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18 March 05

**PALESTINIAN SECURITY PLAN – NATIONAL SECURITY FORCE – REPORT  
BY MILITARY LIAISON OFFICER, JERUSALEM**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

1. **General.** The Palestinian National Security Force (NSF) is a light infantry force with a Northern Command covering the West Bank occupied territories (OTs) and a Southern Command in the Gaza Strip. Southern Command is currently deployed on operations in Gaza whilst Northern Command is non-effective. Annexes B to E to this report provide the detailed findings of the Military Liaison Officer (MLO) on the current NSF deployment in Gaza and the West Bank.
2. The Palestinian Authority (PA) has already made some progress in integrating various military units into a single NSF structure. The degree to which this unification has succeeded will require further assessment. Alongside the re-structuring there is evidence that some younger, more effective commanders are being appointed but many older, ineffective commanders remain in post. The NSF currently lacks the doctrine, command structure and equipment required to be effective. However the deployment in Gaza provides enough evidence of latent capability to justify international efforts to bridge the capability gaps and transform the NSF into a more modern and effective force.
3. The MLO's quick estimate, based on the observed capability of the NSF, has led to a suggested action plan (Annex A to this report) which lists all of the tasks required to be undertaken to reform the NSF.
4. **Approach to Change.** A subtle approach reaps real dividends when dealing with the current NSF commanders and managing change will be all-important. For example, there may be advantages in keeping the "old guard" in positions of authority whilst decisions are made regarding new structures. Steered towards an option that is workable and fits the equipment that is on offer they will take it. In this way, key decisions can be

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imposed on them without upsetting sensibilities<sup>1</sup>. With subtle timing, once the decisions are made and the new structures are emerging the "old guard" can be retired with honour. A new command structure can then begin working, with a system in place that Palestinian commanders have planned, directed and thus endorsed.

### CONCLUSION

5. Using the PA's own plans as a basis but backed up by careful planning, mentoring and sufficient funding and offers of capability enhancements from other nations the NSF can be reconstituted as an effective military force. A co-ordinated approach is vital and orchestrating the international effort will be key. The immediate centres of gravity, which require addressing urgently, are;

- command and control
- communications
- personal equipment
- intelligence
- front line logistic support

In the longer term there is a need to rebuild the infrastructure, establish sensible manning structures and develop suitable standard operating procedures (SOPs), doctrine, training, full logistic support, administration and accountability.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

6. The action plan at Annex A should be implemented in order to improve the capability of the NSF.

7. Measures should be incremental according to the funding, Israeli acquiescence and capabilities available, with priority given to those serials in the action plan that improve the key areas identified in paragraph 5 above.

8. A lead nation should be appointed to oversee the implementation of the action plan for the NSF. Co-ordination of the action plan within the wider context should be provided by the joint headquarters under General Ward to ensure that capability enhancements are commensurate with the aims of overall security sector reform (SSR).

D A COOPER  
Lieutenant Colonel  
for DA

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<sup>1</sup> A working example of this approach is the MLO's first discussion with the NSF (Northern) Commander of Signals. His communications plan included 36 High Frequency (HF) radio sets for the West Bank area. The MLO questioned the utility of HF communications in an Internal Security (IS) context. Commander Signals understood immediately and agreed that the plan was inappropriate. It quickly transpired that this plan was the work of the Egyptians who were offering to provide the equipment, at a price. Commander Signals provided his new plan to the MLO within days, which outlined the requirement for an encrypted digital communications network, something the MLO had "mentioned" in the discussions.

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Annexes:

- A. Action Plan for Enhancement of NSF.
- B. Detailed Report on Gaza NSF.
- C. Detailed Report on West Bank NSF.
- D. Photographs.
- E. NSF Submission on Proposed NSF Structure.
- F. Current Structure (MLO Assessment).

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**ACTION PLAN FOR CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENTS TO PALESTINIAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCE (NSF)**

Ser	Action	Detailed Tasks	Progress	Date Reviewed
(a)	(c)	(d)		(e)

**J1 – Personnel**

J1-1	Establish manning structure for NSF	Based on the operational and administrative tasks required of the NSF, a structure for the NSF needs to be agreed with the Palestinian Authority (PA)	NSF Northern Districts Command have prepared their proposed structures	11 Mar 05
J1-1.1		Establish Headquarters structures	NSF draft available	14 Mar 05
J1-1.2		Establish light infantry brigade structure	NSF draft available	14 Mar 05
J1-1.3		Establish light infantry battalion structure	NSF draft available	14 Mar 05
J1-1.4		Establish specialist unit/sub-unit structures;		
J1-1.4.1		Border Control		
J1-1.4.2		Coastal Defence (Gaza)		
J1-1.4.3		Airport Control		
J1-1.4.4		Military Engineering	NSF draft available	14 Mar 05
J1-1.4.5		Military Communications	NSF draft available	14 Mar 05
J1-1.4.6		Logistic Support	NSF draft available	14 Mar 05
J1-1.4.7		Medical	NSF draft available	14 Mar 05
J1-1.4.8		Training	NSF draft available	14 Mar 05
J1-2	Establish career structure and manning			

	guidelines		
J1-3	Establish retirement funding and procedures		
J1-3.1		Identify personnel to retire	
J1-3.2		Allocate pension funds	
J1-3.3		Retire personnel	
J1-4	Establish recruiting procedures	Separate requirements for officers and other ranks	
J1-4.1		Define recruit standards	
J1-4.2		Produce initial recruiting plan	
J1-4.3		Produce ongoing recruiting plan	

