The Taliban has strengthened ties with certain Middle Eastern countries, aiming for international legitimacy. However, it remains far from securing UN recognition as Afghanistan's legitimate representative.
Ali Noureddine
This article was translated from Arabic to English
Since seizing control of Kabul in May 2021, the Taliban has been able to consolidate its grip over Afghanistan’s civil and security administration, establishing itself as the de facto authority in the country.
This newfound control has led several nations, including Türkiye, Qatar, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, China and Iran, to deepen their bilateral relations with the new Islamic government.
Despite this, the Taliban has struggled to convert its domestic dominance into widespread international recognition, leading to an ongoing legitimacy crisis. This quest for international legitimacy has become a central focus of the Taliban’s foreign policy since taking power in Kabul.
The movement’s supreme leader, Hibatullah Akhundzada, underscored this objective in April 2024, declaring that the Taliban seeks “diplomatic and economic relations with all countries.”
UAE Strengthens Ties with the Taliban
The Taliban appears to have found fertile ground in the Middle East for its pursuit of international legitimacy, with several countries in the region eager to establish diplomatic relations with the movement in hopes of gaining political and economic influence in Afghanistan. This diplomatic race was highlighted by the visit of a Taliban delegation to the United Arab Emirates in June 2024.
The UAE’s reception of this delegation was not its first overture toward the Taliban, but the visit stood out for several surprising reasons. Most notably, the delegation was led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban government’s interior minister, who is one of the most wanted individuals by the United States. The U.S. has offered a reward of up to $10 million for information leading to his capture, due to his role in orchestrating attacks on U.S. interests in Afghanistan.
In this context, Abu Dhabi – a close ally of the United States – went beyond simply engaging with the Taliban’s diplomatic representatives. By welcoming one of the movement’s most powerful military and security figures, the UAE signaled a deeper level of engagement. Haqqani, a key figure in the Taliban’s old guard, represents the faction that adheres to the practices of the Islamic Emirate first established in 1996. This visit to the UAE marked Haqqani’s first public mission outside Afghanistan since the Taliban seized control.
The UAE’s commitment to this relationship was further underscored by President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan personally receiving Haqqani, rather than delegating the task to a lower-ranking official, as protocol might dictate. The meetings also involved Abdul Haq Wasiq, the head of Afghan General Intelligence under the Taliban government, highlighting the sensitive security discussions that took place.
In a significant outcome of this visit, the Taliban achieved a major diplomatic victory in August 2024 when the UAE announced it had accepted an ambassador representing the Taliban government, marking explicit diplomatic recognition of its legitimacy. The UAE became only the second country to officially accept a Taliban envoy since 2021, following China, adding symbolic and strategic importance to this step.
U.S. Tolerance Toward the UAE’s Engagement with the Taliban
In regards to the boldness shown by President Mohammed bin Zayed in receiving Sirajuddin Haqqani, the United States displayed a surprising level of flexibility and tolerance, which caught some observers off guard.
When asked about the visit, U.S. State Department spokesperson Matthew Miller merely reminded that there is a specific legal mechanism that must be followed to exempt countries like the UAE from restrictions on hosting internationally wanted individuals. This response sent an implicit signal that the U.S. does not object to the visit in principle, while also acknowledging the legal constraints surrounding Haqqani’s presence.
This American flexibility can be interpreted from several perspectives. The U.S., along with other Western nations, is not currently in a position to engage diplomatically, politically or economically with the Taliban government, given the recent violent history between the two. It is understandable that the American administration would be hesitant to quickly restore direct and close relations with an organization that seized power through a military offensive against a government recognized by the West.
Meanwhile, United Nations institutions remain concerned about the Taliban’s practices and violations since taking control of Kabul.
Given this context, Washington views the UAE as a strategic ally capable of engaging with the Taliban by establishing a network of economic and political interests with its government in Kabul. This role, also played by Qatar and Türkiye, is seen as a counterbalance to Chinese and Russian influence in Afghanistan, a country with over 21 million tons of lithium reserves in Ghazni province alone.
Lithium, a critical component in battery production for the electric vehicle industry, is at the heart of potential global trade conflicts. Afghanistan is also rich in reserves of copper, iron, gold, silver, zinc and other minerals essential for various industrial sectors, which explains China’s swift moves to engage with the Taliban.
For the U.S. administration, bin Zayed’s openness to the Taliban also serves a strategic purpose: it allows him to influence the movement’s actions and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven for jihadist elements operating across borders. These security concerns align with shared Gulf-American interests, aimed at avoiding a repeat of the Al-Qaeda model, which previously emerged in Afghanistan with Arab support and American involvement.
It is clear that Arab nations, which once facilitated the movement of “mujahideen” to Afghanistan to fight communists, now recognize the dangers associated with such ventures.
The UAE and the Taliban’s Goals for Rapprochement
Amid Washington’s pragmatic approach, the UAE views its openness to the Taliban as a strategic move to enhance its standing as a key partner to Western countries, capable of exerting influence in Afghanistan. The Emirati regime began playing this role as early as 2018, acting as a security mediator between the United States and the Taliban – a move that seemed aimed at competing with Qatar, which was also mediating at the time.
Over the following years, the UAE steadily strengthened its ties with the Taliban.
