Iraq's decision to delay the withdrawal of U.S. military presence reflects a complex balance between internal political pressures and regional dynamics.
Ali Noureddine
This article was translated from Arabic to English
In August 2024, Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad al-Hussein announced the postponement of the scheduled end of the U.S.-led international coalition’s mission in Iraq, citing “recent developments in the region.”
However, he did not clarify how these developments were connected to the decision. This marked a significant shift from the Iraqi government’s earlier stance, set in January 2024, which outlined a timetable for ending the coalition’s military mission and withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq.
This reversal also represented a departure from the promises made by Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani earlier in 2024, where he emphasized Iraq’s intent to negotiate a “rapid and orderly withdrawal” of U.S.-led forces.
Additionally, it postponed the implementation of a January 2020 Iraqi parliamentary resolution that required the government to cancel its request for international coalition assistance following the completion of the mission against ISIS.
The Iraqi Government and Internal Balancing
Around two weeks after this postponement, U.S. Central Command announced in late August 2024 that its forces had conducted a joint raid with Iraqi security forces against ISIS elements in the country.
The timing of this operation was seen as an attempt to suggest that the continued presence of U.S. forces in Iraq was now tied to the resurgence of the ISIS threat, rather than internal political considerations in Iraq or external regional events. It’s noteworthy that the limited scope of the operation would have allowed Iraqi forces to execute it independently, without U.S. support.
The decision to delay the withdrawal of international coalition forces was the result of joint U.S.-Iraqi understandings within a high-level committee formed to review the withdrawal timetable. Therefore, it is evident that the Iraqi government had its internal political reasons for agreeing to this delay, despite the embarrassment caused by retreating from the planned U.S. withdrawal.
The Iraqi government’s position is primarily influenced by the attacks launched by Iranian-aligned Iraqi armed groups on U.S. bases in Iraq since the onset of the Israeli war on Gaza in October 2023. Any U.S. withdrawal under these circumstances could be perceived as a military defeat for the United States in Iraq, which would conflict with the interests of the Iraqi government – especially on the economic front, where maintaining close relations with Washington is crucial even after the withdrawal.
Iraqi officials are particularly concerned about potential financial crises in the event Iraq’s international financial transactions are exposed to future disruptions, especially given that the country’s general budget heavily relies on oil export revenues, denominated in U.S. dollars. For this reason, the Iraqi government is committed to maintaining a balanced relationship with both the United States and Tehran.
In reality, the government of al-Sudani is a product of the intersection between U.S. and Iranian influence within Iraq. Although the “Coordination Framework” coalition that formed this government includes Tehran’s closest Shiite allies in Iraq, including some factions of the Popular Mobilization Forces, the government has prioritized “organizing the relationship” with Washington and securing its support.
Implicitly, some coalition members have sought to balance Iranian influence in Iraq by fostering a strong relationship with the United States, to prevent Iraq from falling entirely under Iranian control.
Outside the “Coordination Framework,” the U.S. military presence has long been viewed as a guarantee for Kurdish and Sunni communities, which fear the expansion of Iranian influence within Iraq. This concern explains, for example, the absence of Sunni and Kurdish representatives from the February 2024 Iraqi parliamentary session dedicated to discussing the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq.
Consequently, al-Sudani’s government appears determined not to exacerbate the concerns of these local communities through an abrupt and disorganized U.S. withdrawal.
Following the decision to postpone the withdrawal, al-Sudani’s adviser, Diaa al-Nasiri, stated that Iraq no longer needed coalition forces on its territory. However, al-Nasiri indicated that the attacks on Ain al-Asad base had led to the postponement of the withdrawal announcement, revealing that al-Sudani had engaged in mediation with local armed factions to halt these attacks.
Al-Nasiri’s statements confirm that the delay in the withdrawal was intended to ensure a dignified and organized exit for U.S. forces from Iraq, without destabilizing internal political balances or Iraq’s foreign policy.
The United States and Regional Considerations
The U.S. administration does not seem eager to end its military presence in Iraq at this particular juncture. Notably, the number of U.S. forces in Iraq has decreased to 2,500 troops, down from more than 5,000 when ISIS controlled large parts of Iraq in 2014. The remaining U.S. forces are now confined to two bases in predominantly Sunni and Kurdish areas, following the closure of seven military bases in other provinces.
Currently, Washington views its presence in Iraq as strategically important in countering Tehran, which supports armed groups along the axis extending from Tehran to Beirut, passing through Baghdad and Damascus. The escalation of regional tensions between Tehran and Washington during the ongoing Israeli war on Gaza has heightened the U.S. administration’s focus on Iraq.
The United States maintains for the same purpose a similar military presence in eastern and southern Syria, where it supports local Arab and Kurdish armed groups to control areas surrounding its military bases.
In this context, Iran-aligned Iraqi armed groups’ insistence on pushing for an accelerated U.S. withdrawal from Iraq is understandable. These groups view the anticipated withdrawal as a step that would gradually reduce U.S. political and economic influence in Baghdad, thereby benefiting them. Some of these groups, such as Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, continue to threaten intensified military operations against U.S. bases to force Washington to end coalition operations.
The United States recognizes that it cannot indefinitely delay its withdrawal from Iraq, especially given the lack of Iraqi consensus on the continuation of coalition operations. As a result, the U.S. administration has been negotiating a package of defense and security partnership agreements with Baghdad which could eventually replace the need for a direct military presence in Iraq.
This situation is reminiscent of the “Strategic Framework Agreement” that Iraq signed with the United States in 2008, and which later led to the first U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. A similar agreement could achieve the goals of some local Iraqi parties who seek to maintain a minimum level of U.S. influence as a counterbalance to Iranian influence via armed factions.
However, the details of the new agreement have not yet been finalized. It seems that the U.S. administration prefers to postpone negotiations until after the ongoing war in Gaza, to avoid relinquishing its presence in Iraq amid current regional tensions.
Furthermore, significant developments on this issue are unlikely before the U.S. presidential elections in November 2024 and the subsequent formulation of the new administration’s Middle East strategy, including its approach to the regional confrontation with Tehran.