The PMF’s future is likely to serve as a test for Iraq's ability to assert its sovereignty and navigate competing influences in the Middle East.

Ali Noureddine
This article was translated from Arabic to English
The future of the Popular Mobilization Forces has become a focal point in Iraqi political discourse, especially following recent statements by Iraq’s highest Shiite authority, Ali al-Sistani. Sistani has called for limiting weapons to state control and eliminating all forms of foreign interference.
These statements are widely interpreted as a direct critique of the PMF, an umbrella organization comprising armed groups that operate outside Iraq’s regular army and security forces. Some factions within the PMF are known for their ideological allegiance or political ties to Tehran.
Sistani’s remarks carry particular weight given his role in issuing the historic fatwa in 2014 that led to the establishment of the PMF to combat ISIS’s expansion in Iraq. However, the current debate surrounding the PMF’s future must also be viewed within the broader context of shifting dynamics in the Middle East.
Iran’s regional influence has waned in recent years, and many Iraqi political factions are increasingly wary of their country becoming the last battleground for Tehran’s defense of its interests, potentially at the expense of Iraq’s internal stability.
External Pressures on the Iraqi Government
The discussion about dissolving the Popular Mobilization Forces gained significant traction in December 2024 with statements from Ibrahim al-Sumaidaie, an adviser to the Iraqi prime minister. Al-Sumaidaie explicitly declared that “the duality of the state and the resistance will end” and asserted that political decisions are “capable of resolving this issue.”
He attributed this stance to mounting international and regional pressures advocating for the disarmament of armed factions and the consolidation of all weapons under state control.
While al-Sumaidaie did not specify the international actors involved, Mukhtar al-Moussawi, a member of the parliamentary Security and Defense Committee, previously acknowledged U.S. pressure on Iraq to address this issue and dissolve the PMF.
Additionally, government sources confirmed that Washington had threatened to withdraw support for Iraq’s political regime if Tehran continued using Iraqi territory for security provocations or military operations.
Regional pressures, as noted by al-Sumaidaie, likely stem from the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Turkiye. These nations view non-state factions capable of acting in Tehran’s interest as a significant threat, given that such groups can engage in security or military activities without Iran directly bearing responsibility.
Saudi Arabia, in particular, has taken a hard-line stance, historically labeling these forces as “a sectarian organization led by Iranian officers.” Riyadh has also tied its financial support for Iraq to the dismantling of these groups.
The Iraqi government faces a delicate balancing act in managing these external pressures. The United States wields substantial influence, given its control over Iraq’s dollar reserves held in American banks.
Iraq’s reliance on these reserves is critical, as oil revenues – accounting for over 85 per cent of the national budget – are denominated in U.S. dollars. Intermittent cash crises, exacerbated by U.S. restrictions on dollar transactions, have underscored this dependency.
Simultaneously, Iraq must address the concerns of Turkiye and the Gulf Cooperation Council states, which are vital investment partners for revitalizing its economy. Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has emphasized transforming Iraq into a regional hub for goods and energy transport between the Gulf and Turkiye.
This vision hinges on attracting Gulf and Turkish investments to develop large-scale infrastructure projects designed to compete with a parallel Iranian initiative aimed at similar goals.
Consequential Regional Shifts
Recent regional shifts in the Middle East have compelled Iraqi Shiite political forces to reassess the role of the Popular Mobilization Forces within Iraq’s internal political landscape.
The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 marked a decisive turning point, permanently removing the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp and its allies from Syria. This event effectively dismantled Iran’s strategic “axis” extending from Tehran to the Mediterranean via Damascus, a corridor critical for the transfer of weapons to Hezbollah.
Many observers view this as the collapse of the axis itself, underscoring the centrality of Damascus in Iran’s regional ambitions.
Before Damascus fell to the Syrian opposition, Israel’s war on Lebanon disrupted Hezbollah’s arms supply lines between Syria and Lebanon. Following the war, a cease-fire agreement between the sides mandated Hezbollah’s withdrawal beyond the Litani River and introduced strict measures to control Lebanon’s border crossings, effectively preventing weapons transfers.
These developments marked a significant setback for Tehran’s influence, diminishing its capacity to shape the regional landscape.
Against this backdrop, many Iraqi political forces have grown increasingly concerned about Tehran’s potential attempts to compensate for its losses in Syria and Lebanon by intensifying its involvement in Iraq.
While most Iraqi Shiite political factions maintain amicable relations with Iran, they are equally cautious about entangling Iraq in regional conflicts that serve Tehran’s interests but could jeopardize Baghdad’s relationships with Washington or Riyadh.
This sentiment became evident during the Syrian opposition’s advance toward Damascus. Despite pleas from the Assad regime for support from the PMF, Iraqi political consensus firmly opposed the involvement of Iraqi forces in Syria. Unlike earlier stages of the Syrian civil war, Iraqi authorities prevented the flow of fighters into Syria, effectively thwarting Tehran’s efforts to mobilize its Iraqi allies to defend Assad.
The Coordination Framework, a coalition of influential Shiite forces within Iraq’s government, exemplifies the delicate balancing act in Iraq’s foreign policy. Although some coalition members are aligned with Tehran, the government seeks to maintain equilibrium between its relationships with Iran, the West, and Arab states.
Many within the coalition advocate for a foreign policy that is amicable toward Iran while limiting Iranian interference in Iraq’s internal affairs and ensuring that non-state weapons do not remain a tool of leverage for Tehran.
Prominent Shiite opposition leader Muqtada al-Sadr has been vocal in resisting Iran’s influence in Iraq. Similarly, Kurdish and Sunni political factions exhibit heightened sensitivity to Iranian meddling, particularly concerning the presence of IRGC-linked factions within the Popular Mobilization Forces.
Differences within the Popular Mobilization Forces
The Popular Mobilization Forces represent a diverse coalition of factions with varying ideological orientations and priorities. Approximately half of the PMF’s Shiite factions are aligned with local political and religious authorities, maintaining no direct ties to Tehran or its strategic objectives.
Moreover, about one-third of the PMF’s fighters hail from Iraq’s Sunni minority or other religious communities, who similarly lack ideological connections to Iran. These segments of the PMF could potentially be addressed through political decisions or religious endorsements, particularly from figures like Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
The primary challenge, however, lies in addressing the “loyalist factions” within the PMF – those ideologically and politically aligned with Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
These groups have shown little willingness to compromise on their role and future. This rigidity was underscored by a statement from Abu Alaa Al-Walaei, secretary-general of the Sayyed al-Shuhada Brigades, a PMF faction, who declared that the PMF is “a solution to what has no solution, and no solution to it.”
His remarks alluded to the deep-seated conflict that must be resolved before the issue of “weapons outside state control” in Iraq can be effectively addressed.
It remains uncertain whether the PMF will be dissolved or integrated into the Iraqi army in the near future, given the political complexities surrounding the issue.
What is clear, however, is that the Iraqi government possesses the tools to confront the matter if it musters the political will. The PMF’s survival is closely tied to Iraq’s general budget, which finances its operations. While Iran-aligned factions within the PMF are well-organized and equipped, they lack broad political support, both among Iraq’s general populace and within the broader PMF coalition itself.