Erdogan Faces Difficult Choices in Syria

Ali Noureddine

This article was translated from Arabic to English

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is gradually working toward normalizing relations with the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Erdogan aims to negotiate a deal that addresses the Syrian refugee issue and the presence of Kurdish armed groups near the Turkish border in eastern Syria.

However, the recent opposition uprising in northern Syria against Turkish forces present there has introduced significant challenges to Türkiye’s new foreign policy direction.

Erdogan faces very difficult choices. Domestically, political pressures and local interests are driving him toward normalization with the Assad regime.

Strategically, however, Erdogan recognizes that this move could jeopardize Türkiye’s relationships with armed groups and opposition forces in areas where the Turkish army is present in northern Syria. The Turkish army’s presence, as a protector of some armed opposition groups, is a key leverage point for Erdogan in negotiations with Assad.

Uprising in Northern Syria

The Syrian areas under Turkish military guardianship cover an approximately 8,835 km² area, including northern Aleppo Governorate, Idlib Governorate, and the areas of Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn in Raqqa and Hasakah.

This control followed several successive Turkish military campaigns, notably Operation “Euphrates Shield” in 2016 in northern Aleppo, Operation “Olive Branch” in Afrin in 2018, and Operation “Peace Spring” in 2019, which extended control to Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ayn. These campaigns saw Turkish expansion at the expense of the Islamic State and the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces.

Since asserting control, Türkiye has acted as a “guarantor party” for local opposition forces, handing over local administration to armed groups from the Syrian opposition, and providing these groups with arms, training and funding. Concurrently, Türkiye made agreements with the Russian army in Syria to delineate control borders between regime areas and opposition areas under Turkish tutelage.

For this reason, significant developments in northern Syria in early July 2024 presented exceptional challenges for Türkiye. The Turkish army faced a substantial uprising in areas under its control, sparked by opposition supporters and militants who were supposed to benefit from Türkiye’s “guarantees,” and its political and military protection. The legitimacy of the Turkish army’s presence in northern Syria was anchored in its declared role of protecting these “safe areas,” making the protests a serious challenge for Erdogan.

During the protests, demonstrators tore down and removed Turkish flags from in front of Turkish army positions. They attacked key headquarters from which the Turkish army conducts its operations in northern Syria, including brigade headquarters in Afrin, the Bab al-Salama border crossing and postal centers used by Turkish advisers. Social media was flooded with videos showing demonstrators confronting Turkish army patrols in the streets or at guard points.

Reasons for the Syrian Opposition’s Anger

The uprising has been linked to the racist attacks that Syrian refugees faced in Kayseri, Türkiye, a night earlier. However, the slogans raised by Syrian protesters quickly revealed that political factors played a significant role in escalating the situation in northern Syria.

These protests came in the wake of Erdogan’s statements regarding the normalization process with the Assad regime. Erdogan expressed a clear desire to develop relations with Syria, recalling his previous family-level meetings with Assad before the Syrian war and suggesting that renewed relations were possible. Erdogan also mentioned the possibility of inviting Assad to Türkiye, alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin, to reach an understanding that could restore Türkiye-Syria relations.

The Syrian opposition sensed that a deal between Erdogan and Assad was imminent and feared this could jeopardize the future of areas outside the Syrian regime’s control. They were particularly concerned that northern Syria might fall under Assad’s control, similar to the situation in Deraa under Russian-brokered deals. Thus, the protests were a rejection of the new Turkish foreign policy and a denunciation of the attacks on Syrian refugees in Kayseri.

For many, these protests were surprising due to the opposition supporters’ boldness in confronting the Turkish army, which is seen as the only guarantor against an invasion of northern Syria by the Assad regime. However, the opposition understood that Erdogan would not relinquish his control over northern Syria before a normalization settlement was reached, as this control was his primary leverage in negotiations with the Syrian regime.

The opposition also recognized that a military attack by the Assad regime could lead to a devastating war and a new wave of refugees heading to Türkiye, contradicting one of the goals of the Turkish-Syrian normalization process – addressing the refugee issue. Therefore, the opposition did not fear Erdogan abandoning his guarantees against a sudden military attack by Assad. Instead, they feared being forced to return to Assad’s regime under a political and security agreement approved by Türkiye.

Erdogan’s Internal and Strategic Calculations

Erdogan faces a challenging path toward any future settlement with Assad, which will inevitably draw the ire of the Syrian opposition. Such a settlement will likely cost Erdogan further support from conservative and Islamic Turkish circles, already discontented with his muted response to the Israeli war on the Gaza Strip. Erdogan certainly sensed this dissatisfaction during the recent local elections, which saw a rise in support for Islamist opponents like the conservative “New Welfare” Party.

However, Erdogan has local interests that push him toward a settlement with the Assad regime. Foremost among these is the issue of Syrian refugees and the need to facilitate their return. The refugee issue has gained increasing importance for Erdogan, especially in light of the nationalist opposition’s criticism of the Turkish government’s handling of the matter. This criticism has become more significant amid a decline in Erdogan’s domestic popularity and an economic crisis that has amplified anti-refugee sentiment.

Strategically, Erdogan has openly declared his goal of reaching a common understanding with the Assad regime and Russia to end the Kurdish autonomy east of the Euphrates River. For Erdogan, the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces are seen as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, posing an ideological threat that could inspire separatist ambitions among Türkiye’s Kurds.

Türkiye’s concerns were heightened when the Kurdish Autonomous Administration announced plans to hold local elections in its controlled areas, potentially leading to decentralized authorities with political legitimacy.

Erdogan’s path to normalization with Assad will be fraught with major obstacles, including the stance of the armed opposition groups controlling northern Syria. The Syrian opposition will resist to the bitter end any settlement that places them under Assad’s security authority.

Meanwhile, the Syrian regime rejects any settlement that does not lead to the withdrawal of the Turkish army from Syria and the complete handover of northern Syria to the Syrian army. Therefore, Erdogan will have to face the objections of the Syrian opposition if he wants to achieve his primary goals: addressing the refugee issue and distancing Kurdish armed groups from Türkiye’s borders.