The complexities of the Syrian-Turkish normalisation naturally lead to questions about the mutual conditions each side will set before finalising any agreement.
Ali Noureddine
This article was translated from Arabic to English
The reconciliation and normalisation project between Ankara and Damascus has emerged as a top priority for both countries, with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan showing a keen interest in advancing this agenda.
The ongoing negotiations are notably driven by effective Russian mediation, with apparent U.S. tolerance or indifference, and are further fueled by strong enthusiasm from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Qatar, however, has chosen to distance itself somewhat from the process, while Iran has offered a formal yet cautious endorsement, amid concerns that these developments may adversely impact its interests in Syria.
The complexities surrounding the negotiations between Syria and Türkiye naturally lead to questions about the mutual conditions each side will set before finalising any agreement on reconciliation.
Moreover, the involvement of prominent regional and international players raises further questions about the broader geopolitical interests motivating the push for Turkish-Syrian normalisation.
Damascus’s Goals and Conditions: Legitimacy, Sovereignty and Strategic Balances
The objectives and interests of Damascus in its reconciliation with Ankara are relatively straightforward, shedding light on the conditions Assad is likely to set before finalising any agreement.
First and foremost, Assad’s regime seeks to reestablish its legitimacy by restoring diplomatic ties and ending the political isolation caused by the Syrian conflict. In recent years, Syria has made concerted efforts to normalise relations with several countries that once supported the Syrian revolution, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Any normalisation with Türkiye would similarly represent formal recognition of Assad’s regime, implicitly ending the pursuit of its removal.
However, Syria’s approach to reconciliation with Türkiye involves more than just diplomatic recognition. Assad expects Erdogan to formally acknowledge Syrian sovereignty over its territory, in line with international law. This expectation was underscored in a July 2024 statement from Syria’s Foreign Ministry, which linked any initiative to normalise ties with Türkiye to the withdrawal of “illegally stationed forces” from Syrian land. In the same month, Assad himself indicated that restoring relations with Türkiye hinges on “requirements imposed by international law.”
One of Assad’s primary conditions is the withdrawal of Turkish forces from northern Syria and the reintegration of these areas under the control of Damascus. This would effectively dismantle the current frameworks of self-rule in northern Syria, which Türkiye and allied Syrian armed groups support. The regime’s overarching goal is to reunify Syrian territory under its central control, a key objective in the ongoing negotiations with Ankara.
In parallel, the Assad regime shares a mutual interest with Türkiye in addressing the situation posed by the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in eastern Syria. The regime seeks to reintegrate those regions under its direct authority, eliminating the potential for separatist movements. Erdogan, on the other hand, views the Kurdish forces as a threat to Türkiye’s national security, considering them an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has long fought for autonomy within Türkiye.
In this context, Damascus hopes to collaborate with Ankara on security measures aimed at ending Kurdish control east of the Euphrates River. Assad counts on his Russian allies to help achieve this goal, while Ankara is expected to apply political pressure on its allies in Washington. The SDF currently benefits from direct American military and financial support, bolstered by the presence of U.S. military bases in their territories.
Furthermore, analysts believe that Damascus is seeking to diversify its security and economic partnerships, aiming to reduce the influence of Tehran-backed armed groups within Syria. Although Damascus maintains a strategic alliance with Iran, the Assad regime is wary of falling entirely under Iranian control, which would effectively transform Syria into a proxy zone for Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corp. Over the past years, Syria has relied heavily on Russian military support to counterbalance Tehran’s growing influence in regime-held areas.
Recent developments suggest that Assad is working to distance Syria from Iran’s more aggressive regional agenda.
For example, Damascus has largely kept the Golan Heights front neutral in the face of confrontations between Iran-backed armed groups and Israel, particularly since the eruption of the Gaza conflict. Syrian state media has covered Tehran’s military operations with noticeable restraint, signalling Damascus’s reluctance to allow its territory to be part of Iran’s broader military strategy. This stance reflects Assad’s desire to maintain a degree of independence from Tehran, which carries significant political implications for Syria’s future relations.
