April 5, 2018
Armored vehicles, spare parts and repairs	\$300 million	March 22, 2018
TOW 2B anti-tank missiles	\$670 million	March 22, 2018
Maintenance and support for military helicopters	\$106.8 million	March 22, 2018
Support services for PAC-3 missile defense system	\$500 million	January 17, 2018
<b>2018 Total: \$2.9 billion</b>		

ITEM	AMOUNT	DATE NOTIFIED
2017		
THAAD missile defense system	\$15 billion	October 6, 2017
Training, Royal Saudi Air Force	\$750 million	June 5, 2017
AN/TPQ-53(V) radar systems	\$662 million	June 5, 2017
Training, Royal Saudi Naval Force (RSNF)	\$250 million	May 23, 2017
74 K Persistent Threat Detection System Aerostats	\$525 million	January 23, 2017
<b>2017 Total: \$17.2 billion</b>		

ITEM	AMOUNT	DATE NOTIFIED
2016		
CH-47 Chinook cargo helicopters	\$3.51 billion	December 7, 2016
M-1A2S Abrams tanks, related vehicles	\$1.15 billion	August 9, 2016
Support services, Saudi Arabia Ministry of Defense	\$200 million	February 18, 2016
MK-15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons sys- tems, Royal Saudi Navy	\$154.9 million	February 11, 2016
<b>2016 Total: \$5.01 billion</b>		

ITEM	AMOUNT	DATE NOTIFIED
2015		
Air-to-ground munitions (bombs)	\$1.29 billion	November 16, 2015
Multi-Mission Surface Combatant (MMSC) ships	\$11.25 billion	October 20, 2015
UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters	\$ 495 million	October 14, 2015
Ammunition Royal Saudi Land Forces	\$ 500 million	July 29, 2015
PAC-3 missile defense system	\$5.4 billion	July 29, 2015
MH-60R helicopters	\$1.9 billion	May 20, 2015
<b>2015 Total: \$20.83 billion</b>		

ITEM	AMOUNT	DATE NOTIFIED
2014		
PAC-3 missile defense system enhancement	\$1.750 billion	October 1, 2014
AWACS warning and control system aircraft upgrades	\$2.0 billion	August 12, 2014
Support services Saudi Ministry of the Interior	\$ 80 million	April 21, 2014
<b>2014 Total: \$3.8 billion</b>		

ITEM	AMOUNT	DATE NOTIFIED
2013		
Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided missiles	\$170 million	December 5, 2013
Tube-launched, Optically-tracked Wire-guided missiles	\$900 million	December 5, 2013
C4I Systems upgrade and maintenance (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence)	\$1.1 billion	November 18, 2013
Military training	\$90 million	October 15, 2013
Munitions and support	\$6.8 billion	October 15, 2013
Sustainment and support Royal Saudi Air Force	\$1.2 billion	August 23, 2013
Mark V Patrol Boats	\$1.2 billion	July 10, 2013
Saudi Arabian National Guard modernization	\$4.0 billion	June 20, 2013
<b>2013 Total: \$15.46 billion</b>		

ITEM	AMOUNT	DATE NOTIFIED
2012		
Patriot PAC-2 Guided Enhanced Missiles (GEM)	\$130 million	November 28, 2012
Cooperative Logistics Supply Support	\$300 million	November 26, 2012
C-130J and KC-130J Aircraft	\$6.7 billion	November 9, 2012
ISR Suites and support (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance)	\$257 million	August 15, 2012
Follow-on support Royal Saudi Air Force	\$850 million	August 6, 2012
<b>2012 Total: \$8.24 billion</b>		

ITEM	AMOUNT	DATE NOTIFIED
2011		
Patriot Engineering Services Program (ESP)	\$120 million	December 23, 2011
High-Mobility-Multi-Purpose-Wheeled-Vehicles (HMMWVs)	\$33 million	October 27, 2011
Howitzers, radars, ammunition and support	\$886 million	September 19, 2011
CBU-105 sensor-fuzed Weapons	\$355 million	June 13, 2011
Light-Armored Vehicles (LAVs) and support	\$350 million	June 13, 2011
Light-Armored Vehicles (LAVs) and support	\$263 million	June 13, 2011
Night vision equipment	\$330 million	May 12, 2011
<b>Total 2011: \$2.34 billion</b>		



ITEM	AMOUNT	DATE NOTIFIED
2010		
JAVELIN missiles	\$71 million	November 18, 2010
Apache/Black Hawk and other helicopters, related equipment	\$25.6 billion	October 20, 2010
Apache Longbow helicopters	\$3.3 billion	October 20, 2010
Apache Longbow helicopters, engines, night vision sensors	\$2.223 billion	October 20, 2010
F-15SA aircraft, bombs, Missiles	\$29.432 billion	October 20, 2010
Blanket order training	\$350 million	September 15, 2010
<b>2010 Total: \$60.97 billion</b>		

ITEM	AMOUNT	DATE NOTIFIED
2009		
SANG Modernization (Saudi Arabian National Guard)	\$1.31 billion	April 5, 2018
Communication/Navigation Surveillance/Air Traffic Management upgrades	\$300 million	March 22, 2108
TASS (Tactical Airborne)	\$670 million	March 22, 2018
<b>Total 2009: \$2.2 billion</b>		

**TOTAL: 2009 through 2018: \$138.95 billion**



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