**J2 – Operational Intelligence**

J2-1	Establish Intelligence Architecture		
J2-1.1		Establish Central Command Intelligence Branch	
J2-1.2		Establish Southern District Command Intelligence Branch (Gaza)	
J2-1.3		Establish Northern District Command Intelligence Branch (West Bank)	
J2-1.4		Establish Brigade Intelligence Cells	
J2-1.5		Establish Battalion Intelligence Cells	
J2-1.6		Deliver formal intelligence training	
J2-1.6.1		Staff Officers	
J2-1.6.2		Battalion Intelligence Officers	
J2-1.6.3		Collators / analysts	

J2-1.7	Establish Information Management (IM) System	
J2-1.7.1	Collection	
J2-1.7.2	Logging	
J2-1.7.3	Collation	
J2-1.7.4	Request for Information (RFI) management	
J2-1.7.5	Analysis	
J2-1.7.6	Dissemination	

### J3 – Current Operations

J3-1	Plan for Israeli disengagement in Gaza		
J3-1.1	Carry out Formal Estimate		
J3-1.2	Produce Concept of Operations		
J3-1.3	Produce Tactical Plan		
J3-1.4	Build/refurbish patrol bases and checkpoints		
J3-1.5	Build/refurbish barracks facilities		
J3-2	Plan for Israeli disengagement in West Bank areas		
J3-2.1	Carry out Formal Estimate		
J3-2.2	Produce Concept of Operations		
J3-2.3	Produce Tactical Plan	NSF deployment plan available	14 Mar 05
J3-2.4	Build/refurbish patrol bases and checkpoints		
J3-2.5	Build/refurbish barracks facilities	NSF building plans available	14 Mar 05
J3-3	Establish commitments		

	cycle – operations, training, rest		
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**J4 – Logistics/Medical**

J4-1	Motorised Transport	Establish a vehicle fleet and maintenance facilities	
J4-1.1		Identify Light Utility Vehicle and variant requirement	
J4-1.2		Identify Medium Utility Vehicle and variant requirement	
J4-1.3		Identify Heavy Utility Vehicle and variant requirement	
J4-1.4		Identify other vehicle requirements	
J4-1.5		Provide secure workshop facilities	
J4-1.6		Provide POL facilities	
J4-1.7		Establish accounting system	
J4-1.8		Roll-out vehicle fleet	
J4-2	Weapons		
J4-2.1		Identify personal weapon requirement	
J4-2.2		Identify non-lethal weapon requirement	
J4-2.3		Identify other weapon requirements (PPW, LMG etc)	
J4-2.4		Agree issue of new weapons with Israelis	
J4-2.5		Provide secure storage	
J4-2.6		Establish accounting system	
J4-2.7		Distribute new stocks	
J4-2.8		Withdraw and destroy old stocks	

J4-3	Ammunition			
J4-3.1		Agree issue of stocks with Israelis		
J4-3.2		Provide secure storage		
J4-3.3		Establish accounting system		
J4-3.4		Distribute new stocks		
J4-3.5		Withdraw and destroy old stocks		
J4-4	Medical			
J4-4.1		Identify equipment requirement	NSF plan available	14 Mar 05
J4-4.2		Identify training requirement		
J4-4.3		Build/refurbish facilities	NSF building plans available	14 Mar 05
J4-4.4		Implement training		
J4-4.5		Provide drugs and consumables		
J4-4.6		Provide secure storage		
J4-4.7		Establish accounting system		
J4-4.8		Distribute new stocks		
J4-4.9		Withdraw and destroy old stocks		

### **J5 – Crisis and deliberate planning**

J5-1	Plan for rebuilding infrastructure			
J5-1.1		Decide locations	Existing sites are rented or too small in some cases	14 Mar 05
J5-1.2		Survey sites		
J5-1.3		Produce building plans	Detailed plans already compiled by NSF Civil Engineers	14 Mar 05
J5-2	Plan future deployment			



	(post-disengagement)		
J5-2.1		Carry out Formal Estimate	
J5-2.2		Produce Concept of Operations	
J5-2.3		Produce Tactical Plan	
J5-2.3.1		Define Missions and Tasks of NSF units	
J5-2.3.2		Define Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAORs)	
J5-2.4		Produce Logistic Support Plan	

### J6 – Communication and Information Systems

J6-1	Establish radio communications		
J6-1.1		Comms Survey of West Bank	1. NSF draft available 2. German company carrying out survey for police communications 14 Mar 05
J6-1.2		Comms Survey of Gaza	
J6-1.3		Comms Survey to link West Bank & Gaza	
J6-1.4		Select bearer system	
J6-1.5		Install rebrros	
J6-1.6		Issue equipment	
J6-1.7		Establish maintenance and repair facilities	
J6-2	Establish Wide Area Network for IT		
J6-2.1		Survey requirement	NSF draft available 14 Mar 05
J6-2.2		Establish PCs in offices to agreed scale	
J6-2.3		Establish LANs on selected sites	

J6-2.4	Link LANs	
J6-2.5	Link remaining stand-alone IT to WAN system where required	

