Algeria and Russia are keen to preserve their partnership, including joint military exercises and trade and investment agreements despite all their differences.
Ali Noureddine
This article was translated from Arabic to English
Since President Abdelmadjid Tebboune assumed office in late 2019, Algeria has pursued a balanced foreign policy, emphasizing diversified partnerships. The country has generally maintained a pragmatic and stable relationship with the West, particularly concerning energy agreements.
However, this relationship has occasionally been strained by disputes with the European Union and France. Conversely, Algeria has strengthened its longstanding partnerships with Russia and China, which have deep historical roots dating back to Algeria’s struggle against colonialism.
The strategic relationship between Russia and Algeria, originating during the Soviet era, has continued through various historical periods, grounded in mutual economic, military and political interests. Nevertheless, recent disagreements have emerged between the two nations, primarily concerning Russia’s military involvement in African countries.
Russian foreign policy in Africa has increasingly intersected with Algerian security interests, especially in Libya and the African Sahel region.
Signs and Symptoms of the Emerging Dispute
In July 2024, Algeria hosted the speaker of the Russian State Duma, Vyacheslav Viktorovich Volodin, on a visit intended to thaw relations between the two countries. It was notable and unusual that the head of Russia’s legislative authority took on this diplomatic task, typically the purview of the Russian foreign minister or members of the executive branch.
This unexpected approach highlighted the underlying tensions between the two nations. The discord began in August 2023 when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov angered the Algerian regime by excluding Algeria from BRICS membership. Lavrov justified the selection of new members by citing specific criteria for BRICS expansion, including “the weight and prestige of the country and its positions on the international scene,” implying that Algeria did not meet these standards.
Algeria felt bitter and resentful over Russia’s lack of support for its BRICS membership bid. This exclusion was particularly disappointing for Tebboune, who had earlier promised his people that Algeria would join BRICS in 2023, relying on the country’s historic and strong ties with Russia and China. The situation was exacerbated by BRICS accepting countries more aligned with the West, such as Argentina, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, making Algeria’s exclusion seem even more puzzling.
The Algerian regime perceived political motivations behind the exclusion, likely linked to differences between Russia and Algeria over regional issues in North Africa and the Sahel. Lavrov’s comments about “weight and prestige” confirmed these suspicions, suggesting that Algeria’s exclusion was influenced by the emerging disputes between the two countries.
Divergence over the Libyan Conflict
In all discussions regarding the Libyan conflict, Algeria has consistently advocated for the withdrawal of foreign armed groups, particularly the Russian “Wagner” group. This stance is rooted in the Algerian regime’s negative view of these groups, which it sees as obstacles to achieving political solutions and ending the ongoing civil war. Algeria’s priority has centered on initiating a peace process leading to the establishment of new, legitimate Libyan institutions to unify the country’s existing authorities.
Algeria’s position is driven by concerns over the impact of the Libyan crisis on its national security, particularly the influx of refugees across its eastern borders and the activity of cross-border armed groups.
Consequently, Algeria has engaged in numerous initiatives to find political settlements in Libya and has declared its support for the government of Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh in Tripoli. Algerian foreign policy has frequently criticized “foreign interference” that exacerbates local divisions, referring to countries backing local armed groups, including Russia and Turkiye.
These priorities starkly contrast with the Russian approach. The Wagner group is a key supporter of Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, who leads rebel forces against the Libyan government and political institutions in the east.
In return for Russia’s support, Wagner and Russian companies gained rights to invest in several oil fields in eastern Libya. This partnership has allowed Russia to expand its influence in North Africa, often at the expense of Western countries’ influence.
The contradictions between Algeria and Russia in Libya peaked in the summer of 2021, when Haftar attempted to expand into western Libya and close the border with Algeria. This escalation occurred shortly after Tebboune highlighted Algeria’s role in preventing Tripoli from falling to Haftar. Haftar’s actions confirmed the Tebboune regime’s fears about the security crises in Libya, especially concerning the activities of irregular armed groups opposing constitutional institutions.
Algeria’s primary concern with the Russian approach is the tendency of armed groups allied with Wagner to coordinate across multiple countries. For instance, Haftar’s forces have played a role in supporting the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan and intervened in armed activities in Chad.
Therefore, Algeria is understandably worried about the expansion of these armed groups, which could intersect with separatist movements and tribal groups present in southern Algeria, turning the issue into a national security crisis for the Algerian army.
Contradictions on Mali Unrest
The ongoing unrest in Mali highlights a significant point of contention between Russian and Algerian foreign policies. Algeria played a crucial role in mediating the peace agreement signed in 2015 between the former Malian government and Tuareg rebels in the north. This agreement had established a minimum level of stability between Mali’s regular forces and the Northern Region residents aspiring for autonomy.
However, the 2020 coup in Mali radically altered the situation. The new military authorities quickly reverted to a military approach against the Tuareg separatists, causing alarm in Algeria, which feared renewed conflict near its southern borders. This led to increased tensions and distance between the Malian junta and the Algerian authorities, which warned against the return of civil war in northern Mali.
At this juncture, Russia intervened through the Wagner Group. With the cessation of French support, which had previously aided Mali’s regular army, Wagner became the primary supporter of the army’s activities in the north, in exchange for access to Mali’s natural resources. Algeria viewed this Russian intervention as destabilizing, especially since it contradicted prior agreements aimed at quelling tensions in the north.
As a result, Algeria officially referred to Wagner’s activities in Mali as those of “international mercenaries” and publicly demanded Wagner’s withdrawal and the cessation of Russian support for military actions against Tuareg separatists. Politically, Algeria condemned foreign militias profiting from Africa’s wealth instead of investing in development.
In July 2024, Tuareg militants announced they had killed and wounded dozens of Wagner operatives and Malian government soldiers in an ambush targeting their advance into separatist areas. This occurred after days of intense and unprecedented clashes near the Algerian border, confirming the Tebboune regime’s fears of the peace agreement being abandoned and Mali returning to a military solution with Russian support.
Strategic Relationship Despite Disputes
It is important to note that these differences have not significantly impacted the strategic relationship between Algeria and Russia, which is still anchored in mutual interests. Russia remains the primary supplier of arms to the Algerian military, accounting for 72.63 per cent of its arms imports, including military aircraft, tanks, and missiles.
Consequently, Algeria relies heavily on Russian military technology to maintain and upgrade its equipment and secure necessary spare parts.
Conversely, Algeria is Russia’s third-largest arms buyer, highlighting the partnership’s importance for Russian President Vladimir Putin, especially amid economic sanctions imposed on Russia. Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Algeria has maintained a neutral and balanced stance, even voting against the United Nations General Assembly resolution that called for suspending Russia’s membership in the Human Rights Council in April 2022.
Both countries are keen to preserve their existing cooperation frameworks, including joint military exercises and trade and investment agreements. Algeria is particularly focused on maintaining its foreign policy openness to the East to mitigate Western pressures while continuing partnerships and cooperation with Western countries.
This approach aligns with Algeria’s historical non-aligned policy. However, this does not eliminate tensions and disagreements with historical partners like Russia, especially on issues impacting Algeria’s national security, contributing to the current coolness in Russian-Algerian relations.