Chronicle of the Middle East and North Africa

Türkiye and its BRICS Bid: Strategic Shift or Tactical Maneuver?

Türkiye's bid to join BRICS represents a strategic move aimed at expanding its global alliances while leveraging its position with Western partners.

Türkiye and BRICS Bid
Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the 10th BRICS summit. Gianluigi GUERCIA / POOL / AFP

Ali Noureddine

This article was translated from Arabic to English

In a surprising geopolitical move, Türkiye applied for BRICS membership in September 2024, catching both the European Union and its NATO allies off guard. The BRICS summit, scheduled for October 22-24, 2024, is expected to address the application formally, according to Russian presidential aide Yuri Ushakov.

Türkiye isn’t the first country in the Middle East region to take such a step. In August 2023, BRICS officially extended an invitation to six new members, including Middle Eastern nations such as Egypt, Iran, the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. However, what makes Turkey’s request exceptional is that it is the first country among NATO members, and among candidates for European Union membership, to head in this direction.

Radical Shift or Western Disillusionment?

Many see Türkiye’s bid as a response to its long-stalled efforts to join the European Union, compounded by frustrations over economic and geopolitical ties with the West. In fact, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself made sure to highlight his country’s futile attempt to join the European Union since its candidacy for membership in 2005, a candidacy that remains pending to this day. He went as far as to accuse critics of Türkiye’s BRICS bid of being the same forces that have “kept us waiting at the door of the European Union for years.”

This has sparked speculation that Erdogan’s decision signals that Türkiye is pivoting toward the East in pursuit of long-term strategic alignment. This theory gains traction when considering the economic influence of BRICS, whose member states account for 34.92 per cent of the global economy as of 2024, surpassing the G7’s 30.05 per cent. Türkiye’s engagement with BRICS presents a potential avenue to pursue its economic interests independent of Western influence.

Adding weight to this shift are Erdogan’s domestic and foreign policies, which often conflict with the frameworks imposed by NATO and the EU. While the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) leans toward socially conservative policies, Erdoğan insists on maintaining warm relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, without fully aligning with NATO’s stance on Russia.

BRICS offers a more adaptable geopolitical space for Erdogan, free from the conditions that NATO or the EU impose on member states. Its membership spans countries with diverse, and sometimes conflicting, foreign policy agendas – such as China and India – making it a flexible platform for a nation like Türkiye, whose alliances are in constant flux.

However, Türkiye’s disillusionment with the West extends beyond its stalled EU candidacy. The country’s relationship with NATO and the United States has also frayed, especially after being excluded from the U.S. F-35 fighter jet program in 2019 due to its acquisition of the Russian S-400 defense system. Erdogan has also voiced frustrations over increased U.S. military support for Greece, a fellow NATO member with which Türkiye has longstanding territorial disputes.

Given this backdrop, Russia was supportive of Türkiye’s BRICS bid, seeing it as a potential step toward a “multipolar world,” a vision espoused by Putin. This explains why Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov quickly and warmly welcomed the Turkish move, in a way that suggests Russia’s support for Turkey’s membership bid. On the other hand, the European Union has voiced “concern” over Türkiye’s BRICS ambitions, underscoring its continued status as an EU membership candidate.

Erdogan’s Maneuvers with Western Partners

Contrary to overly optimistic interpretations of Erdogan’s BRICS bid, a more realistic analysis suggests that Türkiye may be using this step as a strategic maneuver to gain leverage in its relationships with Western partners.

Rather than genuinely turning eastward out of frustration with the West, Erdogan appears to be showcasing Türkiye’s alternatives to put pressure on the United States and the European Union. His goal, it seems, is to resolve issues with these partners, not sever ties. One key issue Erdogan aims to address is Türkiye’s stalled European Union membership candidacy.

Erdogan’s statements following the submission of Türkiye’s BRICS membership application indeed suggest such a direction. He stated that the discussions about Türkiye “shifting its orientation” toward the East are baseless, affirming that his country “is naturally oriented toward the West,” but with the doors open “to opportunities with all entities and actors.”

With these words, Erdogan positioned the BRICS membership request as part of a strategy to diversify Türkiye’s foreign relations, avoiding placing all its options in one basket, which in turn gives Turkey greater negotiating power on the international stage.

What confirms this reality is the nature of the BRICS group, which cannot compensate Türkiye for the benefits it could gain from joining the European Union. Unlike the European Union, BRICS does not constitute an economic bloc with a common market, unified currency, or coordinated monetary policies. Its New Development Bank, while supportive of infrastructure projects, pales in comparison to the economic benefits and support the EU offers its members.

Erdogan’s past dealings with NATO illustrate his strategic approach. Türkiye has never seriously considered leaving NATO or abandoning its partnership with the U.S., despite moments of tension. Erdogan has historically used such moments to extract concessions, as seen when Türkiye temporarily blocked Sweden’s NATO membership, only to lift its objections following U.S. approval of a sale of F-16 fighter jets to Türkiye.

Simply put, Türkiye has never shown a serious intention to leave the NATO umbrella or the strategic partnership with the United States, but rather always seeks to negotiate its position in the equation. Similarly, Türkiye’s relationship with Russia has been marked by calculated diplomacy; Ankara has maintained ties with Moscow without crossing American red lines, often acting as a mediator between the two powers.

In summary, Türkiye’s pursuit of BRICS membership may lead to economic gains, but it is unlikely to signal a decisive break from the West. Instead, Erdogan is likely aiming to strengthen his position in foreign policy negotiations by exploring alternative economic partnerships, ensuring Türkiye is not overly reliant on its relationship with the European Union.

Concerns and Gains Linked to Türkiye’s Request

In practical terms, Russia’s interest in facilitating Türkiye’s accession to BRICS is understandable, given the size of the economic partnerships between the two sides, especially in the energy sector. While BRICS plans to create a non-dollar payment system, free from U.S. hegemony, it is natural for Russia to seek to include its trade with Türkiye in this system. In return, Türkiye is expected to seek to benefit from the projects and loans of the New Development Bank, affiliated with BRICS, to finance its expanding infrastructure projects.

In contrast to these expected gains, all indications are that China views Türkiye’s application for membership with suspicion. More specifically, China believes that Türkiye’s entry into BRICS could strengthen Moscow’s influence within the group’s institutions, at the expense of Beijing, given Erdogan’s close relationship with Putin. At the same time, China does not look with satisfaction at the accession of a NATO member to BRICS, especially since it does not have an exceptionally reassuring relationship with Ankara, unlike Moscow.

In any case, the upcoming BRICS summit is supposed to resolve this internal debate. Not accepting the Turkish request, or postponing the decision on it, may be a possibility, given Beijing’s concerns and the lack of consensus on this step. It is known that the BRICS group has previously ignored the requests of several countries to join for similar reasons, such as the case of Algeria, which was denied membership due to Russia’s concerns about its foreign policies.

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