### **J7 – Doctrine and Training**

J7-1	Provide Training Establishments		
J7-1.1	Refurbish Central Recruit Training Facility in Jericho	Currently in use. Requires extensive refurbishment and provision of all administrative equipment and training aids.	11 Mar 05
J7-1.2	Establish Officer Training Academy		
J7-1.3	<sup>1</sup> Establish Southern District Training Facility (Gaza) for cadre training (JNCO, SNCO, specialist training cadres)	3 possible sites identified. All require extensive rebuild and equipping from scratch	11 Mar 05
J7-1.4	<sup>1</sup> Establish Northern District Training Facility (West Bank) for cadre (JNCO, SNCO, specialist training cadres)	One possible site identified in Jericho requiring extensive refurbishment and some new building. Requires equipping from scratch	11 Mar 05
J7-1.5	Refurbish and re-equip unit training facilities		
J7-2	Write doctrine	Some pamphlets are in use but are likely to require a re-write	14 Mar 05
J7-2.1	Command and Staff Procedures		
J7-2.2	Combined Arms Operations		
J7-2.3	Battalion Tactics		
J7-2.4	Company Tactics		
J7-2.5	Conventional Tactics Techniques and		

<sup>1</sup> One central cadre training establishment might be sufficient subject to movement restrictions Gaza – West Bank

J7-2.6		Procedures (TTPs) (Tactical Aide-Memoire)	
J7-2.7		Internal Security TTPs	
J7-2.8		Engineer TTPs	
J7-2.9		Communications and Information Systems	
J7-2.10		Information and Intelligence	
J7-3	Design Training	Logistics	
J7-3.1		Design Senior NCO training course	
J7-3.2		Design Junior NCO training course	
J7-3.3		Design Junior Officer training	
J7-3.4		Design recruit training	
J7-3.5		Design Junior Staff Officer training	
J7-3.6		Design Senior Staff Officer training	
J7-3.7		Design continuation (unit) training	
J7-3.8		Design communications training	
J7-3.9		Design engineer training	
J7-3.10		Design IT training	
J7-3.11		Design logistics training	
J7-3.12		Identify overseas courses requirement and capacity	
J7-3.13		Identify and design Distance Learning requirement	
J7-4	Implement Training		
J7-4.1		Senior NCO training course	
J7-4.2		Junior NCO training course	
J7-4.3		Junior Officer training	

J7-4.4		Junior Staff Officer training	
J7-4.5		Senior Staff Officer training	
J7-4.6		Communications training	
J7-4.7		Engineer training	
J7-4.8		IT training	
J7-4.9		Logistics Training	
J7-4.10		Distance Learning	

### J8 – Finance and Human Resources

J8-1	Implement financial accountability		
J8-1.1		Design budgetary system	NSF draft available
J8-1.2		Train staff	14 Mar 05
J8-1.3		Provide IT and office equipment	
J8-2	Implement Human Resources Strategy		
J8-2.1		Health & Safety	
J8-2.2		Employment legislation	
J8-2.3		Terms & conditions of service	

### J9 – Policy, Legal, Presentation

J9-1	Media Operations		
J9-1.1		Train Press Officers	
J9-1.2		Produce Media Plan	
J9-1.3		Generate “good news” stories	
J9-2	Military Law		

J9-2.1	Examine requirement		
J9-2.2	Write legislation		
J9-2.3	Train commanders		
J9-2.4	Disseminate		
J9-2.5	Implement		

**DETAILED REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY FORCE SOUTHERN  
COMMAND (GAZA)****BACKGROUND**

1. Following permission from General Mousa Arafat, Commander of the National Security Force (NSF) in Gaza, a detailed tour of the North Gaza NSF deployment was carried out on 17 Feb 05. A detailed tour was led by Brigadier Suleiman Hilis, Commander of the North Gaza NSF and Brigadier Rajav, Director of Operations for the NSF in Gaza. A further visit to South Gaza took place on 21 Feb 05, led by Brigadier Rajav and Colonel Jamal Khayed, Commander of the South Gaza NSF. A "wash up" meeting was held with General Arafat and Brigadier Rajav on 24 Feb 05. The MLO was accompanied on all visits by SSgt McQueer from the Defence Section, Tel Aviv.
2. A considerable amount of detailed information has been gathered regarding the NSF organisation, current deployment, current effectiveness and particularly the capability gaps that exist in the Gaza deployment. However there were some discrepancies in the information volunteered by the different commanders, which requires resolving. A summary of the findings thus far is set out under the Functions in Combat headings below, followed by a prioritised list of where capabilities can best be enhanced, immediately and later.

**INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE**

3. The deployment has been made with due regard to the *modus operandi* of the insurgents carrying out the rocket/mortar attacks. It is assessed that following an initial, somewhat linear deployment a later estimate has led to increased depth, with gaps covered by foot and vehicle patrols. It is therefore assessed that there is knowledge of the estimate process within the staff at brigade/division (equivalent) level and that the planning process has been guided by intelligence.
4. It is less apparent that the patrol and checkpoint activity is driven by intelligence on a day to day basis. The deployment is static, inflexible and reactive. Contingency plans exist to react to incidents, but there is no evidence of intelligence-led planning in order to interdict attacks before they occur.
5. The Signals Officer and the Operations Officer keep an incident log in the operations room at brigade level but this appears to consist only of reports on incidents. There is no evidence that "pattern of life" studies or information gathering takes place at battalion level or below but the NSF battalions do have an Intelligence Officer appointed who works with Military Intelligence (MI) personnel. The detail of this linkage requires determining.
6. The role and composition of the MI units has not yet been firmly established. One checkpoint visited in the South was manned by MI troops, prompting the impression that the role is not as specialised as the title suggests. First impressions are that intelligence is almost entirely derived from human sources and that NSF interdiction of insurgent operations is driven by "tip offs" from the public. The intelligence effort as a whole requires better integration and needs to encompass a broader spectrum of information

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gathering e.g. low level information provided by patrols and surveillance.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

7. Operations Rooms / Command Posts. The Northern Brigade Headquarters (HQ) is housed in a substantial building in Gaza city, adjacent to a Police Station. The building is in a poor state of repair but functional. One desktop computer was seen and general IT support is assessed as inadequate. The Southern Brigade HQ is housed in an adequate barracks facility to the South East of Khan Yunis, again the IT and communications are poor to non-existent. A stated aspiration of Brigadier Rajav is to establish a total of 3 effective operations rooms, one in the North (but not in the current HQ location), one in the South in the existing HQ complex and a central operations room in Gaza City (but not in General Arafat's HQ complex). Detailed written proposals for these operations rooms were received on 24 Feb 05 and are being looked at. The aspiration is valid and sensible – a key weakness at the tactical level is the lack of an effective command and control. This is caused by;

- paucity of communications equipment
- lack of facilities for command, information management and integration required to co-ordinate the actions of the deployed force

8. Two battalion operations rooms were visited in the North, both housed in offices on a site where IDF incursions have destroyed 80% of the original barracks. These offices were of insufficient size for an effective operations room. They had a landline telephone, a hand-held motorola (see communications below) and a hand-drawn map<sup>1</sup>. One PC (assessed to be 5-8 years old running Windows 98) was being used for administration. The HQ of a Border Guards battalion in the South was in a better state of repair having been untouched by any Israeli incursions but the quantity and serviceability of the equipment was much the same. Company operations rooms everywhere consisted of a tent or makeshift shed collocated with a Vehicle Check Point (VCP). These are just adequate for a short-term deployment in the field but are woefully short of communications and basic stores (map boards, stationery, furniture etc). They are not adequate for a sustained deployment.

9. Communications. This is a key weakness at all levels, acknowledged and emphasised by the commanders. Each battalion retains 6 - 7 hand-held Motorola radios. An acute shortage of batteries and chargers causes a high level of redundancy. Communications are supplemented by locally purchased mobile phones. The Motorolas are prioritised to the more sensitive checkpoints indicating a degree of resource planning. Information cannot be passed quickly and this degrades command and control, in particular the capability to react quickly to events.

10. Liaison. Liaison with the IDF takes place at the local level but is assessed as being inadequate and it fails to remove mutual suspicion. The NSF could operate more effectively given greater freedom of movement and fewer constraints on their methods. The very areas that are most sensitive and used by insurgents for launching attacks are in many cases denied to the NSF by the overwatching Israelis. The South Gaza NSF Commander was particularly strident in his calls for the Israelis to allow him the freedom

<sup>1</sup> The hand drawn maps may seem primitive but are very effective in that they are accurate for the purpose and are kept up to date in a landscape that changes daily.



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to be more effective. As a recently promoted, younger generation commander and a graduate of the Indian Defence Services Staff College it is assessed that he could indeed improve his Formation's collective performance if he was not so constrained<sup>2</sup>.

11. A series of Co-ordination Points needs to be established and manned in order to resolve the liaison difficulties on the ground. If such Co-ordination Points are currently not possible a small, independent monitoring force in the border areas could have a marked effect on improving IDF confidence in the NSF thus permitting more effective NSF operations. Either way, situational awareness on both sides regarding what the other is trying to achieve is currently poor. The potential for a nervous IDF sentry or an over-zealous NSF soldier to initiate a damaging exchange of unnecessary fire is a high risk that needs to be removed.

12. Liaison on the ground with Egyptian forces is, rather surprisingly, non-existent. Whilst there have been recent visits by the Egyptians to Gaza, no co-ordination has been established to allow the NSF commanders on the ground to liaise with the Egyptian forces.

MANOEUVRE

13. Deployment. An illustration of the current NSF structure as deployed in Gaza is at Appendix 1. 8 battalions are currently deployed in North Gaza under NSF command. One of these is the Naval Police unit which only has 2 companies. 4 others, including a Military Intelligence (MI) unit and the "elite" Force 17, have 4 companies and their strength was given as 450 officers and other ranks. 2 further battalions of guards<sup>3</sup> are deployed under NSF command in the North. In the South there are 5 NSF battalions and 3 guards battalions under NSF command. One officer from 1st Guards Battalion in the South gave a figure of 300 as the total strength of the Battalion. There are 3 companies to a guards battalion, so this figure seems doctrinally correct. Thus the total force on paper is around 3050 in North Gaza and 3150 in South Gaza. It is assessed that the manpower figures given are optimistic and largely doctrinal. Given undermanning and allowing for shift changes there are probably only 2,000 - 2,500 NSF deployed on the ground throughout the Gaza Strip as a whole. This figure is backed up by observations made throughout the visits to Gaza and it is further assessed that deployed numbers are slowly dwindling

