After Assad's fall, the effectiveness of the new government in managing internal challenges and foreign relations will shape Syria's future and the broader trajectory of the Middle East.
Ali Noureddine
This article was translated from Arabic to English
The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 has triggered a seismic political shift across the Middle East, with the region now navigating the profound changes reshaping the balance of power among its key players. The repercussions of this pivotal event are already proving to extend far beyond Syria, impacting the broader regional landscape.
One of the most notable outcomes is the ascendancy of Türkiye and Qatar, after the two allied nations’ long-standing support for the Syrian opposition has now paid off, positioning them as major influencers in the region.
Conversely, Iran and its allied armed groups find themselves completely ousted from the Syrian arena, casting serious doubts on their ability to revive the arms supply routes that once linked them to Lebanon.
Meanwhile, Russia’s military presence has significantly contracted, retreating toward the Syrian coastal regions. In contrast, Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which had normalized and reconciled with the Assad regime in recent years, are now adopting a wait-and-see approach as the political scene evolves.
The Future of Türkiye’s Influence
The recent developments in Syria underscore the pivotal role Türkiye has played in shaping the conflict’s trajectory, particularly through its long-term support of the armed Syrian opposition and by allowing it to maintain its control over northern Syria.
The ability of the opposition to prepare for its latest operations and ultimately topple the Assad regime can be largely attributed to the military infrastructure it built in northern Syria, a process facilitated by Turkish training and support. Türkiye’s enforcement of red lines in these areas ensured the regime and its allies were unable to regain control.
Türkiye’s involvement dates back to 2017, with the establishment of the Syrian National Army in the Aleppo countryside, coinciding with the expansion of Turkish-controlled territory in northern Syria.
By 2018, Türkiye’s efforts also extended to Idlib, where the Turkish army played a significant role in unifying opposition factions under the National Liberation Front. Meanwhile, Turkish intelligence maintained ties with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, which remained a dominant force in Idlib.
Central to these efforts was Hakan Fidan, a key figure in Turkish strategy. As director of the Turkish General Intelligence Service until 2023, Fidan facilitated the integration of civilian institutions in northern Syria with their Turkish counterparts and oversaw Ankara’s relations with Syrian armed opposition groups.
Now serving as Türkiye’s foreign minister, Fidan continues to influence Syria’s political landscape, leveraging his deep connections and expertise.
Fidan remains at the helm of Türkiye’s Syria policy within President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government, leveraging his deep-rooted relationships in Syria and his expertise in navigating its complex local dynamics. Following the Syrian opposition’s capture of Damascus with Ankara’s support, Fidan has articulated Türkiye’s priorities in Syria with increased confidence.
Chief among these is the objective of eradicating the influence of the Kurdish-majority Syrian Democratic Forces in eastern Syria, a goal that underscores Ankara’s strategic focus in the region.
Expected Presence of Qatar and the United States
Following the recent developments, Türkiye’s growing confidence is unsurprising, especially as the new authorities in Damascus now rely on Ankara’s support to rebuild Syrian state institutions, as Erdogan himself has emphasized.
However, Türkiye’s aspirations to neutralize the Syrian Democratic Forces face a significant hurdle in the form of the military presence that the U.S. maintains in eastern Syria, where Washington continues to back the SDF militarily and politically.
In addition to Türkiye, Qatar emerges as a key beneficiary of the Assad regime’s downfall and the opposition’s control of Damascus. Unlike other Gulf states, Qatar consistently refused to normalize relations with the Assad regime, citing its lack of commitment to a political solution for the Syrian crisis. Throughout this period, Qatar maintained strong ties with the Syrian opposition, providing direct support and funding, including Qatari investments in northern Syria.
As a result, many analyses predict that Türkiye, Qatar and the United States will wield the greatest influence within Syria, with Ankara playing the lead role. While Qatar’s exceptional capacity for investment and financial support positions it as a vital player in the transitional phase, Türkiye’s economic ambitions focus on fostering trade and industrial integration between Aleppo and southern Türkiye, further cementing its influence in the region.
Iran and Russia are the Biggest Losers
Iran and Russia are emerging as the most significant losers in the wake of recent developments in Syria. Since 2013, Iran had established a robust military presence in Syria, deploying forces from the IRGC and allied Shiite militias from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Over time, this military support allowed Tehran to secure lucrative investments in Syria’s energy, mining, and industrial sectors, directly benefiting from its alliance with the Assad regime. However, the regime’s reliance on Iranian support to resist opposition forces over the years has now been rendered moot with the regime’s downfall.
At the onset of the armed Syrian opposition’s offensive that ultimately toppled the Assad regime, Tehran quickly assessed the situation and recognized the frailty of the regular Syrian army.
In stark contrast, the opposition group “Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham” displayed exceptional preparation and coordination. Given this disparity, Iran opted not to commit significant resources or sacrifices to bolster Assad’s forces, a stance explicitly endorsed by the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.
Years of economic and financial challenges had eroded the Syrian army’s morale and fighting spirit, leaving it ill-prepared for sustained conflict.
Iran’s retreat from the battle in Syria was driven by several key factors. The IRGC’s bases in Syria had recently been targeted by Israel, which sought to disrupt the arms supply chains to Hezbollah. Additionally, Hezbollah itself, weakened by the aftermath of the Israeli war on Lebanon, was unable to provide the same level of support to the Assad regime that it had in the past decade.
Faced with these challenges, Iran decided to withdraw its forces and those of its allied militias from Syria, ahead of the fall of Damascus to the armed Syrian opposition. The departure of Assad marked the loss of the strategic foothold Iran had established in Syria, and now it is left waiting for the restoration of diplomatic ties with Damascus.
Iran’s primary concern is now the disruption of its arms supply chains to Hezbollah, which had relied on irregular crossings between Lebanon and Syria.
Russian President Vladimir Putin, preoccupied with the war in Ukraine, avoided committing additional ground troops to support Assad as the opposition advanced on Damascus.
Russian forces have since retreated to their military base in Tartus and are gradually evacuating by sea. Like Iran, Russia seems set to withdraw militarily from Syria, awaiting the reorganization of relations with the new government in Damascus.
Some Arab countries Cautioned against the Fall of Assad
Some Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Jordan, have expressed caution about the fall of Assad, likely fearing that these developments could reignite political Islamist opposition movements within their own borders.
These countries have been careful to support the Syrian people’s right to self-determination, but without any overt optimism regarding the end of the Assad regime. In recent years, they had been working to normalize relations with Assad, even pushing for his re-entry into the Arab League, in an effort to prevent Syria from aligning fully with Tehran’s axis.
The fall of Assad is set to reshape the balance of influence among key players in the Middle East.
However, much of the regional impact will depend on the nature of Syria’s transitional phase and how effectively the new authorities manage the evolving situation. It remains unclear how the new government will define its foreign policy and how it will navigate relationships with neighboring countries.