Chinese diplomacy in the Middle East has evolved from a traditionally restrained approach to a more proactive role, particularly since 2023.
Ali Noureddine
This article was translated from Arabic to English
Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, China has been known for its ambitious economic and investment projects, aligning with its interests as a major industrial power reliant on exports.
However, Chinese diplomacy and foreign policy, particularly in the Middle East, have traditionally been characterized by restraint and a low-profile approach, avoiding loud political interference.
China has often been criticized for its relatively modest political influence in the Middle East, which seemed disproportionate to its significant economic interests in the region. This suggested an opportunity for China to play a more active political role.
However, since 2023, Chinese foreign policy appears to be shifting toward a more assertive and impactful role in the Middle East. This shift is evident in China’s efforts to mediate ongoing conflicts, take clearer stances on regional issues and engage in meaningful interventions to influence their outcomes.
This change aligns with the directives of the 20th National Congress of the ruling Communist Party in 2022, which emphasized a more proactive approach in Chinese foreign policy.
New Roles and Interventions in the Middle East
On March 10, 2023, China surprised the world with the success of its mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, leading to a joint statement by the three countries announcing reconciliation between the two Middle Eastern powers. This outcome was the result of five days of discussions in Beijing, closely overseen by Chinese President Xi Jinping.
As a result, Saudi Arabia and Iran restored diplomatic relations and reactivated communication and negotiation channels on several political issues, seven years after their relations had been severed.
China was widely credited for this significant diplomatic achievement, which marked the beginning of a new era of relations between the two sides of the Arabian Gulf. This success was largely attributed to Xi Jinping’s focus on regional issues, following his visit to Saudi Arabia three months prior to the mediation.
That visit witnessed the signing of economic and investment agreements worth $29.26 billion between China and Saudi Arabia. Xi also took the opportunity to hold two summits – one Gulf-Chinese and one Arab-Chinese – to further strengthen ties.
In November 2023, coinciding with China’s presidency of the U.N. Security Council, Beijing’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted discussions with a joint delegation representing the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the League of Arab States. The aim was to position China to take a stand on the Israeli war in the Gaza Strip and to develop an effective intervention in the conflict.
These discussions led to the release of a Chinese position paper in early December 2023, in which Beijing outlined its vision for resolving the conflict. The paper proposed holding a new international peace conference in the Middle East to develop a roadmap for a two-state solution, under U.N. auspices and based on the 1967 borders. The paper also included urgent proposals on ceasefire mechanisms in Gaza, the protection of civilians, humanitarian aid and the role of the Security Council in diplomatic mediation.
Following the release of this paper, China began diplomatic efforts to facilitate its implementation, starting with the need for political consensus and unity among Palestinian factions. This effort culminated in the “Beijing Declaration” in July 2024, sponsored by China and signed by 14 Palestinian factions, including Hamas and Fatah. The declaration saw these factions agree to form a national reconciliation government, aiming to unify Palestinian political decisions and facilitate negotiations for a unified state in line with U.N. resolutions.
To ensure Arab consensus on this initiative, China organized the “Arab-Chinese Cooperation Forum” in late May 2024, with official participation from the League of Arab States and its members. The forum’s resolutions on the war in Gaza aligned with the contents of the Chinese position paper, which were later formalized in the “Beijing Declaration” signed by the Palestinian factions.
Strengths of Chinese Interventions
Based on this, it is expected that China will build on the achievements of the “Beijing Declaration” and the decisions from the “Arab-Chinese Cooperation Forum” to negotiate toward holding a new international peace conference to end the war. China will likely aim to establish itself as a key international mediator and sponsor of this conference, working alongside other regional and global players.
This approach contrasts with previous peace conferences, which were heavily dominated by the United States as the main international mediator.
While it is too early to predict the success of China’s diplomatic efforts in the region, we can identify the strengths that China is leveraging to enhance its new initiatives in the Middle East.
Since the 1990s, China has abandoned the strict ideological rhetoric of spreading communism and supporting socialist movements globally. This shift has reduced the caution many conservative regimes, including Arab monarchies, once had about China’s role and interventions. As a result, China is now better positioned to build pragmatic relationships in the Middle East compared to the Cold War era.
At the same time, Israel’s war on Gaza has widened the gap between the aspirations of Arab and Islamic populations and the roles played by some Western countries in support of Israel. China seeks to position itself as a more pragmatic and balanced mediator compared to the United States and its Western allies. Crucially, China’s approach does not conflict with the strategies of certain Arab regimes that support normalization with Israel or the two-state solution.
In this context, China has the potential to bridge gaps with parties and movements that have lost faith in Western involvement, including groups like Hamas and countries such as Iran and Syria. Simultaneously, it can earn the trust of nations and movements seeking more peaceful and pragmatic solutions, such as some Gulf states and the Fatah movement. The success of the “Beijing Declaration” and the “Arab-Chinese Cooperation Forum” can be seen in this light.
China’s significant advantage over Western nations lies in its historical record – unlike Western powers, China has not engaged in colonialism, direct military interventions or occupations in the Middle East. This lack of a colonial past reduces sensitivities that could hinder its role or any initiatives it might undertake. Moreover, China is likely to parallel its diplomatic efforts with its growing economic influence in the Middle East, fueled by its increasing investments in the region.
Limits and objectives of the Chinese Role
On the other hand, China’s new role in the region is constrained by several factors. Unlike the United States, China lacks the leverage to impose its options on key players like Israel. This limits its ability to broker comprehensive deals that could end the current conflict, as outlined in China’s position paper.
Additionally, China does not have a military presence in the Arabian Gulf, unlike the U.S., which restricts its ability to offer defense guarantees to the Gulf states in exchange for political agreements.
Due to these limitations, there are questions about the viability of China’s proposed roadmap for the region unless there is positive cooperation with other international players, particularly the United States.
This also explains why Chinese officials have repeatedly emphasized that they do not seek to fill any vacuum in the region, nor to replace the American role in the Middle East. Instead, China seems to be carving out a unique role or space for itself without directly challenging traditional American spheres of influence.
In this context, it’s important to recognize that China’s interest in the region is driven by clear, strategic interests. Chinese industries rely on oil from the Arabian Gulf to meet about half of their energy needs, making their energy security closely tied to the stability of the Middle East.
Simply put, the stability of Beijing’s oil supply chains hinges on the stability of the region and avoiding scenarios of widespread conflict that could disrupt energy flows.
In addition, China is acutely aware of the strategic importance of the Middle East’s geographical location, which has a significant impact on international maritime trade routes. This is particularly sensitive for China, as it is deeply concerned with the security of its export corridors from East Asia to Europe and North America.
Beyond these concerns, China is also invested in the safety of its substantial investments in the Middle East and North Africa, which exceeded $318 billion between 2005 and 2023.
Thus, China’s political interest in the region is a direct reflection of its clearly defined strategic interests. The scope of this interest aligns with the limits of China’s role, especially when compared to the influence of the United States and other major regional players.
However, despite these constraints, many Arab powers and Middle Eastern countries, including U.S. allies, see value in China playing a role in diversifying political relations and achieving a measure of balance in the region. This does not imply abandoning existing partnerships with the West or replacing them, but rather complementing them with a more balanced approach.