14. Concept of Operations. The NSF concept of operations is to dominate the main routes outside the built-up areas that lie close to the Israeli settlements/border in order to deny the insurgents access to the side roads (which provide access to the preferred launch sites). The deployment relies heavily on VCPs and satellite patrols which operate from the VCPs. The satellite patrols tend to move only on the main routes between the VCPs, by vehicle where the VCPs are more widely spaced, otherwise on foot. Commanders agreed that a rudimentary surveillance capability is desirable but as yet no capability exists - the IDF do not permit it and there is no basic equipment available (not even binoculars). There are reserve elements at company and battalion level, intended to provide a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) capability. The concept is sound, given the available resources and current capability. It could be much improved by a surveillance capability and by being more intelligence-led and proactive.

<sup>2</sup> There is a discernible effort within the NSF higher command to replace older officers with more effective, more committed, younger commanders. This requires briefing in more detail to the Israelis who should be persuaded to allow the new generation to prove themselves without unnecessary fetters.

<sup>3</sup> Guards battalions have 3 companies. The guards battalions are deployed along the eastern border with Israel.



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15. Tunnel Operations. Tunnels exist between Egypt and the Rafah area of South Gaza. The Battalion Commander of the area visited stated that the main tunnels under the border are relatively large and 8-12 metres below ground level. Beyond the 150 metre-wide cleared security zone the main tunnels branch into several feeder tunnels dug from the edges of the Rafah built-up area or its ruins. The most southern battalions have the added task of "destroying and demolishing tunnels" (the Bde Comd's words). Again this use of words points to a failure to implement effects-based operations. There is no apparent effort by deployed troops to FIND the tunnels, merely a reliance on human sources to notify the locations prior to the NSF being tasked to block or collapse them. It appears to be only the smaller feeder tunnels that are routinely located and these are quickly replaced when demolished. Better co-operation between the IDF and the NSF and the use of some technical equipment could yield results in terms of finding the main tunnels. Whilst the IDF have tried this before, a combined IDF / NSF or Egyptian / NSF effort in a less tense atmosphere might have more success.

16. At the meeting on 24 Feb 05 Brigadier Rajav reported that a main tunnel had been found on 23 Feb 05 and filled in with sand.

17. Mobility. Vehicles (those observed were Isuzu pick-up trucks carrying 8-10 men and similar 4x4 utility vehicles) are short in number so their use is prioritised to the mobile patrols and QRFs. There is insufficient mobility but more work is required to establish the existing capacity of the vehicles held.

### FIREPOWER

18. Weapons. The personal weapon is the Kalashnikov (AK series). There is approximately one weapon between 4 men, rotated on shift change. The weapons are dated and are in varying states of serviceability resulting in poor reliability (weapons appear clean and well looked after). Ammunition first scales should be 120 rounds per man but this is also in short supply, 30-55 rounds per man was quoted. The ammunition is at least 10 years old, with some stocks having been previously buried in order to avoid detection. One round ejected from a weapon at random to demonstrate the age was verified as 1964 vintage.

19. At the meeting on 24 Feb 05 General Arafat made a specific request that the UK ask the Israelis to allow the import into Gaza of a bulk purchase of ammunition from the Egyptians. This has already been negotiated between the Palestinians and Egyptians. This request will be relayed to the Israelis but is certain to be refused.

20. Weapon Training. Due to shortages a recruit fires 5 rounds in his basic training (this may not be happening at present due to IDF restrictions). There is no continuation live firing training and no simulation available.

21. Rules of Engagement (ROE). ROE are in place and briefed to all levels. The concept of minimum force is applied with lethal force only to be used where life is threatened.

### PROTECTION

22. No helmets or body armour were seen in use, the status of individual protection will be looked into further but it is assessed that none exists. Defences, even cover from view, are not permitted in the areas overlooked by the IDF so the VCPs are exposed. Away from

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these areas some effort has been made but there is no dedicated engineer capability in the NSF. Civil contractors, advised by NSF officers who have learned rudimentary skills on courses overseas, carry out engineering. For this reason, protection is invariably incorrectly sited and poorly constructed.

### LOGISTICS

23. General. Logistic support is inadequate. There are local workshops for vehicles but funding is scarce. There is one weapons workshop, described by a commander as "mediocre" but not visited.

24. Medical. Battalions have first aid trained personnel but no organic medical facility, i.e. no ambulances and no Regimental Aid Post equivalent. The 1<sup>st</sup> Guards Battalion in the South had a medical clinic and a "medical technician" who stated that he had sufficient supplies but that his facility was capable only of giving First Aid. He said that many troops suffered from stomach conditions and flu-like symptoms as a result of the poor living conditions.

25. Consumables. Radios have no spare batteries, thus the set is unavailable whilst its battery is recharged. This exacerbates redundancy of equipment.

26. Infrastructure. Poor to non-existent. Barracks and other facilities need to be re-built. Plans have been drawn up for this but funding is not available.

### MISCELLANEOUS

27. Morale. The commanders report morale as high and this appears to be the case despite the difficulties. Commanders have a good rapport with their subordinates. An air of pride and discipline was evident during the recce.