Türkiye: Concerns of the Displaced and the Kurds
Türkiye appears open to the idea of withdrawing its forces from Syria in the future, as indicated by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who has been mediating between the two sides since September 2024.
However, Türkiye will likely impose certain conditions to ensure the safety of the local armed groups that have cooperated with it in northern Syria. These security guarantees could be achieved through a series of local reconciliations between the Syrian regime and opposition forces – a process in which Russia has prior experience, as demonstrated by its mediation in the reconciliation of Syria’s Daraa region.
At the forefront of Türkiye’s concerns in the normalisation process with Damascus is the coordination needed to eliminate the threat posed by Kurdish militants along its border in eastern Syria. As previously mentioned, this objective aligns with the interests of both Damascus and Ankara.
However, realising this shared goal requires navigating a complex web of security and political challenges. This is why Ankara has insisted on first addressing unresolved issues through intelligence-level talks before advancing to direct political negotiations.
Another key objective for Türkiye is addressing the Syrian refugee crisis, which has of late become a contentious political issue domestically. Erdogan seeks a political win that he can present to the Turkish public, especially if he reaches an agreement with the Syrian regime that facilitates the return of some of the Syrian refugees currently residing in Türkiye. This would help Erdogan counter the political pressure from the Turkish opposition, which has increasingly criticised his handling of the refugee situation.
Complex Regional Calculations
The positions of international and regional actors on the Syrian-Turkish reconciliation process are largely shaped by their involvement in the Syrian conflict. Russia, which has played a military role in the conflict alongside the Assad regime, appears keen to mediate and facilitate normalisation between Syria and Türkiye.
This stance reflects Ankara’s and Moscow’s mutual interests on several international fronts, and a successful reconciliation could deepen their partnership within Syria. Such a development would enhance Russia’s influence in the country through direct cooperation with both Ankara and Damascus, enabling Moscow to play a more active role in resolving outstanding issues.
On the other hand, the United States has publicly stated that it does not support normalisation without a comprehensive political solution to the Syrian crisis. However, Washington has not taken any decisive actions to obstruct the process, signalling a degree of tolerance or flexibility regarding Ankara’s moves in Syria. This mirrors the U.S. position on the normalisation agreements between the Syrian regime and its Gulf allies.
This tolerance likely stems from Washington’s understanding of the current dynamics in Syria. The U.S. appears to recognise Assad’s efforts to reduce his reliance on Iran and to open up politically, economically, and in terms of security to other regional actors.
This aligns with the broader goals of the U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Türkiye, which do not want to see the region from Tehran to Beirut fall entirely under Iranian influence. This shared concern helps explain Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s enthusiasm for the ongoing talks between Damascus and Ankara. Saudi Arabia has even publicly engaged with Türkiye at the ministerial level to lend political support to this process.
Iran’s position, while cautious, is equally telling. The Iranian regime has adopted a reserved stance, quietly supporting the Syrian-Turkish normalisation without displaying open enthusiasm. Leaked Iranian documents from July 2024 revealed Tehran’s concerns about being sidelined in the talks between Ankara and Damascus. Iranian officials are particularly wary of Türkiye taking the lead in Syrian reconstruction efforts and refugee returns, which could diminish Tehran’s political and economic influence in Syria.
One notable absence from the reconciliation scene is Qatar, Türkiye’s traditional partner on many Middle Eastern issues. Unlike other Gulf states, Qatar has neither moved to restore ties with Syria nor sought to challenge Iranian influence in regime-controlled areas. It appears that Qatar is intentionally avoiding involvement in this process, perhaps to steer clear of potential conflicts over influence that could jeopardise its interests in other regional matters.
While the positions of both Syria and Türkiye are becoming clearer and their interests are converging in some areas, the path to a full settlement will likely require prolonged negotiations.
Complex issues, such as Türkiye’s withdrawal from northern Syria, the Kurdish militant presence on Türkiye’s border, and the return of Syrian refugees, are deeply intertwined with political variables that cannot be easily resolved in the short term. However, it is possible that both parties will agree on basic principles or find common ground in the coming months, paving the way for negotiations on the more difficult issues.