With the fall of the previous Kabul government in 2021 and the Taliban’s rise to power, the UAE saw an opportunity to position itself as a valuable ally of the West. During this period, Abu Dhabi facilitated the evacuation of Western diplomats from Kabul, along with over 28,000 Afghan citizens who had previously worked with Western agencies and organizations.
After taking control, the Taliban initially struck a deal with Türkiye and Qatar to manage Afghanistan’s airports. However, Turkish and Qatari security conditions led the Taliban to abandon the agreement, creating an opening for the UAE, which promptly secured the concession to operate the airports in May 2022. This development further cemented the UAE’s role, once again at the expense of Qatari and Turkish influence.
From the Taliban’s perspective, the UAE is an Islamic and Arab country willing to deepen political and diplomatic relations, aligning with the Taliban’s goal of gaining international legitimacy. Additionally, the Taliban aims to diversify its foreign relations to avoid becoming overly dependent on Qatari and Turkish mediation and economic interests. The airports deal is a prime example of the Taliban’s maneuvering to serve its interests without being exclusively tied to Qatar or Türkiye.
A notable aspect of the relationship between the UAE and the Taliban is Abu Dhabi’s decision to host the ousted Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani, who was overthrown by the Taliban. This move allowed the UAE to maintain leverage in its dealings with the Taliban, as the regime could influence Ghani’s political activities abroad, and the Taliban recognized the UAE’s potential to cause them discomfort by leveraging Ghani when necessary.
Qatar’s Role: Historical and Ongoing
The Taliban’s capture of Kabul in 2021 was seen as a significant victory for Qatari foreign policy, as Doha had hosted the Taliban’s political office since 2013. Between 2013 and 2021, Doha was the main hub for U.S. negotiations with the Taliban, independent of the UAE’s efforts to compete for this role. Even after Kabul fell to the Taliban, Doha remained the focal point for international discussions with the movement, particularly on issues like women’s rights and slavery.
Thus, Qatar – both before and after Kabul’s fall in 2021 – served as a lifeline which the Taliban relied on for communication with the world, even as the movement sought to reduce its political dependency on Doha.
Beyond diplomacy, the Qatar Red Crescent played a crucial role in coordinating and delivering humanitarian aid in Afghanistan, in agreement with the Taliban. The Qatari government also encouraged investments by Qatari businessmen in Afghanistan’s agriculture, mining and food security sectors.
Like the UAE, Qatar used this relationship to bolster its political influence by playing a mediation role, similar to its hosting of the political office of Hamas. Simultaneously, Doha capitalized on its financial surpluses by investing in strategic economic projects in Afghanistan, particularly in the construction sector.
Türkiye: Betting on Economic Presence
Türkiye has leveraged its close alliance with Qatar to compete for influence in Afghanistan, aiming to establish a significant presence in the country. For Türkiye, Afghanistan serves as the southern gateway to Central Asia and the Caucasus, a region that includes Turkish-speaking nations and is regarded by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as a strategic depth for his country.
Following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Türkiye initially lost the opportunity to operate Afghan airports in partnership with Qatar, as the UAE secured the concession.
However, Türkiye made a comeback by entering into major deals with the Taliban government in the electricity production sector, securing contracts that span over two decades. Turkish companies were among the first to sign such long-term agreements with the Taliban, providing the economic engagement that the movement desperately needed.
Erdogan has publicly sought to expand these economic partnerships to ensure Türkiye’s presence in Afghanistan, especially after failing to reach an agreement with the Taliban for a direct Turkish security presence in Kabul.
To further this goal, Türkiye organized a visit for Turkish businessmen to Kabul in July 2024, allowing them to explore business opportunities, assess the investment climate, and meet with senior Afghan officials.
It is worth noting that the Turkic Uzbek ethnic group constitutes about 17 per cent of Afghanistan’s population and controls large areas in the north, potentially facilitating the involvement of Turkish investors in these regions.
Iran and Security Calculations
On the other hand, security concerns dominate Iran’s relationship with the Taliban. Before the U.S. forces withdrew from Kabul, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp maintained discreet yet favorable relations with the Taliban, viewing them as a force opposing Western presence in the region.
Some Taliban fighters have even testified to receiving weapons and military training on Iranian soil before launching operations against U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
However, after the Taliban took control of Kabul, tensions quickly arose along the Iranian-Afghan border, culminating in armed clashes in 2023 over territorial disputes and water rights. Tehran became increasingly concerned about the growing instability along its border, exacerbated by the rugged terrain and the activities of smuggling gangs in the area.
Consequently, Iran has sought to deepen its relationship with the Taliban government, but primarily to manage security risks that could arise from border disturbances.
In a significant move, Iran handed over the Afghan embassy in Tehran to Taliban representatives in 2023, formalizing the relationship between the two countries. The Taliban viewed this as an achievement in their quest for legitimacy and international recognition.
As a result, the Taliban has made significant strides in strengthening its relationships with certain Middle Eastern countries, advancing its goal of gaining international legitimacy.
However, the movement is still far from achieving its most critical objective: recognition as the legitimate representative of Afghanistan in the United Nations. This recognition remains contingent on the Taliban lifting restrictions on women’s education and forming a more inclusive government that represents political segments beyond the movement.