28. Training. There are 2 rudimentary training facilities in North Gaza. One in Gaza city with an area of open ground and some classrooms with desks, and another similar collocated with a battalion headquarters where some drill training of new recruits was observed. Similarly there was training activity inside 1<sup>st</sup> Guards Battalion location in the South. Training aids are virtually non-existent. That said, the understanding of training and doctrine amongst the officer ranks appears good. Many have received training and other qualifications in foreign countries e.g India, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, Jordan and Algeria. The tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) for Internal Security are not dissimilar to British Army TTPs, but the training observed was limited to foot drill. With better resources it is assessed that basic training in the operational aspects could be raised considerably, with only limited outside manpower required for specialist areas.

### PRIORITIES FOR ENHANCING THE NSF IN GAZA

29. A detailed matrix of recommendations is at Appendix 1. The priorities for enhancement are summarised below.

30. Equipment and Infrastructure. More in-depth analysis is required to assess the required enhancement and how it is best delivered. However there are some very clear areas that require addressing urgently. The list below has been based partly on the requests made by NSF commanders, but is tempered by the judgement of the MLO as to immediate

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impact, affordability and minimum risk of resources being delivered now that are incompatible with later reform. In order of priority:

- a. Improved Communications. A local purchase of compatible Motorola radios, including vehicle and base stations, with adequate spare battery capacity and charging facilities is urgently required. This would significantly improve command and control.
- b. Mobility. More vehicles are required, with the ability to sustain them. Further work is required to determine how many are required and where.
- c. Infrastructure. Rebuilding of destroyed facilities is required. The deployment of temporary Portakabin-type shelters for a variety of needs (Command Posts, accommodation etc) would have an immediate impact whilst the longer term rebuilding proceeds.
- d. Equipping of Operations Rooms. The provision of basic furniture, office equipment and stationery items to complement the communications equipment would significantly enhance the effectiveness of operations rooms at the tactical level.
- e. Medical. A sustainable medical infrastructure is required. The provision of one equipped ambulance per battalion would be a significant start.
- f. Weapons and Ammunition. The NSF lacks an adequate firearms capability. In the absence of Israeli permission for this some effort to improve the serviceability and reliability of the existing weapons is highly desirable.
- g. Training Aids. The training facilities need rebuilding and repairing and thereafter equipping. Lack of any proper live-firing facility is key. This could be addressed by range construction but shortages of ammunition and weapons may prove too restrictive. A Dismounted Close Combat Trainer<sup>4</sup> in each training facility would have an immediate impact, improving both judgemental and basic shooting skills. A pipe range in each battalion location for limited live firing and zeroing of weapons would be the second priority, provided there is adequate ammunition.

31. Command Support

- a. Establishment of Co-ordination Points. Persuading the IDF to significantly enhance the level of liaison activity between commanders on the ground in order to increase overall situational awareness is of the highest priority.
- b. Command and Staff Training. NSF officers are relatively well trained but require to be brought up to date with newer concepts that will enable them to plan and conduct operations more effectively.

32. Training. Addressing the infrastructure and equipment concerns, together with the efforts to select newer, less moribund commanders throughout the NSF will lead to a much

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<sup>4</sup> A simulator where converted weapons fire a laser beam at a video film. Film can be produced by the user and used on the system (e.g. a populated street with a terrorist target appearing in it). A 4 lane system including weapons of choice costs c.£81K, a 10 lane system c.£150K. Via DPA, obtained from Firearms Training Systems Ltd (UK).

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improved capacity for the NSF to deliver effective training from within its own resources. A limited amount of specialist training will be required to supplement this effort, for instance procedures for working with Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)<sup>5</sup> teams and Military Engineering skills.

### CONCLUSION

33. Based on this initial survey of the NSF in Gaza, the assessment of potential capability is positive. There is an understanding of doctrine and tactics, albeit that it is dated by British Army standards. There is an urgent need to address NSF capability gaps now in order to prepare for Israeli disengagement. The initial visits by the MLO have scoped only the immediate efforts required to achieve an acceptable working capability for the current deployment. Further work is required in Gaza and should be followed by a similar project in the West Bank. The recommendations in Annex A represent only the start of a very substantial effort required to bring the NSF capability up to standard. It is important that these immediate recommendations are effected quickly and that the momentum is maintained with further enhancement in line with later security sector reform (SSR).

34. Basic equipment is in short supply but there are discernible areas where immediate help could have a significant impact whilst remaining compatible with later efforts. Soldiers are motivated and smart despite their equipment shortcomings. It is assessed that they would readily assimilate effective training, which could be delivered largely from internal resources once infrastructure is improved.

35. Currently, Internal Security operations are too static and reactive rather than effects-based and intelligence-led. Some staff training leading to better integration and improved command and staff procedures could address this. Improved liaison and co-ordination with the Israelis is essential at the lower levels of command.

36. At present the Israeli view is that the deployment is not proactive or sufficiently determined in that the NSF is not arresting the perpetrators of the rocket and mortar attacks or looking to seek out and destroy the manufacturing capability. Second, the Israelis will not permit any enhancements to the NSF that might be diverted for use against Israeli interests, for example munitions and surveillance equipment. Thus important progress in enhancing the NSF capability is not yet possible in some areas. Whilst these issues remain sensitive for the present they are not immutable. If the NSF can demonstrate a clearer and more robust commitment to countering the insurgent activity there could yet be progress.

