According to international law, the detention-like conditions in al Hol camp contravene prohibitions on collective punishment, and detention during wartime must be done on a clear legal basis. Detainees have the right to challenge their captivity before a court, according to HRW.

Returning Syrian refugees to this battleground would make them the “buffer” between these warring forces, turning more vulnerable people into collateral damage of a greater geopolitical war.

The first, still best, option – repatriation of foreign nationals – is arguably a quickly closing window. Even then, questions would remain about what should happen to Iraqi and Syrian nationals, and what role the West should play in resolving their situation. But European powers must avoid taking the third option they’d been exercising by default – doing nothing, and waiting for circumstances to change.

In a region surrounded by threats – from Turkey’s attacks and Islamic State terrorism and patriarchy at home – the women of Kurdistan are fighting for their life and liberty. And the cost is hard, dangerous labor.

Alevis and Alawites are often confused or equated, but aside from a similar-sounding name – both a reference to Ali – they are very distinct. One key difference is ethnicity. Whereas Alevis are typically Turkish or ethnically Kurdish and they pray in Turkish, Alawites are Arab and, like nearly all other Muslims, pray in Arabic.

If the Kurds really want to stand up to the forces that are trying to bring them to their knees, whether it is the Syrian regime, the Turkish state or any other entity, they will have to unite. But as long as their commercial and ideological aspirations for the future of a Kurdish homeland are not aligned, they do not stand a chance.

In a matter of days, the US’ role and position in the war in Syria has been thrown into disarray, a relatively stable area of the country has turned into a battlefield, IS, which was all but eliminated, may be rallying, and Moscow and Damascus seem to be in a stronger position than they have for years. In the eight-year war in Syria, a new chapter has just begun.

Tens of thousands of people who left the city before the final battle have now returned. But life is far from easy: most of the buildings are in ruins, there is no electricity and IS sleeper cells still pose a threat. Crucially, a lack of international recognition of the city’s civilian administration is hampering reconstruction.

The kurdish mayors were not given the opportunity to contest their dismissal in court, which would likely have been fruitless anyway since the courts have lost their independence during almost two decades of AKP rule.

The difficult relationship with Kurds and the HDP is embedded in this context. As long as the CHP does not resolve this dilemma and does not replace its ideological-authoritarian canon of values with a liberal understanding of the state, nation and protection of minorities, a substantial contribution to the democratization of the country and to the solution of the Kurdish conflict cannot be expected. As a result, selective cooperation with the HDP can be expected with regard to the HDP as well. The elites of the party are still faced with the ongoing challenge of overcoming the historically developed ideological fundament of the CHP and putting it on a genuine social democratic agenda, as it partly understands itself.