Chronicle of the Middle East and North Africa

Israel and Hezbollah: Post-War Realities

The ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah represents a tenuous pause in hostilities, underscoring the fragile balance of power amid escalating violations and shifting geopolitical dynamics.

Israel and Hezbollah: Post-War
People look through the rubble of buildings levelled by Israeli strikes that targeted and killed Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, in the Haret Hreik neighbourhood of Beirut’s southern suburbs. AFP

Ali Noureddine

This article was translated from Arabic to English

On November 27, 2024, a ceasefire agreement between Hezbollah and Israel came into effect, marking the end of nearly two months of Israel’s extended military campaign in Lebanon. However, the deal, brokered by the United States and spearheaded by U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein, has faced significant challenges in its implementation.

Within the first week, Israeli forces were reported to have committed more than 60 violations of the ceasefire. These repeated breaches suggest a broader strategy by Israel to normalize such infractions as part of an effort to disarm Hezbollah gradually.

Details of the Agreement and Israel’s Calculations

Examining the details of the agreement and the American guarantee presented to Tel Aviv sheds light on some of Israel’s strategic moves for the next phase. The publicly announced terms of the agreement outlined the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1701, which calls for the deployment of the Lebanese army and international peacekeeping forces south of the Litani River, an area bordering Israel’s northern frontier.

Resolution 1701 also mandates that Hezbollah withdraw its military arsenal north of the river, in exchange for Israel refraining from launching any attacks across Lebanese territory.

At first glance, Lebanon had little cause for concern in the text of Resolution 1701, which was initially issued following the Israeli war on Lebanon in 2006.

However, the real danger lies in the fact that Israel secured a separate American guarantee, containing secret clauses beyond the public agreement with Lebanon. This guarantee – later leaked to the media – acknowledged Israel’s right to take action within Lebanon at any time to address perceived future threats. The document also pledged that the United States would share intelligence with Israel, including satellite imagery, to assist in dismantling Hezbollah’s weapon supply networks.

While the American guarantee paper lacks any formal legal standing under international law – as no administration can unilaterally make commitments that affect the sovereignty of another state – its significance lies in the practical implications it carries.

The United States not only chairs the committee tasked with overseeing the ceasefire agreement but also has extensive authority to coordinate with both the Lebanese army and peacekeeping forces, as well as to gather intelligence from them to ensure compliance.

A key indication of the level of U.S. involvement in southern Lebanon is the appointment of General Jasper Jeffers, a senior American officer with extensive experience in managing U.S. military interventions in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. Jeffers has been tasked with overseeing intelligence coordination, training and mentoring programs with U.S. military partners in those regions.

Israel is betting on the U.S. role in directing UNIFIL and the Lebanese army on security and intelligence matters, particularly in curbing Hezbollah’s influence in southern Lebanon. Israel is also relying on this American influence to control Lebanon’s land, sea and air crossings, and to prevent Hezbollah from acquiring weapons through coordinated efforts with the Lebanese state.

To implement this role effectively, the United States will likely increase its presence in southern Lebanon, deploying personnel specializing in security and intelligence coordination, as well as information gathering.

Another Israeli objective is to solidify the practice of daily military interventions in Lebanon, as seen during the first week of the ceasefire. This would align with the terms outlined in the American guarantee paper.

In this scenario, the Israeli military will remain poised to strike Hezbollah positions or intercept weapons shipments, should the Lebanese army or international peacekeepers fail to respond appropriately. Ongoing intelligence coordination between the United States and Israel will ensure that Israel receives timely and actionable information when needed.

Hezbollah’s Vision for the Next Stage

On the Lebanese side, the government was the party that officially approved the ceasefire agreement, following a negotiation process led by Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a close ally of Hezbollah. However, this approval would not have been issued without prior indication that Hezbollah had agreed to the terms of the agreement, facilitated through open communication channels between the party and Berri.

Hezbollah did not express concern over the American side’s guarantees, as they fell outside the scope of Lebanon’s commitments under the ceasefire agreement. Some analyses suggest that Hezbollah was aware of the potential dangers posed by the American guarantees, which could pave the way for high-level security coordination between the United States and Israel.

However, according to this view, the party was compelled to accept the “poisoned cup” in order to end the harsh Israeli assault on Lebanon and later focus on rebuilding its strength.

To counter Israel’s strategic calculations, Hezbollah sought to refocus its narrative on the strong relationship it shares with the Lebanese Army, aiming to prevent future confrontations between the army and the party. Regarding Israeli violations, Hezbollah opted to retaliate by targeting military sites in northern Israel, establishing a deterrent equation to prevent the normalization of repeated breaches of Lebanese sovereignty. The party is well aware that the stability of civilian life in northern Israel remains dependent on calm along the southern Lebanese front, which could serve as a future deterrent to Israel.

In addition to these strategic considerations, Hezbollah is focused on restoring its leadership structure following the series of assassinations that targeted its top political and military leaders. The party has also taken a pragmatic approach to domestic political affairs, signaling its intention to facilitate the election of a new president. This move likely reflects an awareness of the significant challenges the Lebanese state will face during the forthcoming reconstruction phase.

Developments in the Syrian Arena

The outcome of the war in Lebanon has significantly weakened Hezbollah’s ability to support its allies in Damascus against the opposition, as it did in earlier stages of the Syrian conflict. This shift in dynamics appears to have facilitated the recent successes of the Syrian opposition. Following the cessation of hostilities in Lebanon, the opposition launched a military campaign from its strongholds in the Aleppo countryside and Idlib.

In recent days, opposition forces seized control of Aleppo, Homs and Hama, until finally, on December 8, 2024, they captured Damascus, leading to the downfall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and his subsequent flight from the country. The Syrian army has stood down, and Hezbollah has withdrawn from Syria, abandoning its key stronghold in Qusayr – a vital area for both its influence in the country and its weapons smuggling operations into Lebanon.

The collapse of Assad’s regime has had immediate and profound consequences for Hezbollah. With the loss of Qusayr, the party’s ability to maintain its influence in Syria and sustain vital arms supply routes into Lebanon has been severely compromised. The opposition’s advances have also disrupted key arms corridors passing through Syria into the northern Bekaa Valley, a critical lifeline for Hezbollah’s weapons. Hezbollah’s withdrawal from Syria further erodes its logistical and strategic positioning in the region.

Given these rapid developments, Lebanon’s political landscape is now closely tied to the situation in Syria. With the fall of the Assad regime, Hezbollah’s ability to maneuver in Lebanon – particularly in implementing ceasefire agreements – will be increasingly constrained. This context may explain the party’s relatively cautious responses to the frequent Israeli violations, now a near-daily occurrence, despite their escalating scope and frequency.

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