37. It is encouraging that planning for the re-building of infrastructure is underway to some extent, based on a newly emerging NSF structure. The scale of effort and the generic manpower structures envisaged by the NSF mean that the priority 1 efforts in Annex A below are not nugatory, they reflect basic capabilities at the lower levels which are required immediately. The priority 2 and 3 measures should form part of the longer-term planning for SSR and will continue to be monitored and developed.

38. It was very clear from the meeting on 24 Feb 05 that General Arafat's frustration is mounting. He and his staff have provided a great deal of assistance and detail to inform this report whilst their forces continue to operate under very difficult conditions. They do not view it as unreasonable that the UK should now respond with some immediate help in

<sup>5</sup> Project CASTOR is equipping and training the Palestinian Police EOD teams. The NSF will require an understanding of how they operate and how to task them effectively.

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the key areas. If this is not forthcoming, the goodwill that exists currently may quickly evaporate.

Appendices:

1. NSF Structure in Gaza.
2. Detailed recommendations for capability enhancements to Gaza NSF.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CAPABILITY ENHANCEMENT OF PALESTINIAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCE (NSF) IN GAZA

Ser	Priority	Recommendation	Action Required	Progress	Date Reviewed
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(e)
1	1	<p><u>Equipment</u></p> <p><u>Communications</u></p> <p>1. An immediate donation should be made to the NSF of communications equipment with associated spare batteries and a maintenance contract.</p> <p>2. A comprehensive package of communications enhancement should be donated in the short-term (prior to Israeli disengagement)</p> <p><u>Mobility</u>. The 20 Isuzu Pick-Up Trucks (originally ordered for the Central Intervention Force (CIF)) held in the Israeli port of Ashdod should be released to the NSF.</p>	<p>1. Funding required to make immediate improvement in communications.</p> <p>2. Further funding to be determined after a more extensive survey of the existing equipment and shortfall in capability.</p> <p>3. There is some knowledge on the ground of existing dead-spots. A plan is required to determine where more relay stations are needed.</p>	£50,000 now granted to MLO for small projects fund.	17 Mar 05
2	1	<p><u>Accommodation</u>. Temporary Portakabin-type shelters should be provided as a matter of urgency. An initial donation of 30 -50 is required immediately to provide shelter and office space for the current deployment i.e. VCPs, Patrol Bases and Command Posts.</p>	<p>1. Permission required from GCPP to transfer cars.</p> <p>2. Final payment and transfer of cars to Gaza - the agent has stated that they can move within 24 hours of payment being finalised.</p>	<b>COMPLETED</b>	17 Mar 05
3	1	<p><u>Accommodation</u>. Temporary Portakabin-type shelters should be provided as a matter of urgency. An initial donation of 30 -50 is required immediately to provide shelter and office space for the current deployment i.e. VCPs, Patrol Bases and Command Posts.</p>	<p>MLO to carry out more detailed survey of deployment to determine exact number required and prioritise.</p>		23 Feb 05



4	2	<p><u>Administration.</u> Basic furniture, office equipment and stationery items should be donated to enhance the effectiveness of operations rooms at the tactical level.</p>	Requirements to be analysed and costed	<p>Detailed survey of NSF Southern Command (Gaza) ops room completed on 15 Mar. Awaiting purchase of equipment:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ 2 laptop computers</li> <li>▪ 3 desktop computers</li> <li>▪ One scanner</li> <li>▪ One fax machine</li> <li>▪ One photocopier</li> <li>▪ One Motorola base station</li> <li>▪ 2 Motorola hand held radios</li> <li>▪ Miscellaneous office stationery</li> </ul>	17 Mar 05
5	2	<p><u>Medical.</u> A fleet of 8 ambulances with an immediate life-saving capability should be donated (one per NSF battalion).</p>	Cost and source suitable vehicles and equipment		23 Feb 05
6	2	<p><u>Weapons</u></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Existing weapons should be inspected and refurbished where they are dangerous or unreliable.</li> <li>2. In the longer term the force should be re-equipped with suitable small arms.</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Qualified armourer required.</li> <li>2. Funds for spares.</li> <li>3. Subsequent funds for re-equipping.</li> <li>4. Israeli permission for re-equipping.</li> </ol>		23 Feb 05
7	3	<p><u>Ammunition.</u> New ammunition stocks should be donated at a scale of 120 rounds per existing weapon. Old stocks should be withdrawn and destroyed.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Exact number of weapons to be determined</li> <li>2. Israeli permission required</li> <li>3. Source</li> <li>4. Fund</li> </ol>	<p>The NSF has already agreed a purchase of ammunition from Egypt. The MLO was requested to approach the Israelis to permit this to be imported. A request</p>	25 Feb 05

