The difficult relationship with Kurds and the HDP is embedded in this context. As long as the CHP does not resolve this dilemma and does not replace its ideological-authoritarian canon of values with a liberal understanding of the state, nation and protection of minorities, a substantial contribution to the democratization of the country and to the solution of the Kurdish conflict cannot be expected. As a result, selective cooperation with the HDP can be expected with regard to the HDP as well. The elites of the party are still faced with the ongoing challenge of overcoming the historically developed ideological fundament of the CHP and putting it on a genuine social democratic agenda, as it partly understands itself.

Although many ACS joined the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces in north-east Syria to fight IS, a growing number of reports point to the human rights abuses committed by the Kurdish authorities against non-Kurdish minorities, including ACS.

Given that the north and north-east of Syria are considered to be the country’s bread basket and that the burning fields in Iraq are situated in fertile Mesopotamia, this may be just the beginning of a much larger disaster.

In practice, there is no transfer of power, just a reassignment of positions among the Barzanis. With Nechirvan as president and Masrour as prime minister, the Barzani family remains firmly in charge of the KDP and the regional government.

Will breaking Ocalan’s isolation do the trick? Not in the sense that HDP supporters will suddenly vote for the AKP’s candidate. But they could feel less compelled to vote at all, which would negatively impact the CHP.

The UAVs do pose a problem for the PKK, however, since they can strike as soon as they detect a camp or group of fighters. Before the use of UAVs, fighters could go into hiding because it would take some time before an F16 could make it to the mountains from the airbase in Diyarbakir.

Trump threat and his earlier vow to stand by the Kurds despite the troop withdrawal gives Saudi Arabia and other Arab states such as the United Arab Emirates and Egypt political cover to support the Kurds as a force against Iran’s presence in Syria. It also allows the kingdom and the UAE to attempt to thwart Turkish attempts to increase its regional influence.

But the real question is, what will the Kurds do? Initially following Trump’s pull-out tweet, an SDF alliance with the regime of Bashar al-Assad and Russia seemed most likely. There were early signs of the SDF reaching out to both parties and protesting the US move. Within days, pro-al-Assad forces were reportedly moving into areas previously dominated by the SDF.

By closing its airspace to flights to and from Sulaymaniyah airport, Turkey is trying to pressure the PUK to crack down harder on the PKK in the areas of the region that it governs. However, Turkey’s definition of ‘PKK’ and ‘terrorism’ is broad.

Kavala’s continued detention perhaps signals President Erdogan’s fear of well-connected civil society figures with money to spend. Kavala’s threat surely comes from his refusal to toe President Erdogan’s line and the potential of his wealth to turn a spark of dissent into a tide of change.