			5. Import 6. Distribute 7. Withdraw and destroy old stocks	will be made but it is certain that the Israelis will not permit this at this stage. Hence Priority 3.	
8	1	<b>Infrastructure</b> <u>Protection.</u> VCPs and Patrol Bases should be afforded better protection.	1. Permission from Israelis to construct defences. 2. Funding of work. 3. Military Engineer required to advise and help with construction.	Israelis reluctant to agree unless NSF commitment to preventing attacks is more demonstrable.	25 Feb 05
9	2	<u>Training Facilities.</u> The NSF training facilities should be rebuilt and thereafter equipped.	1. Decide location(s) and exact facilities required 2. Produce building plans 3. Fund 4. Build 5. Equip		23 Feb 05
10	2	<u>Barracks.</u> Barracks accommodation should be rebuilt on those sites identified as having been destroyed by IDF incursions.	1. Decide priorities and exact facilities required 2. Produce building plans 3. Fund 4. Build 5. Equip		23 Feb 05
11	3	<u>Surveillance Towers/Sangars.</u> A basic surveillance capability should be built into the deployment at selected checkpoints and patrol locations.	1. Permission from Israelis to construct towers/sangars. 2. Funding of work. 3. Military Engineer required to advise and help with construction.	This has been discussed with the Israelis. They will not permit such a surveillance capability at this stage. Hence Priority 3.	25 Feb 05
12	1	<b>Command Support</b> <u>Liaison.</u> It is recommended that the Israelis be approached as a matter of urgency and requested to help in establishing better co-ordination with the NSF forces on the ground	1. Agree concept with IDF. 2. Implement Co-ord Points or other measures.		23 Feb 05



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13	2	<p><u>Command and Staff Training.</u> It is recommended that training packages for junior commanders and staff officers be implemented for the NSF, to consist of;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Doctrinal updates</li> <li>▪ IS Operations TTPs</li> <li>▪ Intelligence Collection &amp; Collation</li> <li>▪ Operations Room Procedures</li> </ul>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Content to be refined and agreed with NSF.</li> <li>2. Consideration of external course places for NSF.</li> <li>3. Implementation of Short Term Training Teams;             <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. "Train the Trainer" for junior commanders</li> <li>b. Command and Staff Training for Ops Officers and selected staff</li> </ol> </li> </ol>	23 Feb 05
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**DETAILED REPORT ON WEST BANK (WB) NATIONAL SECURITY FORCE (NSF)****BACKGROUND**

1. Following permission from General Haj Ismael, Commander of NSF Northern Command (West Bank) visits were made to the Ramallah Central Operations Room and thereafter to a battalion (+) location in Salfit. This is only the start of the MLO's activity in the West Bank and more visits will be required to determine the extent to which capability enhancement for the NSF will be required. The aim of this report is to summarise the information gathered so far and compare the situation to Gaza where appropriate, in order to make recommendations for a cohesive approach to enhancing the NSF capability.
2. The situation in the West Bank is markedly different from that in Gaza. The IDF presence has largely succeeded in disabling the militant capability. The NSF commanders assess that only 2-300 Palestinian militants remain active in the West Bank as a whole. At the same time the Israeli occupation has totally destroyed the capability of the NSF itself and inflicted significant damage on its infrastructure. NSF personnel are not permitted to bear arms or to move between areas in uniform. NSF locations are subject to sporadic IDF attacks whereby buildings are damaged and property and uniforms are confiscated. Areas that the IDF consider being non-permissible to the NSF are sometimes targeted by small arms fire resulting in risk to life.
3. For the NSF part there is a determination to carry on in the face of great adversity but an almost total lack of any capability. The NSF, being unarmed, are in no position to confront the militants. The establishment of the Central Operations Room (COR) in Ramallah has provided a focus for the NSF Northern Commander and his staff and has resulted in a great deal of forward planning. For the most part this planning appears logical and the structures proposed are recognisable. In short, the plans already in place can and should be built upon, thus ensuring maximum co-operation from the Palestinians as authors of their own destiny.
4. The next section of this report lists the detailed findings under the Functions in Combat headings as used in Annex A, the detailed Gaza report.

**INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE**

5. It is difficult to assess the current intelligence capability, because the restrictions placed on the NSF in the West Bank prevent them from carrying out even the most basic of military operations. That said, the potential for the NSF to obtain information from the locals is huge and it is assessed that any current intelligence held is almost entirely HUMINT based.

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providing resuscitation. It was reported that a new medical facility was under construction elsewhere in Salfit.

18. Infrastructure. The buildings being used by the NSF range from poor to non-existent. The space dedicated to the NSF for rebuilding in Salfit is very small and is the only "NSF owned" site for the battalion visited. Hence the reason for the out-stations to be "squatting" on a sheep farm which was falling down and in a water tower converted to provide very basic accommodation. Conditions in all "barracks" are unsafe or unhygienic or both.

19. Barracks and other facilities need to be re-built. Plans have been drawn up for this but funding is not available. The plans were drawn up by civil engineers working in the NSF. They appear detailed and professionally produced and will be provided in English soon. The plans take into account local factors, for instance the design of a barracks is such that maximum numbers of men can be accommodated on a small site. The total cost to rebuild all the NSF barracks to modern, safe standards including living accommodation, medical facilities, cookhouses and offices was given as US \$66 million.

MISCELLANEOUS

20. Training. Takes place at the battalion locations, but there are no facilities or weapons. Drill and an organised physical training session (a road march) was observed, but looked to have been laid on for the benefit of the visit. There is a central training academy in Jericho, visited previously and although old and basic it is nonetheless working. Training facilities need to be rebuilt and equipped. It is not known if the cost for this aspect of rebuilding is included in the \$66M quoted.

CONCLUSION

21. Forward planning is better organised and further advanced than in Gaza, but the infrastructure and logistics is much worse and needs addressing from scratch. The COR provides a good Central HQ but there is no linkage to Gaza, this needs addressing to ensure command is unified.